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φi i-th entry of φ
φi i-th vector of angles (polar coordinates)
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Introduction
"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers,  
you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot 
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind: it  
may be the beginning of knowledge,  but you have scarcely,  in your thoughts,  
advanced to the stage of science." –William Thomson, 1st Lord Kelvin [48].
Every structure can suffer a localized Damage because of some unforeseen event. This localized 
Damage can either remain confined or spread up to a final wider extent. The latter case is 
commonly known as Progressive Collapse.
Of course, Progressive Collapse is not desirable. Thus, for over forty years building regulations 
have been asking to avoid or limit this phenomenon, and several mitigation techniques have been 
identified. Yet research on Progressive Collapse mitigation is still in a primordial state.
When designing for other types of Hazard (such as for example earthquake or wind), us designers 
usually follow some established methodologies: we get information about the characteristics of the 
Hazard; we choose the characteristics of the structure to be made, such as material types and 
element dimensions; we make a model of the structure, and with this model we calculate some 
parameters. By comparing these parameters with parameters derived from the Hazard, we can 
assess if the structure is to be deemed verified. In modern design methods, “verified” usually means 
that the probability of occurrence of some unwanted events (such for example a building collapsing 
under an earthquake) is lower than an acceptability value.
With Progressive Collapse a similar procedure still does not exist. We still don't have reliable and 
practical methods to quantify the propensity to Progressive Collapse of a given structure, as well as 
to quantify an acceptable level of this propensity. In other words, we have the tools to mitigate, but 
we still don't have a reliable methodology to decide if and how much we need to apply them. In the 
words of Lord Kelvin, our knowledge is “of a meager and unsatisfactory kind”.
The present work is an attempt to solve this problem by incorporating Progressive Collapse in a 
probabilistic Risk Framework. 
The motivations and the target of the present work are presented and discussed in section 5.1.
The first part of the work (chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) provides information useful to understand what 
the problem consists of, as well as to better understand the approach proposed to solve it.
The second part (chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) presents the proposed approach, test applications of it and 
ideas for further developments.
More in detail:
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of Progressive Collapse, lists the characteristics that are desirable 
in a structure in order to mitigate this phenomenon, and lists causes of Collapse, subdivided in 
categories. Furthermore, it describes and analyzes some of the most important case studies.
Chapter 2 lists and explains the strategies that have been devised for Progressive Collapse 
mitigation and lists some of the most significant regulations about this subject, explaining how they 
evolved.
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Chapter 3 lists and analyzes several ideas that have been proposed for parameters to quantify the 
propensity to Progressive Collapse of structures and elaborates on the reasons why no building code 
has adopted any of these methodologies yet.
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of Risk. It describes the probabilistic Risk management 
framework developed by the University of Braunschweig, whose concepts are used in this work, 
and points out some aspects of the adopted nomenclature.
Chapter 5 proposes two methodologies to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity of frame 
structures, which basically consist in incorporating this phenomenon in a probabilistic Risk 
framework. First, the motivations to the development of these methodologies and the targets they 
aim to are explained. Then, the basic ideas and the details of how the methodologies can actually be 
implemented are described.
Chapter 6 presents some test applications of the first proposed methodology. It includes the 
description of the used structural models and of how the single elements of the framework are 
implemented. Examples of analyses are presented.
It is pointed out that the main target of the performed analyses is not the testing of the modeled 
structures, but the testing of the algorithms used for the analyses, to study the the feasibility of the 
proposed approaches, to find out their problems, and to debug the implemented algorithms.
Chapter 7 summarizes the entire work and presents its conclusions.
Chapter 8 lists several aspects that need to be further considered to improve the proposed 
methodologies. Other ideas that might be developed are also described.
The conclusions of the work are presented in section 7.2.
No particular evidence was found to prove that the proposed target is impossible to reach through 
the adopted approach. It is concluded that the present work represents the first steps towards the 
achievement of the proposed target, and that the developed methodologies are to be considered as 
prototypes that need further improvement to actually be usable.
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Chapter 1 - What is Progressive Collapse
This chapter reports information useful to understand the problem this work is about, as well as to 
better understand other parts of the work.
Section 1.1 gives a definition of Progressive Collapse and elaborates on it.
Section 1.2 lists the characteristics that are desirable in a structure in order to reduce the chances of 
occurrence of Progressive Collapse, or to mitigate its intensity.
Section 1.3 lists causes of Collapses, subdivided in categories.
Section 1.4 describes and analyzes some of the most important case studies of Progressive Collapse, 
as well as a significant case in which an initial Damage did not evolve in a Collapse; references to 
characteristics and causes listed in sections 1.2 and 1.3 are given.
Section 1.5 summarizes the chapter and elaborates on aspects that will be useful in the rest of the 
work.
1.1 Definition of Progressive Collapse
Several slightly different definitions of the expression “Progressive Collapse” have been 
formulated. One of the most used is given by the US Standard ASCE 7 [6]: “Progressive Collapse 
is defined as the spread of an initial local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in  
the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it”.
The common feature of all the definitions is that an initial Damage that is limited in space 
progresses up to a bigger final extent. The underlying idea is that the initial Damage is provoked by 
some traumatic event (such e.g. an explosion, a collision or a localized deterioration) while the extra 
Damage is not directly due to the traumatic event, but due to the inability of the wounded structure 
to bear its loads.
Thus, in a Progressive Collapse two stages can be identified.
In the first one, the structure undergoes a traumatic event and suffers some local Damage. The local 
Damage is the direct effect of the traumatic event, so in this phase the effect is considered 
proportionate to the cause.
In the second stage the Damage progresses up to a final wider extent. This second type of Damage 
is an indirect effect of the traumatic event.
The total Losses due to the traumatic event are the sum of those due to the direct and indirect 
effects. In some cases the indirect effects are much bigger than the direct effects; thus, a relatively 
small traumatic event can potentially lead to relatively big Losses. Since the possibility of 
occurrence of a local Damage cannot be completely avoided, it is desirable to limit the indirect 
effects.
One flaw that has been highlighted (for example in section 2.1 of [35]) is that most definitions of 
Progressive Collapse include the terms “disproportionately” or “disproportionate”, which makes 
them ambiguous. While these terms express an important aspect of the idea of Progressive Collapse, 
there is not general consensus on when a Damage is to be considered “disproportionate”, so the 
same Collapse could be subjectively considered Progressive or not. Furthermore, this ambiguity 
does not make clear what are the targets to pursue in Progressive Collapse mitigation.
The ambiguity has led to some debate. For example, according to some Authors (section 2.4 of 
[35]) the Murrah Building Collapse (which is thoroughly described in section 1.4.3 of the present 
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script) does not comply with the definition given by ASCE 7, even though in literature it is 
generally presented as one of the most significant examples of Progressive Collapse.
In the present work the question of what is “disproportionate” is not addressed. Instead, the target is 
to estimate if the consequences of the events are acceptable or not, independently from the ratio 
between indirect and direct consequences. This is done by incorporating Progressive Collapse in a 
probabilistic Risk framework.
Referring again to the Murrah Building Collapse, in the Writer's opinion the important thing to 
consider is that about 80% of the 168 victims, which were not directly due to the explosion, could 
have been be avoided [40], regardless of the chosen nomenclature.
1.2 Opposing Progressive Collapse
In order to reduce the chances of occurrence of Progressive Collapse, or to mitigate its intensity, 
some characteristics are desirable in a structure.
Resistance is the ability of a body or a material of not breaking under loading.
Stability is the property of a system of being able to withstand an arbitrary limited perturbation with 
a limited variation of its state. In the present context, we are referring to the static equilibrium 
stability of a given structure.
Ductility is the ability of a body or a solid material to endure permanent deformations without 
breaking. The permanent deformations usually compromise the functionality of a structure, but they 
allow energy dissipation; thus ductility is generally considered a desirable quality, especially in 
seismic design. Historically, ductility began to be considered only after the adoption of structural 
steel and reinforced concrete in the nineteenth century, because the natural materials that have been 
used for thousands of years (mainly wood and stone) don't have this quality.
In the present context, Redundancy is the quality of a structure to be able to sustain its loads in more 
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Figure 1.1: Three examples of structures that suffered localized traumatic events, with different outcomes.  
The building on the left suffered direct Damage from an explosion; the building in the center partially 
collapsed because of a car impact; the structure on the right completely collapsed during construction 
due to inadequate bracing (Source: [4]).
than one way, i.e. to convey its loads to the ground through multiple load paths. According to M. 
Levy and M. Salvadori [22] “redundancy must be considered a necessary quality in every big 
structure or in every structure whose collapse can cause major damage or loss of human lives” and 
“all structural collapses can be considered as due to the lack of redundancy”. Before the Ronan 
Point disaster (which is described in section 1.4.1 of the present script) few building codes included 
prescriptions for redundancy, even though its utility was known (like in the case of Eads Bridge, 
described in section 1.4.5).
There is generally consensus about the fact that structural safety also depends on accuracy of design 
and construction of structural details.
Furthermore, compartmentalization is the technique of subdividing a structure in parts, or 
“compartments”, and apply means to avoid the transmission of the Damage from one compartment 
to the other. This is generally achieved by disconnecting each compartment from the others or, more 
rarely, by strategically making some parts of the structure very resistant. In the first case, if a 
compartment gets damaged, in the worst case scenario the entire compartment collapses, but the 
other ones are not affected because they are not connected to it. In the second case, if some Damage 
ensues, the Damage should reach the reinforced parts and stop. Figure 1.2 depicts a case in which 
compartmentalization by disconnection was used in the design of a long bridge.
It must be observed that redundancy and compartmentalization by disconnection are considered 
antithetical, in that the first requires a high level of connection and the second requires strategically 
designed disconnections.
In general, compartmentalization is more suitable for structures with a prevalent horizontal 
extension, in which providing multiple load paths (i.e., providing redundancy) is difficult or not 
5
Figure 1.2: The Confederation Bridge in Prince Edward Island, Canada, is a post-tensioned prestressed 
concrete bridge composed of 43 spans, each 250m long. It was inaugurated in 1997. It was designed with 
structural “fuses”, to allow the maximum Collapse of two and a half spans in case of one structural 
element failure. The idea to apply complementation arose by observing that in 1992 a similar bridge in  
Seoul, Korea suffered a Progressive Collapse in which the prestressing cables ripped the concrete decks 
for a total of eleven spans. (Sources: www.confederationbridge.com; [46]).
possible at all. Compared to redundancy, compartmentalization might require the sacrifice of an 
entire compartment to save the rest of the structure (like in the example of figure 1.2), while in the 
best case scenario a redundant structure is able to suffer a localized Damage without any spreading 
of it (like in the case of figure 1.1, left). However, in general a highly connected structure is not 
automatically a redundant structure. If the parts that surround a damaged area are not able to bear 
the increased loads, they can be “dragged down” by it. Thus, in some cases a high level of 
connection can be a disadvantage.
1.3 What prompts a Collapse
When a Collapse happens, it is usually due to a concurrence of causes. In many cases it is possible 
to recognize a main cause and/or prompting event (usually this is done with investigations in legal 
actions). These causes can be subdivided in categories, as listed next.
During the design phase:
– models not adequate to the physical system actually built (like in the example of figure 1.3);
– wrong design. This condition 
happens when the used models are 
adequate, but are applied in the 
wrong way or there are big 
calculation errors;
– not consideration of some loads.
During the construction phase
– bad workmanship;
– low quality materials, compared to 
those specified in the design;
– differences between the design and 
what is actually built.
During use:
– loads unforeseen in the design 
phase. In this category are generally 
included exceptional loads like 
impacts and explosions, but also 
cases of misuse of a structure such 
as buildings improperly used as 
storehouses, in which excessive 
loads are imposed;
– materials deterioration (corrosion, 
fire);
– bad maintenance or modifications to the structure.
Structural Collapse can also happen during construction or demolition phases, thus it is often 
necessary to “design” and “verify” these phases, too.
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Figure 1.3: The C.W. Post College dome was located in Long 
Island, New York, USA. It was 51m in diameter. Its structure 
consisted in steel parallels, meridians and x-shaped braces  
arranged in alternate meridian sectors. It collapsed in the early 
morning of the 21st of January, 1978; the prompting event was 
an asymmetrical accumulation of ice and snow, which caused 
the progressive buckling (a form of instability) of the steel  
elements. The subsequent investigations found out that the  
structure had been designed with a too simplified theory, which 
had the hypotheses of isotropic materials and symmetrical  
vertical loads; an asymmetrical vertical load, of about one 
quarter of the considered design load, would have been enough 
to prompt a Collapse. (Source: [22]).
1.4 Case studies
This section reports five important cases of Progressive Collapse, as well as a meaningful case in 
which an initial Damage did not result in Collapse. Each Collapse case is described and analyzed, 
and their consequences (in terms of research and building codes implementation) are reported. At 
the end of the chapter, the most important aspects of the cases are summarized and discussed.
1.4.1 The Ronan Point Tower
On the 16th of May 1968, at 5:45 AM, an explosion occurred at the eighteenth floor of the building 
denominated Ronan Point Tower, located in Canning Town, England. This prompted a chain-like 
Collapse, which damaged all 22 stories of the building, causing the death of 4 people. This episode 
made history; following it the expression “Progressive Collapse” was invented, and research begun 
aimed at preventing it or at mitigating its effects.
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Figure 1.4: The Collapse of the Ambiance Plaza in Bridgeport, Connecticut, USA, is probably the most  
famous case of Progressive Collapse during construction. The structure was supposed to become a 
sixteen-story apartment building. Its construction technique, called “lift-slab”, consisted in casting the  
reinforced concrete floor slabs on the ground and then lift and anchor them to the steel columns.
On the 23rd of April, 1987, several slabs collapsed progressively one on the other, causing the death of  
28 workers. The most likely prompting event was the failure of a lifting device. (Source: NIST).
Figure 1.5: The Ronan Point Tower and its Collapse mechanism. (Sources: NIST, www.imacleod.com).
Description
The tower was built between 1966 and 1968 and was part of a group of nine twin buildings. The 
floor plan was rectangular and repeated identically on every floor. The towers were built using a 
new (at the time) pre-casting system, which had the advantage of being fast and economical. The 
system was composed of reinforced concrete panels, each extended as an entire room, for walls and 
floor slabs. It required that the connections between the panels were to be filled with mortar, but 
without additional metal ties.
Analysis
The explosion was prompted by a gas leak on the eighteenth floor. The investigations concluded 
that one external vertical panel, which had both structural and separation functions, was expelled by 
the overpressure caused by the explosion. The panels located above the expelled one, lacking 
support for their weight, started to fall. When they hit the elements of the seventeenth floor, the 
acquired kinetic energy was enough to break them. The same thing happened on all the underlying 
floors.
One surprising fact is that, according to the investigations, the wall panel from which the Collapse 
started did not break; instead, it was expelled from its housing. The woman who caused the 
explosion while trying to turn on her stove was thrown towards the inside of the building and 
survived. Since she did not suffer permanent ear damage, it was concluded that the pressure of the 
explosion had to be less than 0.07N/mm2, which is roughly equivalent to the pressure 3m 
underwater. Experimental tests showed that 0.02N/mm2 would have been enough to expel that 
particular panel; if the explosion had happened at a lower floor, the friction with the surrounding 
elements could have retained the panel.
The structure was an ideal candidate for a Progressive Collapse: its connections were fragile; the 
capability to absorb energy by deformation (ductility) was lacking; it had no capability to 
redistribute its loads after a local Damage (redundancy); its size was considerable and its 
conformation was primarily vertical.
Consequences
The inquiry report of the Ronan Point disaster highlighted the need to improve building regulations 
in order to prevent similar events. Consequently, in November 1968 the first UK regulation that 
directly addressed Progressive Collapse was issued (“Flats Constructed with Precast Concrete 
Panels. Appraisal and Strengthening of Existing High Blocks; Design of New Blocks” by the UK 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government). Previously, the regulations of some countries had 
included generic prescriptions that Collapse “like a house of cards” must be avoided, but Ronan 
Point gave a strong impulse to the legislators. In a short period of time the building regulations of 
all the most advanced countries were modified to include prescriptions, more or less explicit, to 
contrast the phenomenon. (The evolution of building regulations is thoroughly described in section 
2.2 of the present script.)
The immediate consequence of the Ronan Point Collapse was the interruption of gas distribution in 
all similarly designed structures. The damaged part of the building was rebuilt with reinforced 
connections. In 1984, after some cracks in the walls appeared, the building was evacuated; in 1986 
its demolition begun. The building was disassembled piece by piece to assess the quality of 
construction, which resulted quite poor. In particular, the connections between the precast elements, 
instead of being filled with mortar, were partially empty or filled with waste material. Consequently 
many similar buildings were deemed insecure and demolished.
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1.4.2 The Hyatt Regency Walkways
On the 17th of July 1981, at 7:05PM, two walkways located in the lobby of the Hyatt Regency 
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri (USA) collapsed causing the death of 114 people and injuring 180. 
This was the event that provoked the highest number of victims because of a structural failure in the 
USA.
The investigations highlighted numerous flaws, both in the design and in the construction phases. 
These were especially attributed to the adopted scheduling method, which was called “fast track”. It 
allowed to start the construction of the building before the entire design phase was completed; thus 
several details could be designed concurrently to the construction process.
Description and analysis
The main building of the Hotel is 35 story high, houses the 750 rooms and is topped by a revolving 
panoramic restaurant. At a distance of 36.6m is located a “functional block”, i.e. a 4 story building 
that houses restaurants, meeting rooms and other functions. Between the two buildings is located 
the main lobby. To allow transit between the two buildings at the second, third and fourth floors a 
system of walkways was designed. The initial idea was to build the walkways on columns; lately it 
was decided to hang them from the 
ceiling, for a better visual effect. 
The second and fourth floor 
walkways were located one above 
the other, while the walkway at the 
third floor was offset and parallel 
to the other ones.
The total span was subdivided into 
four parts, each about 9m long. 
One extremity of the walkways 
was fixed to the floor system of the 
functional block, while the other 
extremity was connected to the 
floor system of the main building 
trough slotted plates, to allow 
expansion movements. The 
intermediate supports were held by 
couples of hangers rods connected 
to a roof structure.
The design of the walkways changed 
several times, after the construction had 
already started, as a consequence of the 
adopted “fast track” method. The design 
consisted in two W16x26 longitudinal 
beams (i.e., beams with a “double T” 
transverse section) topped by a metal 
deck and a lightweight concrete slab 
(figure 1.7).
Transverse beams connected the 
longitudinal beams and transferred the 
loads to the hanger rods.
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Figure 1.6: (Left) The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel. The low 
white building in the foreground is the functional block.
(Right) The original walkways in the main lobby.
(Sources: crowncenter.hyatt.com, [22]).
Figure 1.7: Transverse section of the walkways. On the left side  
is represented the first design; on the right side is represented 
the second design, which was built. (Source: [33]).
In the original design, the transverse beams were W8x10 (“double T” shaped; shown on the left of 
figure 1.7); later they were replaced with rectangular box shapes, obtained by welding flange to 
flange two “C-shaped” MC8x8.5 profiles (figure 1.7, right). 
Figure 1.8b is the original drawing of the detail of the connection between the transverse beam and 
the hanger rod. According to the common practice at the time, the fact that the load on the hanger 
rod (22kips) is reported in the drawing indicates that the drawing is not definitive. The drawing also 
reports the yielding stress of the steel 
Fy, because the type of material had 
changed from the previous design. 
Figure 1.8c is the detail drawn by a 
draftsman for the documents of the 
contract. This time the information 
about the load and the material type, 
which implicitly suggest that the detail 
has not yet been designed, is not 
indicated.
Later, the contractor that was building 
the walkways asked the project manager 
to change the detail of the hanger rod 
connections upper walkway. The 
original idea was to use continuous steel 
bars, from the ceiling to the lower 
walkway. To facilitate construction, the 
contractor asked if they could be made 
discontinuous and offset at the fourth 
floor. The project manager made a quick 
flexural and shear verification of the 
box beam, while at the phone with the 
contractor. He considered the new 
solution acceptable and told the 
contractor to submit the request through 
the channels of authority; this was not 
actually made.
A few days later the contractor pulled the job out of his engineering department to make work for 
another large project. The partially completed shop drawings were sent to an outside engineering 
company to be completed. The outside engineering company received the drawing shown in figure 
1.8d. They assumed that the detail had already been designed, and only added the notation for welds 
to be added to keep the profiles together during shipping and erection.
The project manager, who was the only one to know the evolution of the design of the walkways, 
was busy and under pressure because the owner wanted the construction to be completed as fast as 
possible. It must be highlighted that the walkways were considered relatively unimportant, 
compared to the rest of the Hotel. Thus, the review of the definitive drawings was carried out by a 
co-worker of the project manager, who did not notice the error in the connection.
On the 14th of October 1979, when construction was completed but the hotel was not yet open to 
the public, one walkway partially collapsed. No one was hurt. The investigations found that the 
connections of the walkways with the buildings were poorly made and were not in compliance with 
the design. The Authorities ordered a control of the connections between walkways and buildings, 
but not of those with the hanger rods. Instead, it was discovered that the truss structure of the 
ceiling, from which the walkways were hanging, was at risk of sudden buckling, thus it had to be 
10
Figure 1.8: Drawings of the transverse beam/hanger rod 
connection, at different design stages.(Source: [28]).
modified.
Finally, in July 1980 the hotel was inaugurated.
One year later, in July 1981, one of the fourth floor hanger rod connections failed. This happened 
while a musical group was playing in the lobby, and the connection failure was probably prompted 
by the people on the walkway moving at the rhythm of the music. The connection failure basically 
consisted in the pulling of a rod through its connection because of the high stresses concentrated on 
one face of the box beam. After the first failure the loads redistributed on the other connections, 
which in turn failed progressively. The hanger rods holding the fourth floor walkway remained 
connected to the ceiling, while the second and fourth floor walkways fell together on the lobby 
floor.
The investigations that followed concluded that the connections had always worked close to their 
ultimate limit state, even without live loads. In the the connections with the hanger rods, the stress 
level in the lower flange of the beam box was so high that plastic deformations had already 
occurred with dead loads only. By modeling the connection with finite elements it was concluded 
that a simple plate between the box beam and the washer at the end of the bar would have avoided 
the initiating failure.
The investigations ascertained some facts:
– the connection that failed had never been designed. The project manager thought that the 
contractor would have designed it, as it was common practice, because he had reported in his 
drawing the force to withstand. Because of a copying mistake, the contractor did not receive this 
information;
– as a consequence, the connections between hanger rods and box beams did not meet the existing 
requirements;
– the walkways collapsed under very low live loads, compared to those required by the local 
regulations;
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Figure 1.9: The main lobby after the Collapse and detail of the failed connection.
(Drawing source: [22]; pictures source: unknown).
– modifying the connection detail from one continuous bar to two offset bars doubled the contact 
stress between the lower surface of the box beam at the fourth floor and the washer at the end of 
the bar;
– the new solution also doubled the 
shear load on a short span of the 
box beams at the fourth floor 
(picture 1.10b). This was deemed 
not determinant for the Collapse. 
However, if the hanger rods 
connecting the fourth floor 
walkway to the ceiling had been 
placed internally, the maximum 
shear would not have been 
doubled (figure 1.10c);
– material quality and workmanship 
did not have a determinant role in 
prompting the Collapse;
– in any case, even if the 
connections had been properly 
designed, the overall system 
lacked redundancy and ductility, 
thus it was not capable to contrast 
or limit Progressive Collapse in 
the case of a connection failure.
Consequences
Several legal actions followed the Hyatt Regency Hotel Collapse. From several testimonies of 
experts in court, it emerged that the expression “standard practice” did not have an unequivocal 
meaning. As a consequence, in the following years several new regulations were issued, mainly 
aimed at:
– assessing more rigorously the responsibilities 
of the subjects involved in designing and 
building structures;
– improving communication between the 
subjects;
– making controls more effective, both on the 
design and on the built structures.
Nowadays, the Hotel is still in function. The 
walkways have been rebuilt, on columns.
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Figure 1.10: Shear loads on the transverse beam. (a) original  
design (continuous hanger bars); (b) offset design actually  
made; (c) offset design that would not have doubled the 
maximum shear loads.
Figure 1.11: One of the new walkways, on 
columns. (Source: www.flickr.com).
1.4.3 The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
On the 19th of April 1995, at 9:02 AM, a car bomb exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, USA, causing the death of 168 people. According to 
the following investigations, about 80% of the victims were not directly due to the explosion, but to 
the following Progressive Collapse. It turned out that several design choices made the building very 
sensitive to Progressive Collapse. The results of the investigations prompted debates about building 
safety among American designers and politicians, and produced some changes in design 
regulations.
Description
Construction of the building lasted 20 months, between 1974 and 1976. The investigations 
recognized a good accordance between the blueprints and the actually built structure. The design 
consisted of 117 architectural and 40 structural drawings, which have been deemed very detailed 
and well made. Detail quality resulted significantly better than common practice for this type of 
buildings. Debris analyses found that the components were built according to the codes and that 
material resistances abundantly exceeded the minimum required by the design.
The used building code was the ACI 318-1971 "Building Code Requirements for reinforced 
Concrete"; at the time the code did not require to consider earthquakes, explosions or other extreme 
loads in Oklahoma City.
The Murrah Building consisted of a central nine-floor part with two single-floor wings and a 
partially underground parking lot. The structure of the nine-story part was cast-in-place concrete 
and had ten 6.1m long spans in one direction and two 10.7m spans in the other, plus shear walls and 
other resistant elements at the center of the south side (figure 1.13). Floor slabs were placed in the 
east-west direction.
One important element of the structural system was a transfer girder located at the third floor of the 
north facade. The girder supported intermediate columns, thus at the lowest two floors the spans of 
the north facade were 12.2m long (i.e., double as the other ones). The transfer girder had a 
rectangular 91x150cm section and was supported by rectangular 50x91cm columns. The facade at 
the two lower levels was re-entrant, so that there was a hollow volume under the third floor.
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Figure 1.12: The A.P. Murrah Building in pristine state and after the bombing. (Source: NIST)
Analysis
The north facade was directly hit by the explosion and was severely damaged. A big part of the 
north half of the building, comprised between vertical elements G12 and G28 (see figure 1.13 for 
the nomenclature) collapsed. Three columns (G16, G20 and G24) supporting the transfer girder 
were destroyed. This prompted the Collapse of the higher floors. Furthermore, between column 
lines 20 and 24 Collapse extended for the entire depth of the building. In all, about one half of the 
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Figure 1.13: A.P. Murrah Building. (Top) Floor plan of the ground floor. (Middle) Floor plan of the upper 
floors. (Bottom) Front view of the north facade and peak overpressures of the bomb explosion.
(Source: [11]).
floor surface of the nine floor part collapsed; 112 of 180 floor slab panels between the second floor 
and the roof broke completely or partially. Damage to the facades not directly hit by the explosion 
was minimal. No significant global lateral or torsional displacements were noticed.
It has been deemed that the direct effect of the explosion was the destructions of three columns and 
some floor slabs, while the remaining Damage is deemed due to Progressive Collapse.
By studying the bomb crater and other produced Damages, it was estimated that the bomb had a 
potential equivalent to 4000lb (1814 kg) of TNT and was placed at a distance of about 4.75m from 
column G20. This column was abruptly removed by brisance (a shattering effect). This removed 
support of the transfer girder between columns G16 and G24. Analyses show that the structure, with 
this modification, would not have been not able to bear the vertical load of the floors above the third 
one. Furthermore, the explosion should have caused shear failure of columns G16 and G24. The 
loss of these columns leaves the transfer girder free of support from the east facade to column G12; 
of course, calculations show that this configuration is also not bearable by the structure.
The building lacked intrinsically redundancy and ductility. The weakest element was surely the 
transfer girder. It could not have been able to survive the removal of a column because its lower 
longitudinal reinforcement was not continuous at the columns (figure 1.14). Thus the girder was 
unable to withstand flexural moment reversal, forming de facto a simple hinge and overloading the 
adjacent extremities. Furthermore, all elements had in general much longitudinal reinforcement and 
little transverse reinforcement, giving them little ductility.
In 1985, about ten years after the building construction, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 
Program (NEHRP) issued the first recommendations aimed at making structures more capable of 
dissipating energy. It has been calculated that, if columns G16 and G24 were made according to the 
new recommendations, they would have had a high probability of surviving the explosion without 
shear failure. Because of the proximity to the bomb, column G20 would probably have been 
shattered even if it was made according to the recommendations.
It has been estimated that, if the seismic recommendations had been adopted, the following 
scenarios could have happened:
1. if column G20 resisted the explosion, then the structural Damage would have been limited to 
the floor slabs directly destroyed by the explosion. The surface losses would have been reduced 
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Figure 1.14: A.P. Murrah Building. (Left) Longitudinal reinforcement on the third floor transfer girder. It  
is to be noticed the absolute lack of continuity of the lower bars. (Right) Collapse mechanism of the north  
facade in case of removal of column G20 alone. (Source: [45]).
by 85%
2. if only column G20 was removed by the explosion and the transfer girder had resisted, the 
global structural losses would have been reduced by 80%;
3. if column G20 was destroyed and the transfer girder was non able to bear the span between G16 
and G24, then the structural losses would have been the elements directly hit by the explosion 
and the floor panels between column lines F and G, 16 and 24. The surface loss would have 
been reduced by 50%.
Consequences
Oklahoma City was the first attack against a federal building inside the USA; at the time this 
eventuality had never been considered. There were recommendations for government buildings 
built abroad (“Structural Engineering Guidelines for New Embassy Office Buildings”, published by 
the Department of State), and the first move was to extend these recommendations to the new 
federal buildings built inside the USA. The main recommendations were about the minimum 
standoff distance of vehicles, ductility and steel reinforcement continuity.
After the building was built several regulations on constructions in seismic areas had been issued, 
which provide for a high level of ductility. Several studies proposed that prescriptions for structural 
details in seismic areas should also be applied to new buildings in non seismic areas, disregarding 
of seismic lateral forces. For existing buildings it was proposed to adopt techniques of seismic 
improvement like the addition of structural walls.
The first official document issued after the Oklahoma City bombing was the Proceedings of the 
1996 ASCE Structure Congress, which includes suggestions and references to design structures 
potentially subjected to terroristic attacks. The document consists in chapters that correspond to 
design steps:
– the first step is to quantify the level of risk of the design. To achieve this, an algorithm is given;
– the second step is the quantification of parameters of the loads associated with a particular risk. 
For example, the interesting parameters for explosions are the overpressure peak, the length and 
the shape of the pressure wave;
– then a structural system that withstands the calculated loads is chosen. One main decision 
criterion is the ability to provide ductility and redundancy;
– then the single structural elements are designed for the dynamic loads of the design explosion. 
According to the document, design can be effectively made with models of Single Degree Of 
Freedom (SDOF) oscillators. The analysis is generally performed with non-factorized 
parameters (i.e. not multiplied by safety coefficients) and provides for inelastic response and 
damaging of the structural elements.
It must also be observed that a debate arose, about the costs of applying the suggestions. The 
difference in cost between a normal building and one with anti-seismic details has been estimated in 
1-2%, and with one with the specific Collapse analysis has been estimated in 5-7%. Since thousands 
of federal buildings exist, the debate was mainly based on the question if the extra costs involved 
are justified by the social costs of a possible Collapse.
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1.4.4 The World Trade Center
1.4.4.1 Buildings 1 and 2 of the World Trade Center
Description
The World Trade Center (WTC) was a a complex of seven buildings located in the southern part of 
Manhattan island (New York city, USA). It comprised two 110-floor office buildings (WTC1 and 
WTC2), a 22-floor hotel (WTC3), two 9-floor office buildings (WTC4 and WTC5), one 8-floor 
office building (WTC6) and one 47-floor office building (WTC7). It was property of the Port 
Authority of New York; its construction required an estimated cost of 1.29 billion US dollars 
(adjusted to 1992).
Construction of the structures started in 1968. WTC1 (North Tower) and WTC2 (South Tower) 
started to be occupied in 1970 and 1972, respectively, even though the official inauguration of the 
Center was in 1973.
The North Tower was about 416m tall and supported a 110m long antenna; the South Tower was 
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Figure 1.15: Aerial view of the World Trade Center complex and its surrounding buildings. Each color  
corresponds to the amount of Damage suffered on September 11th, 2001. (Source: [44]).
about 414m tall. Each Tower had a square floor plan with sides of about 64m and beveled corners. 
They included 110 floors in elevation plus 6 underground floors.
The structures consisted of four major structural subsystems: a central core, the exterior wall, the 
floor system and the “hat truss”.
– The central core consisted in 47 steel columns, which extended virtually the full length of the 
building, interconnected by a grid of steel beams. In the floor plans it corresponded to the 
central rectangular area, about 41m by 26m, in which stairs, elevators and bathrooms were 
concentrated.
– The exterior wall was a square tube, consisting of 236 narrow steel columns connected by 
spandrels, located in the facades. It consisted of prefabricated welded modules, three stories tall 
and three columns wide, bolted to the adjacent units. At the lower floors, bundles of three 
columns merged together to allow transit.
– The floor system consisted of lightweight concrete on a steel deck, supported by a grid of steel 
trusses. The trusses covered spans of 11m or 18m. One end of each truss had a viscoelastic 
device to dampen horizontal oscillations. The floor system did not only support vertical loads; it 
also had the important function of connecting the central core and the exterior walls, giving a 
high horizontal stiffness to the tower. Furthermore, the lack of structural elements between the 
core and the facades provided for great flexibility in the internal partitions.
– The “hat truss” was a set of steel braces, located from the 107th floor to the roof of each tower. 
Its primary purpose was to support a tall antenna atop each tower, although only WTC1 had one 
installed. The hat truss provided additional connections among the columns, providing 
additional means for load redistribution.
Ten different grades of steel, with yield strength ranging from 36ksi to 100ksi were used for the 
structural elements. For fireproofing, most of the core columns were protected by sheets of gypsum 
wallboard. The other elements were coated with sprayed fire-resistive materials (the elements of the 
exterior wall were also enclosed in a sheet-aluminum cover).
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Figure 1.16: (Left) The North Tower (WTC1) under construction. Central core, exterior wall and floor system 
are clearly distinguishable. (Center) Detail of the connection between floor system and exterior wall during 
assembly. It is worth noticing the staggering of the prefabricated facade modules. (Right) Representation of the  
hat truss. (Sources: [44], [34]).
Analysis
On the 11th of September 2001, at 8:46 AM, the North Tower (WTC1) was hit by an aircraft. The 
building collapsed 102 minutes later, at 10:28 AM. The South Tower (WTC2) was hit by another 
aircraft at 9:03 AM and collapsed 56 minutes later, at 9:59 AM.
In WTC1, the most of the impact Damage was confined to the 95th and 96th floors. Summed over 
all floors, the estimated Damages are: 35 exterior columns severed and 2 heavily damaged; 6 core 
columns severed and 3 heavily damaged; 43 (out of 47) core columns stripped of insulation on one 
or more floors; insulation stripped from trusses covering 60'000ft2 (≈5500m2) of floor area.
In WTC2, the bulk of the impact Damage was confined to six floors (78 to 83). Summed over all 
floors, the estimated Damages are: 33 exterior columns severed and 1 heavily damaged; 10 core 
columns severed and 1 heavily damaged; 39 (out of 47) core columns stripped of insulation on one 
or more floors; insulation stripped from trusses covering 80'000ft2 (≈7500m2) of floor area.
In both cases, a big amount of jet fuel spilled in the buildings and fed fires.
According to the Final Report on the Collapse of the World trade Center Towers [34], the probable 
Collapse sequence for both towers was the following:
– each aircraft impact severed exterior columns, damaged interior core columns and knocked off 
insulation from steel structural elements. The weight carried by the severed columns was 
distributed to other columns.
– Subsequently, fires began to grow and spread. Because of these these fires, the building core 
weakened and began losing its ability to carry loads.
– The floors weakened and sagged from the fires, pulling inward on the exterior columns.
– Floor sagging and exposure to high temperatures caused the exterior columns to bow inward 
and buckle.
– Collapse then ensued. 
Furthermore, according to the Final Report [34] the WTC towers likely would not have collapsed 
under the combined effects of aircraft impact Damage and the extensive fires that followed, if the 
thermal insulation had not been widely dislodged or had been only minimally dislodged by the 
impacts. In other words, the towers had enough redundancy to withstand a considerable initial 
Damage, in absence of the effects of fire.
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Figure 1.17: (Left) Impact Damage observed on the north face of WTC1. (Right) One estimated impact  
Damage scenario of WTC1. (Source: [34]).
The Bažant study
A few hours after the Collapses, Prof. Zednek P. Bažant of the Northwestern University, Evanston 
(Illinois, USA) released a study of the Collapse mechanism [7]. The study highlights that, once the 
upper part of each building started to fall down and hit the lower part, arresting the Collapse was 
impossible because the dynamic load was much bigger than the available bearing capacity.
To reach these conclusions, first the Author estimates the elastic overload ratio of the falling part of 
the structure on the lower part. This is achieved with very simplified calculations, using two 
different methods.
In the first method the Author assimilates the lower part of the tower to a Single Degree Of 
Freedom (SDOF) oscillator. All the reported 
parameters refer to the North Tower. The 
stiffness of the oscillator is estimated in the 
most optimistic case, i.e. with all undamaged 
columns and with all loads evenly distributed. 
The estimated stiffness of the oscillator is 
C≈71 GN/m (1 GN=109 N; the Author does 
not specify on which bases this value is 
obtained). The estimated mass of the upper 
part of the North Tower is m≈58·106 kg. By 
equating the loss of gravitational potential 
energy of the falling (upper) part in a one floor 
fall and the deformation energy of the lower 
part at maximum elastic deflection, the 
overload ratio due to impact of the upper part 
is calculated as
Pdyn
P0
=112Ch/mg≈31
in which:
h≈3.7m is the falling height of the mass, which is equal to the height of critical floor columns;
g is the gravity acceleration;
Pdyn is is the static force that produces maximum deflection;
P0=mg is the weight of the upper part of the building.
The other estimate is obtained with the following formula, which is derived from an elastic wave 
equation, according to a theory reported by the Author in one of his books:
Pdyn
P0
=A /P02 g Eef h≈64.5
in which
A is the cross section of the building;
Eef is the stiffness of the cross sections of all columns, divided by A;
ρ is the mass of the building for volume unit.
Because of the approximations, these two results are just indicative. It is meaningful that according 
to both calculations the falling of the upper part produces effects of a higher order of magnitude 
than the static force.
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Figure 1.18: Schematic representation of the 
Collapse sequence and equivalent SDOF oscillator  
of the Bažant study. (Source: [7]).
Subsequently, the Author tries to find out if the fall of the upper part can be arrested by energy 
dissipation during plastic buckling which follows the initial elastic deformation.
To do it, it is assumed that every column buckles and three 
plastic hinges form in each one (figure 1.19). Assuming that 
each plastic hinge can rotate indefinitely without breaking, the 
sum of their rotations cannot be higher than the combined 
rotation angle Σθi=2π.
By calculating the maximum plastic deformation energy and 
multiplying it by the number of columns, the optimistic 
estimate Wp=0.5GNm is obtained.
In order to have the maximum combined rotation angle 
Σθi=2π, the upper part of the building must fall one whole floor 
height. Thus the variation of the gravitational potential energy 
between the beginning of the fall and the maximum plastic 
deformation of the columns is Wg=2hmg≈4.2GNm.
In conclusion, the ratio between the energy to dissipate and the 
energy that it is possible to dissipate is Wg/Wp≈8.4. This 
estimate is highly optimistic, because in reality the plastic hinges would break for rotations much 
smaller than the ones considered, and because the actual falling height was likely 3 to 10 floors 
(which would make the estimated ratio 3 to 10 times higher).
Other cases of impact of aircrafts on high-rise buildings
It must be highlighted that other impacts of aircrafts on high-rise buildings have happened, but in 
these cases the buildings did not collapse. The following is a list of reported cases:
– On July 28, 1945, a US Army B-25 bomber crashed into New York's 102-story tall Empire State 
Building, killing 3 crew members and 11 other people. Low visibility due to fog was identified 
as the main cause of the crash.
– On May 20, 1946, a US Army C-45 Beechcraft airplane crashed into New York's 70-story tall 
40 Wall Street Building (known today as the Trump Building), killing 5 who were on the plane. 
Again, low visibility due to fog was identified as the main cause of the crash.
– On January 5, 2002, a 15-year-old boy stole a Cessna 172 airplane from a flight school and 
committed suicide by crashing into the 42-story tall Bank of America Tower in Tampa, Florida, 
USA. He was the only fatality.
– On April 18, 2002, a Rockwell Commander 112 airplane crashed into the 31-story tall Pirelli 
Tower in Milan, Italy, killing the pilot, who was alone in the airplane, and 2 occupants of the 
building. It is unclear if it was an accident or if the pilot committed suicide.
– On October 11, 2006, a Cirrus SR20 light aircraft crashed into the 50-story tall Belaire 
Apartments building in New York, killing the 2 people who were on the plane. Pilot error was 
identified as the cause of the crash.
High rise buildings have necessarily a very redundant structure, because of the high loads that they 
must bear. Not only the vertical loads must be borne; the horizontal loads of wind and earthquake 
are very important. Furthermore, the big number of occupants and the relatively scarcity of escape 
paths leads to the use of bigger safety coefficients than normal buildings.
The wind load is especially critical, because the big surface of the facades makes the total force 
extremely strong. The Twin Towers were designed to withstand winds up to 225km/h.
The Twin Towers were also designed to withstand an impact with a Boeing 707-320, which was the 
biggest aircraft in existence when the WTC was designed. Compared to this model, the Boeing 
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Figure 1.19: Schematic  
representation of a buckled 
column in the Bažant study.  
(Source: [7]).
767-200 aircrafts that hit the Twin Towers have a maximum full load weight about 15% higher. 
According to Bažant [7], this difference is well within the safety margins of the design.
The best documented case of aircraft impact on a high rise building happened on the 28th of July 
1945, when a B52 bomber collided on the 79th floor of the Empire State Building, in New York 
city. The impact provoked a hole 5.5m wide and 6m high in the building's facade. The consequent 
fire remained confined. All the 14 victims were either on the plane or in areas close to the impact 
point. The death toll could have been worse because both engines separated from the aircraft and 
kept moving, in flames, by inertia.
The aircraft impacted exactly the 79th floor system, and this contributed to distributing its thrust in 
the structure. The numerous steel columns, located at a mutual distance of about 5.8m, give the 
building a great redundancy. The 
structure did not suffer Damage 
other than in the impact area. In 
fact, it has been calculated that the 
global thrust of the impact was 
about two hundred times lower 
than the design wind thrust. The 
mass of the aircraft was about 
104kg, as opposed to 8x107kg of 
the building. The occupants that 
were in the building, but distant 
from the impact area, referred to 
have felt a “light tremor” of the 
structure and an oscillation that did 
not last long (the oscillation was 
probably dampened rapidly by the 
masonry wall panels).
1.4.4.2 Building 7 of the World Trade Center
Description
Building 7 of the World Trade Center was a 47 
story office building located immediately to the 
north of the main WTC complex, approximately 
105m from the north side of WTC 1 (figure 1.21).
The floor plan of WTC 7 was an irregular 
trapezoid, approximately 100m long on the north 
face and 75m long on the south face, 44m wide. 
The 186m tall building contained approximately 
200'000 m2 of floor area.
The structure was steel frame. From the 7th floor 
to the 47th floor, WTC7 was supported by 24 
interior columns and 58 perimeter columns (figure 
1.22). Twenty-one of the interior columns formed 
a rectangular building core. The remaining three 
interior columns (labeled 79, 80, and 81) were 
particularly large, as they provided support for the 
long floor spans on the east side of the building.
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Figure 1.20: The Empire State Building after the 1945 aircraft  
collision and a detail of the impact zone. (Source: unknown).
Figure 1.21: Location of WTC7. (Source: NIST).
The lower floors had a different column arrangement. Therefore, a set of column transfers were 
constructed within the 5th and 7th floor slabs.
The floor structures were composed of reinforced concrete of varying thickness on top of 
corrugated metal decking. The floor 
beams were connected to the 
concrete deck by shear studs to 
allow composite action of the 
concrete slab and the steel elements. 
The floor beams were connected to 
girders, which framed into the 
columns.
Sprayed fire-resistive material was 
applied to the structural steel and to 
the underside of the metal floor 
decking. Active fire protection 
systems comprised fire sensors and 
alarms, notification systems, 
automatic fire sprinklers, water 
supplies, and smoke management.
Analysis
According to the Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 [36], none of the 
large pieces of debris from WTC2 hit WTC7 because of the large distance between the two 
buildings. Pieces of WTC1 hit WTC7, severing six columns on Floors 7 through 17 on the south 
face and one column on the west face near the southwest corner. The debris also caused structural 
Damage between Floor 44 and the roof.
Most likely, the WTC7 fires began as a result of burning debris from the Collapse of WTC1. Unlike 
the Towers, where dispersion of jet fuel caused simultaneous fire initiation over extensive areas and 
multiple adjacent floors, in WTC7 were typically observed multiple single floor fires that started in 
local origins and that were fed by typical office combustibles, such as furniture and appliances.
Fires were observed spreading on the 7th floor through the 13th floor, with the exception of the 10th 
floor. On some floors the fires were limited by automatic sprinklers, whose water came from the 
storage tanks on the 47th floor. However, on the lowest 20 floors the sprinkler system was not 
working because it relied on the city water system, which had been damaged by the Collapse of the 
Towers.
 
According to the Final Report [36], the sequence that most likely led to the Collapse of WTC7 is 
the following:
– WTC7 endured fires for almost seven hours before Collapse happened (from 10:28AM until 
5:21PM). Prolonged heating of the long beams resulted in proportionately large thermal 
elongation relative to the other components of the floor system, compressing the beams along 
their length. This led to distortion of the beams and breaking of the connections between beams 
and floor slabs.
– Some floor beams expanded enough to push the girder spanning between Columns 79 and 44 
out of its support at Column 79. The unsupported girder and other local fire-induced Damage 
caused floor 13 to collapse, beginning a cascade of floor failures down to the 5th floor (which 
was much thicker and stronger than the other floors). This left column 79 without lateral support 
for nine floors; as a consequence, the column buckled, becoming the initial local failure for 
Collapse initiation.
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Figure 1.22: Typical floor plan of WTC7, from the 7th to the 
47th story. (Source [36]).
– The buckling of column 79 led to a vertical 
progression of floor failures up to the roof and to the 
buckling of columns 80 and 81. An east-to-west 
horizontal progression of interior column buckling 
followed. As the failed building core moved 
downward, its loads were redistributed to the exterior 
columns, which subsequently buckled. Global 
Collapse occurred as the entire building above the 
buckled region moved downward as a single unit.
According to the Final Report [36], “The collapse of 
WTC7 represents the first known instance of the total  
collapse of a tall building primarily due to fires”, and 
WTC7 would have collapsed from the fires even without 
the initial structural Damage caused by debris impact. 
Furthermore, removal of a section of column 79 between 
Floors 11 and 13 would have led to the Collapse of the 
entire building, even in absence of debris impact and fire. 
Yet no evidence was found to suggest that WTC7 was not 
designed in a manner generally consistent with building 
codes in effect at the time of construction, and that it was adequately designed for vertical loads due 
to gravity and lateral loads due to wind. The structural design did not explicitly evaluate fire effects, 
which was typical for engineering practice at that time the WTC was designed (as well as at the 
time the Final Report [36] was published).
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Figure 1.23: Model of the WTC7 
Collapse. Still frame of the area where 
the Collapse started, just after column 
79 buckled. (Source: [36]).
Figure 1.24: Model of the WTC7 Collapse. Sequence of the start of the Collapse. (Source: NIST).
Consequences of the WTC Collapses
The WTC Collapses had a strong impact on the public opinion, on the technical community and on 
the political world. In particular, they gave they gave new impulse to research and regulations on 
Progressive Collapse mitigation, as the following chapters show.
Immediately after the WTC attacks, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) did a building performance study of the disaster “to  
determine probable failure mechanisms and to identify areas of future investigation that could lead 
to practical measures for improving the damage resistance of buildings against such unforeseen 
events” [34]. The Building Performance Study Team issued its report in May 2002. The study team 
consisted of experts who largely volunteered their time away from their other professional 
commitments.
A much deeper investigation was conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). The investigation was announced on August 21, 2002, with funding from the US Congress. 
On October 1, 2002, the Congress signed a law (“National Construction Safety Team Act”) under 
which authority the the NIST investigation was conducted.
The goals of the investigation of the WTC disaster were:
“To investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that  
contributed to the outcome of the WTC disaster.
To serve as the basis for:
– Improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used;
– Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials;
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Figure 1.25: Model of the WTC7 Collapse. Sequence of the whole building Collapse. (Source: NIST).
– Recommended revisions to current codes, standards, and practices; and
– Improved public safety.
The specific objectives were:
1. Determine why and how WTC1 and WTC2 collapsed following the initial impacts of the aircraft  
and why and how WTC7 collapsed;
2. Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or low depending on location, including 
all technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency response;
3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of WTC1, WTC2, and WTC7; and
4. Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and 
practices that warrant revision.”
A staff of over 200 contributed to the investigations. The investigation team accumulated over 300 
hours of video footage and more than 7000 photographs; conducted interviews with over 1000 
people; analyzed hundreds of steel pieces obtained from the wreckage; performed laboratory tests. 
Computer simulations of the sequence of events that happened from the aircraft impacts to the 
initiation of Collapse were performed for WTC1 and WTC2. For WTC7, the Collapse sequence was 
also modeled.
During the course of the investigation, public briefings and meetings were held to solicit input from 
the public, present preliminary findings, and obtain comments on the direction and progress of the 
investigation.
Eventually, the Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers [34] was issued in 
September 2005, while the Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 [36] was 
issued in November 2008.
Other than the already mentioned conclusions about the sequence of events, the Reports include a 
series of recommendations for increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, 
new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved 
building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and 
education and training. The first Report includes 30 recommendations; the second Report includes 
13, of which 12 are reiterated and 1 is new. Two recommendations regard Progressive Collapse, and 
are here reported.
The first one is called “Recommendation 1” in the Twin Towers Report and “Recommendation A” 
in the WTC7 Report.
NIST recommends that: (1) progressive collapse be prevented in buildings through the 
development and nationwide adoption of consensus standards and code provisions, along with 
the tools and guidelines needed for their use in practice; and (2) a standard methodology be 
developed—supported by analytical design tools and practical design guidance—to reliably 
predict the potential for complex failures in structural systems subjected to multiple hazards.
The Twin Towers Report also elaborates:
a. Progressive collapse should be prevented in buildings. The primary structural systems should 
provide alternate paths for carrying loads in case certain components fail (e.g., transfer girders or 
columns). This is especially important in buildings where structural components (e.g., columns,  
girders) support unusually large floor areas. Progressive collapse is addressed only in a very 
limited way in practice and by codes and standards. For example, the initiating event in design to 
prevent progressive collapse may be removal of one or two columns at the bottom of the structure.  
Initiating events at multiple locations within the structure, or involving other key components and 
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subsystems, should be analyzed commensurate with the risks considered in the design. The 
effectiveness of mitigation approaches involving new system and subsystem design concepts should 
be evaluated with conventional approaches based on indirect design (continuity, strength, and 
ductility of connections), direct design (local hardening), and redundant (alternate) load paths. The 
capability to prevent progressive collapse due to abnormal loads should include: (i) comprehensive 
design rules and practice guides; (ii) evaluation criteria, methodology, and tools for assessing the 
vulnerability of structures to progressive collapse; (iii) performance-based criteria for abnormal 
loads and load combinations; (iv) analytical tools to predict potential collapse mechanisms; and (v) 
computer models and analysis procedures for use in routine design practice. The federal 
government should coordinate the existing programs that address this need: those in the 
Department of Defense; the General Services Administration; the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency; and NIST. Affected Standards21: ASCE-7, AISC Specifications, and ACI 318. These 
standards and other relevant committees should draw on expertise from ASCE/SFPE 29 for issues 
concerning progressive collapse under fire conditions. Model BuildingCodes: The consensus 
standards should be adopted in model building codes (i.e., the International Building Code and 
NFPA 5000) by mandatory reference to, or incorporation of, the latest edition of the standard. State 
and local jurisdictions should adopt and enforce the improved model building codes and national  
standards based on all 30 WTC recommendations. The codes and standards may vary from the 
WTC recommendations, but satisfy their intent. b. A robust, integrated predictive capability should 
be developed, validated, and maintained to routinely assess the vulnerability of whole structures to 
the effects of credible hazards. This capability to evaluate the performance and reserve capacity of  
structures does not exist and is a significant cause for concern. This capability also would assist in 
investigations of building failure—as demonstrated by the analyses of the WTC building collapses 
carried out in this Investigation. The failure analysis capability should include all possible complex 
failure phenomena that may occur under multiple hazards (e.g., bomb blasts, fires, impacts, gas 
explosions, earthquakes, and hurricane winds), experimentally validated models, and robust tools  
for routine analysis to predict such failures and their consequences. This capability should be 
developed via a coordinated effort involving federal, private sector, and academic research 
organizations in close partnership with practicing engineers.
The second recommendation is called “Recommendation B” and is only present in the WTC7 
Report.
NIST recommends that buildings be explicitly evaluated to ensure the adequate performance of  
the structural system under maximum credible (infrequent) design fires with any active fire 
protection system rendered ineffective. Of particular concern are the effects of thermal 
expansion in buildings with one or more of the following features:
(1) long-span floor systems which experience significant thermal expansion and sagging effects,
(2) connection designs (especially shear connections) that cannot accommodate thermal effects,
(3) floor framing that induces asymmetric thermally-induced (i.e., net lateral) forces on girders,
(4) shear studs that could fail due to differential thermal expansion in composite floor systems,
and (5) lack of shear studs on girders. Careful consideration should also be given to the 
possibility of other design features that may adversely affect the performance of the structural  
system under fire conditions.
Building owners, operators, and designers are strongly urged to act upon this recommendation.  
Engineers should be able to design cost-effective fixes to address any areas of concern that are 
identified by these evaluations. Several existing, emerging, or even anticipated capabilities could 
have helped prevent the collapse of WTC 7. The degree to which these capabilities improve 
performance remains to be evaluated. Possible options for developing cost-effective fixes include:
• More robust connections and framing systems to better resist the effects of thermal expansion on 
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the structural system.
• Structural systems expressly designed to prevent progressive collapse. The current model building 
codes do not require that buildings be designed to resist progressive collapse.
• Better thermal insulation (i.e., reduced conductivity and/or increased thickness) to limit heating of 
structural steel and to minimize both thermal expansion and weakening effects. Currently,  
insulation is used to protect steel strength, but it could also be used to maintain a lower 
temperature in the steel framing to limit thermal expansion.
• Improved compartmentation in tenant areas to limit the spread of fires.
• Thermally resistant window assemblies which limit breakage, reduce air supply, and retard fire 
growth.
Industry should partner with the research community to fill critical gaps in knowledge about how 
structures perform in real fires, particularly considering: the effects of fire on the entire structural 
system; the interactions between subsystems, elements, and connections; and scaling of fire test  
results to full-scale structures, especially for structures with long span floor systems.
1.4.5 The Eads Bridge
The Eads Bridge is a railway bridge that crosses the Mississippi river in St.Louis, Missouri, USA. 
Its construction was completed in 1874. It consists of three steel truss arches that cover a total 
length of about 500m. This structure is particular for its great redundancy; this is not casual, as it 
was conceived like this in its design phase. At the inauguration of the bridge, its designer James 
Buchanan Eads stated: “The peculiar construction of the superstructure is such that any piece in it  
can be easily taken out and examined, and replaced or renewed, without interrupting the traffic of  
the bridge... In completing the western span two of the lower tubes of the inside ribs near the 
middle of the span were injured during erection, and were actually uncoupled and taken out without  
any difficulty whatever, after the span was completed, and two new ones put in their place in a few 
hours” [35].
In October 1969 a tug boat knocked out a section of one of the arches, but the Damage remained 
limited to the hit elements.
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Figure 1.26: The Eads Bridge during construction and detail of the Damage it suffered in 1969.  
(Sources: Wikipedia, [4]).
1.5 Summary and comments
In the beginning of this chapter, in section 1.1, a definition of Progressive Collapse is given and 
elaborated on.
Then the characteristics that are desirable in a structure in order to reduce the chances of occurrence 
of Progressive Collapse, or to mitigate its intensity, are listed in section 1.2.
Then the causes of Collapses are listed, subdivided in categories, in section 1.3.
Finally, some of the most important case studies of Progressive Collapse are described and 
analyzed, as well as a case in which an initial Damage did not prompt a Collapse, in section 1.4.
All this information is useful to better understand the problem this work is about, as well as other 
parts of the work.
In the first section it is highlighted that the generally accepted definitions of Progressive Collapse 
include some ambiguities, and that the present work intends to overcome this problem by 
incorporating Progressive Collapse in a probabilistic Risk framework.
From the other sections it can be noticed that several types of Progressive Collapse exist, as well as 
different types of prompting events and types of structure behavior.
– The Ronan Point tower was a precast concrete panel building with a prevalent vertical 
conformation. Its Collapse prompting event was an accidental explosion due to a gas leak. Its 
main negative qualities were lack of ductility and redundancy; poor workmanship also 
contributed to its propensity to Collapse.
– The Hyatt Regency Collapse involved two walkways, whose structure consisted in steel frame 
and hangers. The prompting event of the Collapse was the live loads, which were actually well 
under the design values. The structure suffered lack of adequate design and poor workmanship. 
Furthermore, once the first connection failure occurred the non-redundant design made it 
impossible to stop the spreading of the Damage.
– The A.P. Murrah building had a cast in place concrete frame structure. Its Collapse was 
prompted by a terroristic bomb attack. It was made in accordance with the regulations, with 
good materials and workmanship; nevertheless, its inherent lack of redundancy and ductility 
made it extremely vulnerable to Progressive Collapse.
– The WTC1 and WTC2 towers were high rise steel frame buildings. Their Collapses were 
prompted by extensive impact Damage due to a terroristic attack and the subsequent extended 
fires. The structures were inherently very redundant and would have resisted the impact Damage 
without Collapse in absence of fire.
– The WTC7 building was a steel frame high rise building. Its Collapse was prompted by fire 
alone. Even tough it was designed in accordance with the building codes, the area in which the 
Collapse started was unable to resist the removal of few structural elements.
– The C.W. Post College dome (described in section 1.3) was a steel truss dome. Its Collapse was 
prompted by vertical loads lower than the design values. The model used in the design was not 
adequate to the actual structure.
– The Ambiance Plaza Collapse (figure 1.4) involved a multi-story building during construction. 
It was likely prompted by a lifting device failure. The adjacent devices were not able to 
withstand the increased loads and, once the Collapse started, the structure did not have enough 
resources to stop it.
In some other cases Progressive Collapse did not ensue.
– The Eads bridge is a steel truss structure purposely made very redundant. In two cases it was 
able to withstand localized Damage with no spreading or loss of functionality.
– The Empire State Building (described in section 1.4.4.1) is a steel frame high rise building 
which was hit by an aircraft with no subsequent Collapse. Its high level of redundancy is 
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deemed as the main cause of its Collapse resistance.
– The Confederation bridge (described in section 1.2) is a pre-stressed concrete, multi-span bridge 
that has been designed to stop Progressive Collapse trough compartmentalization, in case one of 
its piers gets damaged.
Historically, some of these cases prompted changes in building regulations and influenced research 
efforts, as chapter 2 illustrates.
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Chapter 2 - Mitigation Strategies and Regulations
In this chapter, section 2.1 lists and explains the strategies that have been devised for Progressive 
Collapse mitigation.
Section 2.2 lists some of the most significant regulations about Progressive Collapse and explains 
how they evolved.
Section 2.3 summarizes and comments the chapter.
2.1 Mitigation strategies
Four categories of Progressive Collapse mitigation strategies have been identified. In general, they 
can be applied alone or combined together in the attempt to avoid the occurrence of Progressive 
Collapse or to mitigate its consequences. Each strategy has pros and cons, as well as limitations in 
their applicability, as explained in the next sections.
2.1.1 Event Control (EC)
This strategy consists in trying to foresee all the possible traumatic events that can cause an initial 
Damage and try to avoid their occurrence. Examples of this strategy are the standoff distance on 
strategic buildings, which prevents Damage from car bombs, or barriers that protect a structure from 
vehicular impact.
If successfully applied, this strategy should 
avoid any Damage, both direct and indirect. 
In reality, it is not always possible to 
foresee all the traumatic events that can 
happen, so it should be used in combination 
with other strategies. However, this strategy 
is often the simplest and most effective one 
against clearly identified potential 
traumatic events.
In some cases the causes of the traumatic 
events can be foreseen, but not avoided. 
For example, in [35] Ellingwood states that 
“the writer is aware of one jurisdiction in 
which it was suggested that the use of 
natural gas be prohibited in certain multi-
family residential buildings over four 
stories in height; the socioeconomic impact  
of that ordinance, had it been implemented,  
would have been unacceptable”. The 
reference is to the prompting event of the 
Ronan Point tower Collapse (section 1.4.1).
2.1.2 Specific Load Resistance (SLR)
This strategy consists in trying to foresee all the possible traumatic events as well as their 
intensities, and then design the structure to withstand these exceptional loads. An example of this is 
designing a structure to be able to withstand the overpressure of a bomb explosion or the force of a 
vehicular impact. 
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Figure 2.1: The barriers surrounding the World 
Financial Center in New York, NY, USA, prevent  
unauthorized vehicles to get close to the buildings and 
are a form of Event Control.
Like Event Control, the Specific Load Resistance strategy has the drawback that it is not always 
possible to foresee all the traumatic events. Furthermore, the intensities of the traumatic events 
could be underestimated, making the strategy ineffective.
One more limitation of this strategy is that the extra costs required to provide additional resistance 
can be deemed unacceptable, because the probability of occurrence of the exceptional events is 
generally low. It also must be noticed that designing a structure to resist a given type of event does 
not automatically make it safer against other types of events.
Thus, this strategy is best applied when some Hazards and their maximum intensities are clearly 
identified. For example, in a structure located close to the transit of vehicles of known 
characteristics (mass, maximum speed).
2.1.3 Alternate Load Path (ALP)
This strategy consists in modeling the structure with some structural elements removed to simulate 
the initial Damage, and verifying that the loads once borne by the damaged area can flow to the 
ground through an “alternate path” provided by the remaining elements. In some cases even 
elements that are commonly considered “non-structural”, such as wall panels in a frame structure, 
are considered as possible load paths (figure 2.2). Furthermore, in an Alternate Load Path analysis 
the so called “catenary action” or “membrane action” of structural elements can be considered, as 
illustrated in figure 2.3.
32
Figure 2.2: In 1986 the US Congress ordered a structural safety analysis of the building destined to be  
the US embassy in Moscow, Russia (then Soviet Union), shown at left. The analysis included a 
Progressive Collapse analysis, which was carried out following the ANSI A58 standard. Most beam 
connections of the structure had very little bending moment resistance, if any. Thus, the ALP method was 
applied by verifying that the loads of a removed column can flow to the surrounding columns through the  
masonry walls enclosed in the frame, acting as struts, as shown at right. (Sources: [53], [54]).
One advantage of this strategy is that by modeling the structure it can be obtained information about 
its behavior, for example highlighting critical areas. Another advantage is that in general the initial 
Damage is assumed without considering the event that caused it, thus guessing the traumatic events 
is not required.
One drawback of the Alternate Load Path strategy is that it generally requires more computational 
effort than the other ones. Furthermore, there is not general consensus on several aspects of its 
application, like for example: where and how extended the initial Damage should be; the required 
level of detail of the model; if and how the dynamic effects are to be modeled; what type of 
performance of the wounded structure is to be considered acceptable.
2.1.4 Indirect Design Method (IDM)
With this method, general structural integrity is pursued by prescribing measures such as minimum 
levels of strength, ductility and continuity.
This strategy is relatively simple to apply, as it does not require to foresee the traumatic events or to 
model the damaged structure. It is generally deemed appropriate for regular building layouts and 
lower importance structures. On the other side, since the structure is not analyzed there is no 
guarantee that the measures will actually be effective.
2.2 Regulations about Progressive Collapse
This section reports an historical overview of the regulations about Progressive Collapse and 
describes the current status. Two important research works are also related in sub-section 2.2.1.1. 
Most of the historical information is taken from [24] and [35].
2.2.1 Historical overview
The first reference to Progressive Collapse in a building regulation was probably the April 1967 
Comité Européen du Béton (CEB) “Recommandations Internationales Unifiées Pour le Calcul et  
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Figure 2.3: Representations of the so called “catenary action” or “membrane action”. If a floor slab or a  
beam is overloaded, it can reach its ultimate limit state and lose most or all of its flexural resistance. In this  
case, the elements might still be able to support the loads by working in tension, similarly to a tensile  
structure. Reinforced concrete beams and floor slabs are a typical example of this: an overloading will  
generally cause crushing of compressed concrete and loss of bond between concrete and reinforcement,  
impairing the flexural resistance. At this stage, the metal reinforcement could still work in tension, if it is  
sufficiently continuous and restrained. (Source: [37]).
l'Exécution des Constructions en Panneaux Assembles de Grand Format” (“Unified International  
Recommendations for the Design and Construction of Large-Panel Structures”), which included the 
following text (translated from French):
“One can hardly over-emphasize the absolute necessity of effectively joining the various 
components of the structure together in order to obviate any possible tendency for it to behave like 
a 'house of cards' and of organizing the structure accordingly. In this respect it would appear to be 
of major importance to install mechanically continuous steel ties interconnecting opposite walls or 
facades and providing safeguards for all the vertical panels.”
Only after the Ronan Point Collapse (May 1968; see section 1.4.1 for its description and analysis) 
widespread attention was gained by the “house of cards” phenomenon, which was termed 
“Progressive Collapse”.
At the time in the United Kingdom no regulation considered it. The board of inquiry report 
(Griffiths, Pugsley, Saunders - Report of the inquiry into the collapse of flats at Ronan Point,  
Canning Town - Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, UK 1968) found that there was no 
violation of any applicable building standard in the design of the Tower, yet it was not “an 
acceptable building”. The report highlighted that the building standards, typically, gave detailed 
requirements for the design of individual members but provided little guidance for the stability 
design of the entire structural system.
Subsequently, the circular 62/68 entitled “Flats Constructed with Precast Concrete Panels.  
Appraisal and Strengthening of Existing High Blocks; Design of New Blocks”, issued on November 
15, 1968 by the UK Ministry of Housing and Local Government was the first document to include 
recommendations on the prevention of similar events. The circular required that multistory 
buildings be designed to provide either an alternate load path in the event of the loss of a single 
critical member or sufficient local resistance to withstand the effects of a 5 psi (34 kPa) design 
pressure. These two requirements correspond to the Alternate Load Path (ALP) and Specific Load 
Resistance (SLR) mitigation strategies, which are described in sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.2 of the 
present text, respectively. The value 5 psi was based on a gas-type explosion, although this is not 
stated in the document.
The requirements of circular 62/68 were then adopted in the “Statutory Instrument 1970 No. 109 -  
The Building (Fifth Amendment) Regulations” issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office in 1970. 
The “Fifth Amendment” immediately received considerable criticism, both inside and outside the 
UK. The local resistance approach was was criticized on the basis of of the lack of information 
about the the dynamic effect of an abnormal load; due to this insufficient knowledge, the specified 
design static pressure 5 psi was considered unjustified. It was argued that the required overpressure 
would not necessarily protect against other abnormal events such as vehicular collisions. The 
alternate load path approach was deemed too complex, as well as illogical, since more than one 
critical load-carrying member could be removed by an abnormal event. The provisions were also 
criticized for being implemented without knowing the effect on the cost of building construction.
Despite these objections, the Ronan Point Collapse affected the building regulations of many other 
countries.
In 1970, Canada adopted a Progressive Collapse requirement in its National Building Code.
In the USA, in 1972 the ANSI A58.1 standard “Minimum Design Loads in Buildings and Other 
Structures” included the following general recommendation:
“Buildings and structural systems shall provide such structural integrity that the hazards associated 
with progressive collapse such as that due to local failure caused by severe overloads or abnormal 
loads not specifically covered herein are reduced to a level consistent with good engineering 
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practice.”
In 1973 the City of New York amended its building code to require that Progressive Collapse 
resistance be provided by either the Specific Load Resistance or the Alternate Load Path methods. 
Provisions for structural ties entered the British Standards in 1974.
In the USA a research program denominated “Operation Breakthrough” was launched on May 8, 
1969, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to encourage industrialized 
housing concepts. Progressive Collapse was considered a concern for the evaluation of concrete 
panel systems, and the criteria adopted by HUD were similar to the British Fifth Amendment:
“Explosions or other catastrophic loads on any one story level should not cause progressive 
structural collapse at other levels. The criterion applies to buildings four stories or higher. At a 
load level of 1.0 dead + 0.5 live, the accidental removal of any one of the following (load)  
supporting structural elements at one level should not cause collapse of the structure on another 
level:
a) two adjacent wall panels forming an exterior corner;
b) one wall panel in a location other than an exterior corner;
c) one column or other element of the primary structural support system.
This criterion is waived if the above-mentioned structural element or elements are capable of  
resisting a pressure of 5 psi (34.5 kPa), applied in the most critical manner within one story level to 
one face of the element and of all space dividers supported by the element or attached to it.”
(From “Guide Criteria for the Evaluation of Operation Breakthrough Housing System” Building 
Research Division Team, Springfield, VA, 1970).
 The 1971 HUD-FHA (Federal Housing Authority) “Provisions to Prevent Progressive Collapse” 
included other “Breakthrough” criteria:
“Joints between prefabricated structural elements used as columns, beams, bearing walls, or slabs 
should develop continuity similar to that provided by conventional cast-in-place concrete or 
structural steel framing systems. In regions not subject to severe seismic or wind action,  
connections should not be designed solely as gravity-type relying only on compression and 
friction.”
Furthermore, the 1971 HUD-FHA criteria stated that, if abnormal loading occurred, Damage must 
be limited to 93 m2 (1000 ft2) or 20% of horizontal floor area, whichever was less, and to three 
stories vertically.
2.2.1.1 Two influential research works
It is worth to mention two works that influenced building regulations and research.
The first work is “Progressive Collapse, Abnormal Loads and Building Codes”, a paper by D.E. 
Allen and W.R. Schriever included in the book “Structural Failures: Modes, Causes,  
Responsibilities” [4], published in 1973.
The paper estimates the incidence of Progressive Collapses from two news sources: the Engineering 
News Record (from 1968 to 1972) and from newspapers clippings on Collapses in Canada (from 
1962 to 1972). The “rule of three” is used in classifying structural Collapses as progressive or not: a 
Collapse is considered progressive if it involves members that are three or more members away 
from the original failure or if three or more spans collapse.
According to the these statistics (as reported in table 2.1), the number of Progressive Collapses 
comprises approximately 15% (i.e., 75 over 495) to 20% (22 over 110) of the total number of 
Collapses. This statistic on the incidence of Progressive Collapses is still quoted today in 
regulations and research works, like for example in the standard ASCE 7-05 (which is described in 
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section 2.2.2.2 of the present work and is a reference for other regulations).
The second work is “The Incidence of Abnormal Loading in Residential Buildings” by E.V. 
Leyendecker and E.F.P. Burnett [23], published in 1976.
The work presents the findings of an analysis of available US statistics concerning the incidence of 
abnormal loading events in residential buildings. The study evaluates natural gas explosions, bomb 
explosions, motor vehicle collisions, sonic boom (i.e., shock waves generated by aircrafts flying at 
supersonic speeds), aircraft collision and explosion of hazardous materials. It is concluded that only 
the gas-related explosions, bomb explosions and vehicular collision are of significance in building 
design for Progressive Collapse. For the other Hazards, it is suggested that certain building 
locations may require a site study. The work also states that the considered abnormal loads do not 
constitute a complete list, and other types may occur.
The following excerpt explains how the data were collected:
“The number of incidents causing damage in excess of a specific level (measured in dollars) or a 
brief description of damage is usually provided. There is rarely complete information on the type or 
number of structures affected or an adequate description of their damage. There is also no 
available US data which provide a correlation between a specified damage level and a 
corresponding damage loss in dollars. Finally there are no data on the load characteristics of the 
actual events.
In order to compare the data for the gas explosion, bomb explosion, and vehicular collision, the 
following definitions are adopted:
1) Total incidents- All incidents involving a particular abnormal load.
2) Intermediate or greater damage – Damage in excess of $1000 for gas explosions, $1000 for 
vehicular collision, or described as intermediate or greater for bomb explosions. This level 
implies fairly extensive damage such as walls blown down.
3) Severe damage – Damage in excess of $10000 for gas explosions; $5000 for vehicular 
collision; or describes as severe for bomb explosions. This level implies extensive structural 
damage, such as unit destroyed.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the statistics collected by Allen and Schriever. (Source: [4]).
These definitions involve some arbitrary judgment because of the limitations on the available 
data”.
The collected data are discussed in terms of probability theory. The following equation is given:
P(D)p=P(Dp|AB) · P(AB) (2.1)
where P(D)p is the probability of Damage above a specified level;
the subscript p indicates the specified Damage level (intermediate or severe);
P(AB) is the probability of occurrence of an abnormal load event;
P(Dp|AB) is the probability of Damage above a specified level given an abnormal load event.
The terms P(D)p and P(AB) are obtained from the data reported in figure 2.4, while the other term is 
computed as
P(Dp|AB)= P(D)p / P(AB) (2.2)
The calculated probabilities are reported in table 2.2.
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Figure 2.4: Summary of annual probabilities of abnormal loadings for  
1970. (Source: [24]).
The work also states that “a number of assumptions have been necessary in order to analyze the 
data presented in this report. These are related primarily to the lack of detailed descriptions of  
damage accompanying the various abnormal loading events and the lack of detailed descriptions of  
the buildings involved in the incidents” and “the statistical reporting of abnormal loading events 
needs to be considerably improved in order to obtain load data and damage data in particular 
types of building construction”. In spite of this, not much has been done, and Leyendecker and 
Burnett's statistics are still referenced today, for example in [35].
2.2.2 Current status
Nowadays, the regulations of many countries include recommendations or provisions about 
Progressive Collapse. The following is a partial list:
– The British provisions, with modifications that put less emphasis on explosions and more on 
ductile performance, are still in force today in the UK. Namely, the notional removal of an 
essential structural element should cause only local Collapse (70m2 or 750ft2 or 15% of the plan 
area of the story, whichever is less), and buildings should be designed for an accidental pressure 
of 34kPa or 5psi acting simultaneously with dead and imposed loads.
– The current Italian regulations give a definition of Robustness as a general requirement, which 
is considered guaranteed by respecting the prescribed limit states and by applying conventional 
horizontal loads. The Italian regulations are further described in section 2.2.2.1.
– The National Building Code of Canada contains a general statement about the need for 
structural integrity, and its Commentary provides an extensive discussion on means to achieve 
that goal. The extent of the discussion reflects the importance accorded to the topic at the time, 
e.g., the 1975 version is much longer than the 1995 version. The Commentary covers 
recommendation for good structural layout, continuity of reinforcement, and structural 
mechanisms that would mitigate Progressive Collapse after local loss of support. No specific 
values are given for tie forces or accidental loads for key structural elements.
– The ACI 31-05 standard is an example of indirect design. It defines requirements for structural 
integrity such as continuity of reinforcement and use of ties in precast concrete construction.
– On the other side, the 1998 New York City Building Code is an example of direct design. It only 
mentions the alternate load path and the specific local resistance (34 kPa or 5 psi) methods.
– The commentary of ASCE 7-05 contains extensive discussion on General Structural Integrity. It 
lists the direct design approaches (Alternate Path and Specific Load Resistance methods) and 
the Indirect Design approach. It provides design guidelines for general structural integrity, such 
as good plan layout and use of structural ties. As well, it recommends load combinations 
including extraordinary loads, and explains the underlying probabilities. The ASCE 7-05 
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Table 2.2: Calculated estimates of the probabilities in Leyendecker and Burnett's study. (Source: [24]).
standard is further described in section 2.2.2.2
Furthermore, two regulations do exist, which include precise procedures to determine if a structure 
is to be deemed acceptable with respect to Progressive Collapse. They are the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) “Design of Buildings to Resist Progressive 
Collapse” - DoD UFC 4-023-03 [12], [13], and the General Services Administration's guidelines 
“Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines for New Federal Office Buildings and 
Major Modernization Projects” (GSA 2003) [15]. Their enforcement is only mandatory for 
buildings that belong to these two agencies. However, since no other regulation gives such detailed 
procedures, they are also used outside. The 2005 and 2009 versions of DoD UFC 4-023-03 are 
described in sections 2.2.2.3 and 2.2.2.4, respectively. The GSA 2003 guidelines are described in 
section 2.2.2.5.
2.2.2.1 Italy
In Italy, before 2005 the regulation on precast constructions (DM 03.10.1987) requested that “the 
designer shall give particular attention in order to contain the propagation of a local impairment 
(chain-like collapse)”. The regulation also required minimum ties and generally requested that, in 
case of exceptional events “the prospective destruction of a vertical bearing element of the size of a 
room, of two such elements in a corner position, shall not allow a chain-like collapse”.
In 2005, all the Italian building regulations were replaced by a single Text (“Norme Tecniche per le  
Costruzioni”, commonly referred as “Testo Unitario”), which included multiple references to 
structural Robustness. A second version of the Text, which replaced the first one, was released in 
2008 and included much fewer references and requirements.
The 2005 version of the Text included two definitions of the term “Robustness” (“the ability to  
avoid damages non proportional to the entity of the prompting causes, such as fire, explosions,  
impacts or consequences of human errors”, given in section 2.1, and “the ability of the structure to 
respond in a proportional manner to exceptional situations, whose occurrence cannot be excluded,  
but that cannot be entirely described”, given in section 3.1.
Section 6.1 requested that “buildings must be designed so that the principal structural system can 
withstand local damage without suffering total collapse; the decay in the resistance performance 
must be proportional to the cause that provoked it” saying that this can be achieved through “a 
layout of the structural elements that maintains resistance and stability of the principal scheme 
through a transfer of the load from any damaged structural region to the adjacent ones; this can be 
achieved by providing sufficient continuity, static indeterminacy, ductility to the parts of the 
building.” 
Furthermore, “this way, it should also be prevented the diffusion of the damage from a limited 
region of the structure to a significant part of it, or even to the entire structural organism, in the so 
called “progressive collapse” modality. Such collapse modality, and in general the damage 
propagation, will also be achieved through an appropriate compartmentalization of the structural  
organism.” It must be noticed that the previous quoted part includes the expressions “progressive 
collapse” and “compartmentalization”, but the text does not give a precise definition of 
“progressive collapse”, and “compartmentalization” is only defined referring to thermal insulation 
of structural elements.
The same section says that the Robustness of a work must be tested by imposing some nominal 
loads, “arbitrary but significant for the considered scenario”, including an horizontal load which is 
generally assumed as a fraction of the vertical loads, and by imposing “lack of structural elements,  
to evaluate the consequence of their loss regardless of the cause, in order to locate the critical  
ones”. It must be noticed that these last two prescriptions should have been both mandatory (i.e., the 
Robustness of a work must be tested, by imposing some nominal loads and by imposing lack of 
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structural elements). Furthermore, the last prescription corresponds to the Alternate Load Path 
mitigation strategy (described in section 2.1.4 of the present work), but no indication is given for 
load combinations to be applied in the test, and to the number of elements to be removed from the 
model. This was an exception, as most regulations prescribe combinations and the removal of a 
single element at a time.
The 2008 version of the Text includes one definition of Robustness, almost equal to the first one of 
the 2005 Text: “the ability to avoid damages non proportional to the entity of the prompting causes,  
such as fire, explosions, impacts.”
The requirement of Robustness is considered guaranteed by respecting the limit states prescribed by 
the regulation and by applying conventional horizontal loads equal to 1% of the other loads, not 
concurrently with wind and earthquake. A similar prescription was given in the 2005 Text, but the 
entity of the horizontal loads was reduced for structures taller than 100 m.
Furthermore, “for exceptional design scenarios, the design shall demonstrate the robustness of the 
work by means of procedures of damage scenarios” with given safety coefficients of the materials.
Fires, explosions and impacts are classified as exceptional loads. Load combinations that include 
exceptional loads are given. When explicit consideration is not given to exceptional loads, “the 
structural layout, the details and the used materials will have to be such to avoid that the structure 
could be damaged disproportionately with respect to the cause”.
In the section of the Text is about design criteria for explosions, it says that “local damages due to 
explosions, even severe, are considered acceptable if they don't put into danger the entire structure 
or if structural integrity is maintained long enough to put into effect the necessary emergency 
measures”. In the same section, compartmentalization by disconnection is described among other 
protection measures (see section 1.2 of the present work for a description of this technique).
2.2.2.2 ASCE 7
Nowadays one of the most considered regulations is the ASCE Standard 7 “Minimum Design Loads
for Buildings and Other Structures” (formerly ANSI Standard A58). It includes a small section 
about “General Structural Integrity”, as well as a commentary that elaborates extensively. Among 
the other things, the commentary lists the mitigation strategies, provides design guidelines and 
recommends load combinations for the Specific Load Resistance and Alternate Load Path methods. 
Applying the guidelines and recommendations of ASCE 7 is not mandatory, as they are included in 
a commentary; however, some of these have been included in other regulations, such as the DoD 
UFC 4-023-03 and GSA 2003 (which are described in the next three sections of this work). 
Furthermore, the Standard does not provide specific design criteria (such as e.g. the intensity of the 
extraordinary loads or the required tie strengths).
The edition of the Standard that first introduced a requirement for Progressive Collapse due to 
“local failure caused by severe overloads” was the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
A58.1-1972 Standard, which was the first following the Ronan Point Collapse. Additional 
commentary was provided in later editions. A requirement to check strength and stability of 
structural systems under low-probability events was introduced in 1995.
The 1998 edition of the American Society of Civil Engineers Standard 7 (ASCE 7-98) included a 
short discussion on mitigation of Progressive Collapse in its commentary section C1.4. In particular, 
it recommended:
– to provide sufficient continuity, redundancy, or energy dissipating capacity (ductility), or a 
combination thereof, in the members of the structure;
– to identify extraordinary events with a probability of occurrence in the range of 10−6/yr to 
10−4/yr or greater, and ensure key load-bearing elements can withstand such events;
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– that minimum tie force between structural elements should be 20 kN/m (1400 lb/ft);
– that “design limit states include loss of equilibrium as a rigid body, large deformations leading 
to significant second order effects, yielding or rupture of members, of connections, formation of  
a mechanism, instability of members or the structure as a whole. […] In a damaged structure,  
additional load-carrying mechanisms, such as membrane or catenary action, may be included”;
– that, as elastic analysis may vastly underestimate the capacity of the structure, non-linear or 
plastic analysis may be used.
The 2002 and 2005 editions (ASCE 7-02 and ASCE 7-05) are almost identical, with only small 
editorial differences. Compared to the 1998 version, the commentary is expanded considerably and 
provides guidance on various structural actions to prevent local Damage from progressing. 
Interestingly, the commentary no longer provides guidance on the minimum tie force.
Section C1.4 of the commentary (“General Structural Integrity”) lists the Alternate Path and the 
Specific Local Resistance methods (which together form the “Direct Design” category) as well as 
the Indirect Design method, as “ways to obtain resistance to progressive collapse”. It is also 
comments that “alternate path studies may be used as guides for developing rules for the minimum 
levels of continuity and ductility needed to apply the indirect design approach to enhance general  
structural integrity”.
The Ronan Point and A.P. Murrah Collapses are also briefly described, as “Examples of General  
Collapse”.
Guidelines for the provision of general structural integrity are then given. These include:
1. Good plan layout.
2. Provide an integrated system of ties among the principal elements of the structural system.
3. Returns on walls. A return is a short length of wall usually at right angle to another wall.
4. Changing directions of span of floor slab.
5. Load-bearing interior partitions.
6. Catenary action of floor slab.
7. Beam action of walls. Walls may be assumed to act as the web of a beam with the slabs above 
and below acting as flanges.
8. Redundant structural systems.
9. Ductile detailing.
10. Provide additional reinforcement to resist blast and load reversal when blast loads are 
considered in design.
11. Consider the use of compartmentalized construction in combination with special moment-
resisting frames in the design of new buildings when considering blast protection.
Section C2.5 of the commentary (“Load Combinations for Extraordinary Events”) recommends 
checking the capacity of the structure after notional removal of load-bearing elements (i.e., using 
the Alternate Load Path strategy) with the following load combination:
(0.9 or 1.2) D + (0.5 L or 0.2 S) + 0.2 W  (2.3)
where D is the dead load, L is the live load, S is the snow load and W is the wind load.
According to Ellingwood [35], this load combination is obtained from load statistics and principles 
of reliability analysis, and it has an annual probability of being exceeded of approximately 0.05.
For checking the capacity of a structure or structural element to withstand the effect of an 
extraordinary event (Specific Load Resistance strategy), the following load combinations are 
recommended:
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1.2 D + Ak + (0.5 L or 0.2 S) (2.4)
(0.9 or 1.2) D + Ak + 0.2 W (2.5)
where D is the dead load, L is the live load, S is the snow load, W is the wind load and Ak is the 
value of the load or load effect resulting from extraordinary event A. The value of Ak “must be 
specified by the authority having jurisdiction”.
Further considerations given by the commentary are the following:
“Generally, extraordinary events with a probability of occurrence in the range 10-6 to 10-4/yr or  
greater should be identified, and measures should be taken to ensure that the performance of key 
load-bearing structural systems and components is sufficient to withstand such events.”
“Specific design provisions to control the effect of extraordinary loads and risk of progressive 
failure can be developed with a probabilistic basis. One can either attempt to reduce the likelihood 
of the extraordinary event or design the structure to withstand or absorb damage from the event if it  
occurs. Let F be the event of failure and A be the event that a structurally damaging event occurs. 
The probability of failure due to event A is
P = P( F | A) P( A) ( C2.5-1)
in which P(F | A) is the conditional probability of failure of a damaged structure and P(A) is the 
probability of occurrence of event A. The separation of P(F | A) and P(A) allows one to focus on 
strategies for reducing risk. P(A) depends on siting, controlling the use of hazardous substances,  
limiting access, and other actions that are essentially independent of structural design. In contrast,  
P(F | A) depends on structural design measures ranging from minimum provisions for continuity to 
a complete post-damage structural evaluation.”
“The probability, P(A), depends on the specific hazard. Limited data for severe fires, gas 
explosions, bomb explosions, and vehicular collisions indicate that the event probability depends 
on building size, measured in dwelling units or square footage, and ranges from about 0.23 × 10-6 /
dwelling unit/year to about 7.8 × 10-6 /dwelling unit/year.”
“If one were to set the conditional limit state probability P(F | A) = 0.1/yr - 0.2/yr, however, the 
annual probability of structural failure from eq. C2.5-1 would be on the order of 10-7 to 10-6,  
placing the risk in the low-magnitude background along with risks from rare accidents.”
“Design requirements corresponding to this desired P(F | A) = 0.1 – 0.2 can be developed using 
first-order reliability analysis if the limit state function describing structural behavior is available.”
2.2.2.3 DoD 2005
The 2005 version of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) “Design 
of Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse” - DoD UFC 4-023-03 (in the following referred as 
DoD 2005 for brevity) is described in this section. In 2009 it has been replaced by a new version, 
which is described in section 2.2.2.4 of the present work, and which includes several important 
changes.
DoD 2005 requires that “all new and existing buildings of three stories or more be designed to 
avoid progressive collapse.”
The Progressive Collapse design requirements use two approaches: tie forces (i.e., Indirect Design 
Method) and Alternate Load Path (the latter referred as “Alternate Path method”, or AP). Specific 
Load Resistance and Event Control are not used.
Every DoD facility is assigned one of four Level of Protection ratings: Very Low Level Of 
Protection (VLLOP); Low Level Of Protection (LLOP); Medium Level Of Protection (MLOP) and 
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High Level Of Protection (HLOP). The level of Progressive Collapse design for a structure is 
correlated to its Level of Protection.
The Alternate Path method is used in two situations:
– when a vertical structural element cannot provide the required tie strength, the AP method can 
be used to determine if the structure can bridge over the deficient element after it has been 
notionally removed;
– for structures that require Medium (MLOP) or High Levels of Protection (HLOP) the Alternate 
Path method must be applied for the removal of specific vertical load-bearing elements. A peer 
review for all these Alternate Path analyses must be performed and documented by independent 
and qualified organizations.
More specifically:
– A structure with a Very Low Level of Protection (VLLOP) must provide a specified adequate 
horizontal tie force capacity. If a structural element does not provide the required horizontal tie 
force capacity, it must be re-designed in the case of new construction or retrofitted in the case of 
existing construction; the Alternate Path method cannot be used.
–  A structure with a Low Level of Protection (LLOP) must incorporate both horizontal and 
vertical tie force capacities. If a vertical structural member cannot provide the required vertical 
tie force capacity, the designer must either re-design the member or use the Alternate Path 
method to prove that the structure can bridge over the element when it is removed. For elements 
with inadequate horizontal tie force capacity, the Alternate Path method cannot be used; in this 
case, the designer must redesign the element for new constructions or retrofit the element for 
existing constructions.
– For Medium (MLOP) and High Levels of Protection (HLOP) structures the requirements are 
similar to LLOP, plus the following: “the structure must be able to bridge over specific vertical  
load-bearing elements that are notionally removed from the structure. The plan locations of the 
removed vertical load-bearing elements include, as a minimum, the center of the short side, the 
center of the long side, and the building corner. In addition, vertical loadbearing elements are 
removed wherever there is a significant variation or discontinuity in the structural geometry,  
such as re-entrant corners and abrupt changes in bay sizes.”
“For each plan location of a removed element, an Alternate Path analysis is performed for 
every floor, one at a time; thus, if there are three plan locations and eight stories, twenty four AP 
analyses must be performed. If bridging cannot be demonstrated for one of the removed load-
bearing elements, the structure must be re-designed or retrofitted to increase the bridging 
capacity. Note that the structural re-design or retrofit is not applied to just the deficient element, 
i.e., if a structure cannot be shown to bridge over a removed typical column at the center of the 
long side, the engineer must develop suitable or similar re-designs or retrofits for that column 
and other similar columns. For instance, a re-design might consist of additional positive 
moment rebar at a reinforced concrete beam-column joint; this new design must be applied to 
other columns on that external column line.”
However, “if the designer can show that similar structural response is expected for column 
removal on multiple floors (say, floors 4 though 10), the analysis for these floors can be omitted 
but the designer must document the justification for not performing these analyses.”
Furthermore, “for structures with underground parking or other uncontrolled public ground 
floor areas, remove internal columns near the middle of the short side, near the middle of the 
long side and at the corner of the uncontrolled space. [...] For each plan location, the AP 
analysis is only performed for the column on the ground floor or parking area floor and not for 
all stories in the structure.”
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Specific sections contain the tie requirements as well as the acceptance criteria for Alternate Path 
analyses for reinforced concrete, structural steel, masonry, wood and cold-formed steel. The 
acceptance criteria include strength limits, deformation limits and spread of Damage limits. Step-
by-step procedures for Linear Static, Nonlinear Static and Nonlinear Dynamic Analysis are given.
In section 3.2.4.2 of DoD 2005 the load combination to use for nonlinear dynamic Alternate Load 
Path is given:
(0.9 or 1.2) D + (0.5 L or 0.2 S) + 0.2 W (2.6)
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Figure 2.5: Location of external and internal columns to notionally remove in the Alternate Load Path 
analysis, according to DoD UFC 4-023-03. Similar schematics are given for load-bearing wall  
structures. (Source: [12]).
Figure 2.6: (Left) Location of the areas in which amplified static loads must be applied in an Alternate  
Path analysis, according to DoD UFC 4-023-03. (Right) Schematic of the ties required by the 2005 
version of DoD UFC 4-023-03 (Source: [12]).
where D is the dead load; L is the live load; S is the snow load and W is the wind load.
For linear and nonlinear static analyses, the following amplified load combination must be applied 
to the bays immediately adjacent to the removed element and at all floors above the removed 
element:
2.0 [(0.9 or 1.2) D + (0.5 L or 0.2 S)] + 0.2 W (2.7)
for the rest of the structure, the load combination (2.6) must be used.
It must be noticed that the load combination (2.6) corresponds to the one given by ASCE 7, which 
is reported as formula (2.3) in the present work.
It is prescribed that, if an element reaches the strength or deformation limits during an Alternate 
Path analysis, then it must be either modified or removed.
“For Linear Static models, structural elements that can sustain a constant moment while 
undergoing continued deformation must be modified through insertion of an effective plastic hinge.  
Place a discrete hinge in the model at the location of yielding and apply two constant moments, one 
at each side of the discrete hinge, in the appropriate direction for the acting moment. Determine the 
location of the effective plastic hinge through engineering analysis and judgment or with the 
guidance provided for the particular construction type. In Nonlinear Static and Dynamic models,  
the software must have the ability to adequately represent the nonlinear flexural response, after the 
internal moment reaches the flexural design strength of the element.” If the element must be 
removed, then “Redistribute the loads associated with the failed element per Section 3-2.4.3, before 
the analysis continues.”
“3-2.4.3 Loads Associated with Failed Elements. As discussed later, the internal forces or  
deformation in a structural element or connection may be shown to exceed the acceptability  
criteria. If so, the element is considered to be failed and is removed from the model.”
“For a Nonlinear Dynamic analysis, double the loads from the failed element to account for impact  
and apply them instantaneously to the section of the structure directly below the failed element,  
before the analysis continues. Apply the loads from the area supported by the failed element to an 
area equal to or smaller than the area from which they originated.”
“For a Linear or Nonlinear Static analysis, if the loads on the failed element are already doubled 
as shown in Section 3-2.4.2, then the loads from the failed element are applied to the section of the 
structure directly below the failed element, before the analysis is re-run or continued. If the loads 
on the failed element are not doubled, then double them and apply them to the section of the 
structure directly below the failed element, before the analysis is re-run or continued. In both cases, 
apply the loads from the area supported by the failed element to an area equal to or smaller than 
the area from which they originated.”
The following excerpts describe the prescribed Damage limits of the Alternate Load Path analyses.
“3-2.6.1 Damage Limits for Removal of External Column or Load- Bearing Wall
For the removal of a wall or column on the external envelope of a building, the Damage Limits  
require that the collapsed area of the floor directly above the removed element must be less than the 
smaller of 70m2 (750ft2) or 15 % of the total area of that floor and the floor directly beneath the 
removed element should not fail. In addition, any collapse must not extend beyond the structure 
tributary to the removed element.”
“3-2.6.2 Damage Limits for Removal of Internal Column or Load- Bearing Wall
For the removal of an internal wall or column of a building, the Damage Limits require that the 
collapsed area of the floor directly above the removed element must be less than the smaller of  
140m2 (1500ft2) or 30 % of the total area of that floor, and the floor directly beneath the removed 
element should not fail. In addition, any collapse must not extend beyond the bays immediately 
adjacent to the removed element.”
45
In the commentary of DoD 2005, several observations are given.
Section B-3 states that the tie force requirements are very similar to those provided in the British 
Building Standards, which were developed in response to the Ronan Point accident in 1968. 
Furthermore, “attempts to uncover the processes and logic by which these requirements were 
developed were partially successful and, in discussions with British engineers, it has been noted 
that engineering judgment was used for some of the requirements.” Results of the background 
research are presented.
Section B-4.1 is about the removal criteria of load-bearing elements.
“As discussed in the UFC, the AP method for MLOP and HLOP requires that load-bearing 
elements be removed from every floor, after their plan location is identified. The main motivation 
for this requirement is that DoD facilities could be attacked with artillery, rockets, mortars, or 
rocket propelled grenades, all of which could 
damage a structure at upper floors. Many 
buildings are more susceptible to progressive 
collapse if the damage initiates at higher  
elevations (due to the reduced reserve 
capacity from the fewer number of floors 
above) and this requirement will motivate the 
designer to distribute additional strength and 
ductility to the upper levels.”
Furthermore, “the column or wall is removed 
from the structural model without degrading 
the capabilities of the joint at the upper end of  
the member. Physically, this is unlikely to  
happen in an accidental or man-made event  
and critics of this approach usually refer to 
the column deletion as the “immaculate 
removal.” However, it should be emphasized 
that the AP method is not intended to replicate  
an actual event; the goal is to verify that the 
structure has satisfactory flexural resistance 
to allow bridging across an area with  
localized damage”.
Section B-4.2.2 is about the increase factor in the load combination (2.7).
“The factor of 2.0 acting on the Dead, Live and Snow Loads in Section 3-2.4.2 is used to account  
for the localized inertial effects due to the loss of vertical support over a short, finite period of time.  
The factor 2.0 is used in GSA 2003 and has been validated as conservative through a number of  
numerical simulations of progressive collapse.”
Section B-4.2.3 is about the redistribution of the loads associated with “failed” elements.
“When an element fails, the element's load must be transferred to the rest of the structural model.  
For Nonlinear and Linear Static analysis, the loads applied above the removed column or wall are 
doubled to account for inertial effects that can't be represented in a static solution. As these loads 
are already increased by a factor of 2.0, they are redistributed, without increase, to the structure 
below, over an area that is equal to or smaller than the loaded area that the failed element was 
supporting.”
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Figure 2.7: Representation of the “immaculate 
removal” approach. The same picture, with slight  
variations, is used in DoD UFC 4-023-03 and in  
GSA 2003. (Source: [15]).
“For Nonlinear Dynamic analysis, the entire structure is loaded as detailed in Section 3-2.4.1,  
without the factor of 2 that is used in Static analysis for the structural areas above the removed 
element. However, for Nonlinear Dynamic analysis, the loads from a failed element are doubled 
before being applied to the area below, to grossly account for the effect of structural elements 
falling upon other elements. The load is applied instantaneously, as is the removal of the structural  
element, which may induce significant dynamic response in the structure. The choice of 2.0 is based 
on engineering judgment. While the peak loads in a perfect impact will be much higher than 2.0, it  
is unlikely that elements will fail completely and fall intact upon the lower level. It is more likely 
that the element will be partially restrained, e.g. with rebar that is still embedded in the concrete,  
shear connectors between floor systems and beams, non-load-bearing walls, and other non-
structural elements.”
Examples of design and analysis for reinforced concrete, steel and wood are presented to illustrate 
tie force and Alternate Path calculations. The examples use the software SAP 2000NL.
Observations
Despite the fact that the requirements of DoD 2005 are said to be threat-independent, section B-4.1 
states that the main motivation to require Alternate Path analyses “is that DoD facilities could be 
attacked with artillery, rockets, mortars, or rocket propelled grenades”. Furthermore, in the same 
section it is stated that “however, it should be emphasized that the AP method is not intended to 
replicate an actual event”
The presented procedures are more detailed than those of GSA 2003 (section 2.2.2.5).
The 2005 version of DoD UFC 4-023-03 is not in force anymore; the 2009 version introduced 
several changes, including different removal criteria of load-bearing elements, different increase 
factors and removed Damage limits in the Alternate Path analysis (Damage propagation is not 
admitted anymore).
2.2.2.4 DoD 2009
The 2009 version of UFC 4-023-03 (in the following referred as DoD 2009) “is a significant  
revision to the 25 January 2005 version.” The reasons for the changes include the incorporation of 
new knowledge, the resolution of some contradictions in terminology for structural concepts, and 
the clarification of ambiguities and imprecise guidance for linear static, nonlinear static, and 
nonlinear dynamic structural analysis methods.
Some of the significant changes are:
- replacement of Levels Of Protection 
(LOP) with Occupancy Categories 
(OC), to determine the required level of 
Progressive Collapse design;
- revision of the tie force method, 
including force magnitudes and 
locations of tie forces;
- inclusion of different increase factors 
in the load combinations of the Alternate 
Path analyses;
- Damage propagation in Alternate Load 
Path analyses is not admitted anymore;
- introduction of the “Enhanced Local 
Resistance”, which is basically a hybrid 
between the Specific Load Resistance and the Indirect Design Method.
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Table 2.3: The design requirements of DoD 2009 as a  
function of the Occupancy Category. (Source: [13]).
DoD 2009 prescribes that “for new and existing buildings, all portions that are three stories or 
more shall be designed to avoid progressive collapse”.
The Alternate Path method “is used in two situations: 1) for Option 1 of Occupancy Category II  
and for Occupancy Category IV, when a vertical structural element cannot provide the required tie 
strength, the designer may use the AP method to determine if the structure can bridge over the 
deficient element after it has been notionally removed, and 2) for Occupancy Category II Option 2, 
Occupancy Category III, and Occupancy Category IV, the AP method must be applied for the 
removal of specific vertical load-bearing elements which are prescribed in Section 3-2.9.”
“3-2.9.2 Location of Removed Load-Bearing Elements.
For each plan location defined for element removal, perform AP analyses for:
1. First story above grade
2. Story directly below roof
3. Story at mid-height
4. Story above the location of a column splice or change in column size”
It must be noticed that DoD 2005 required that the analyses to be performed for every story of the 
building, unless “the designer can show that similar structural response is expected for column 
removal on multiple floors”.
Detailed procedures for linear static, nonlinear static and nonlinear dynamic Alternate Path analyses 
are given.
The use of the linear static procedure is limited to structures that meet specific requirements for 
irregularities and Demand-Capacity Ratios (DCR). (A DCR is the ratio between the calculated 
internal forces and the expected strength of an element.)
For linear static and nonlinear static analyses, the gravity load combination for the bays 
immediately adjacent to the removed element and at all floors above the removed element is:
G = Ω [(0.9 or 1.2) D + (0.5 L or 0.2 S)] (2.8)
which is similar to (2.7), with the difference that in (2.8) the increase factor Ω can assume values 
other than 2.0. The value of Ω are tabulated as a function of materials (steel, reinforced concrete, 
masonry, wood or cold-formed steel), structure type (framed or load-bearing wall), type of analysis 
(linear static, nonlinear static) and, for linear analysis, type of internal actions (force-controlled or 
deformation-controlled).
For floor areas away from removed column or wall, the load combination (2.6) remains valid.
Furthermore a fraction of the vertical loads must be applied horizontally in four separate analyses, 
i.e. one for each principal direction of the building.
Enhanced Local Resistance (i.e., an indirect version of the Specific Load Resistance mitigation 
strategy) is introduced for the cases listed in table 2.3. The number of elements for which it is 
required increases with the Occupancy Category.
In the commentary of DoD 2009, several observations are given.
The “three story requirement” is based on a minimum threshold of 12 estimated causalities:
“C-2.1 Three Story Requirement and Story Definition.
The required minimum height of 3 stories for progressive collapse design is taken from the original 
DoD guidance (DoD 2001). This requirement was based on a minimum threshold of 12 casualties  
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in a progressive collapse event where it was assumed that the 2 bays on either side of a removed 
column or wall would collapse on each of 3 floors and that each bay/room would house 2 persons.  
Thus, the justification for setting the limit at 3 stories was determined by the level of casualties and 
not by the mechanics of progressive collapse as a function of structural characteristics.”
The incorporation of different increase factors Ω is discussed:
“C-6.8 Load and Dynamic Increase Factors.
Three analytical procedures may be employed: Linear Static, Nonlinear Static, and Nonlinear 
Dynamic. As progressive collapse is a dynamic and nonlinear event, the applied load cases for the 
static procedures require the use of load increase factors or dynamic increase factors, which 
approximately account for inertial and nonlinear effects. For both Linear Static and Nonlinear 
Static, the 2005 UFC 4-023-03 and the GSA Guidelines use a load multiplier of 2.0, applied 
directly to the progressive collapse load combination.
Three issues with the use of a fixed factor of 2 have been identified. First, the same load multiplier  
is used for Linear Static and Nonlinear Static analyses, although the Nonlinear Static analysis 
incorporates nonlinearity. Second, an increase factor of 2.0 is not appropriate for the majority of  
LS and NS cases. The maximum dynamic displacement of an instantaneously applied and sustained 
load in a linear analysis is twice the displacement achieved when the load is applied statically. If a 
structure is designed to remain elastic, a factor of 2.0 would be appropriate. However, in extreme 
loading events, it is typical to design structures to respond in the nonlinear range. Thus, the 
dynamic increase factor (DIF) that allows a Nonlinear Static solution to approximate a Nonlinear 
Dynamic solution, is typically less than 2. On the other hand, the load increase factor (LIF) for a 
Linear Static analysis must be greater than 2, since dynamic and nonlinear effects are present.  
Third, the load enhancement factor did not vary with the structural performance level, i.e., a 
structure is assigned a load enhancement factor of 2.0 regardless of whether the designer wants to 
allow significant structural damage or very little damage.”
Damage spread is not allowed anymore in Alternate Path analyses:
“C-6.9 Structural Damage Limits.
In the previous UFC, the structural  
damage limits were set at 15% and 
30% for the floor area above the 
removed column or wall at an 
external or internal column or wall,  
respectively. In this UFC, no damage 
to the floor is allowed and these 
criteria have been removed, as the 
floor system, beams, and girders in  
the bays directly above the removed 
column can be designed to not fail,  
as is done for the bays in the floors 
above the removed column location.”
“E-4.2.9 Iterate Dynamic Analysis.
It is important to check that both 
stages of every analysis case 
converge. If the analysis does not 
converge, there is a problem with the 
model and it must be fixed. The 
problem could be numerical with 
assumptions made in SAP, but the 
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Figure 2.8: Drawing from one of the examples included in 
DoD 2009 for Alternate Path analysis. In the first version of  
the structure a mechanism forms, so the analysis is  
immediately terminated and the structure is redesigned 
(Source: [13]).
most likely reason is that the model has a plastic hinge that failed or a mechanism has formed. At  
this point, the model cannot support the load. If the analysis fails to converge [...] members must be 
redesigned.”
2.2.2.5 GSA 2003
The General Services Administration Guidelines “Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design 
Guidelines for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects” (GSA 2003) are 
meant to be used by for all new facilities or building modernization projects of the GSA. A first 
version of the Guidelines was released in 2000, and focused primarily on reinforced concrete 
structures; the 2003 version also addresses steel frame structures.
The Guidelines use a threat independent methodology and rely mainly on the Alternate Load Path 
method (referred as “Alternate Analysis Techniques”).
A series of flowcharts are provided to guide the designer and in deciding if the building needs to be 
designed against Progressive Collapse or not. The flowchart criteria are based on use, occupancy, 
type of the building, standoff distance from moving or parked vehicles, as well as structural features 
such as seismic design.
If design against Progressive Collapse needs to be considered, then static or dynamic, linear or 
nonlinear analyses can be performed (although static analyses are not recommended for buildings 
taller than 10 stories). If the analysis results don't comply with given analysis criteria, then “the 
facility exhibits a high potential for progressive collapse” and shall be redesigned.
The overall recommended design strategy is to notionally instantaneously remove one primary 
vertical structural element (one column in frame structures, one structural bay or 9 m of wall, 
whichever is less, in load bearing wall structures), and to show by analysis that the resulting 
Damage is limited to:
- the structural bay directly associated with the removed element, or
- 170 m2 (1800 ft2) at the floor directly above (if the removed element is exterior), or
- 330 m2 (3600 ft2) at the floor directly above (if the removed element is interior).
In typical structural configurations, the analyses must be performed for the instantaneous loss of 
elements located:
- at or near the middle of the short side of the building; 
- at or near the middle of the long side of the building;
- at the corner of the building.
If there is an uncontrolled ground floor area and/or an underground parking area, then the analysis 
must also be performed for the instantaneous loss of one internal element that extends from the 
floor of the area to the next floor (1 story). Additional analysis cases should be considered if there 
are significant changes in column or other load bearing member strength or configuration along any 
portion of the facility.
For structural configurations with an atypical structural arrangement, engineering judgment must be 
used to determine critical analysis scenarios that should be assessed, in addition to the situations 
previously listed. Possible structural configurations that may result in an atypical structural 
arrangement include, but are not limited to: combination structures; vertical discontinuities/transfer 
girders; variations in bay size/extreme bay sizes, plan irregularities; closely spaced columns.
The vertical load combination to be applied for static analyses is:
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Load = 2(DL + 0.25LL) (2.9)
and for dynamic analyses is:
Load = DL + 0.25LL (2.10)
where DL is the dead load and LL is the live load.
The coefficient 2 in the static analyses combination (2.9) accounts for the dynamic effects due to 
instantaneous removal. If dynamic analysis is performed, member removal should take place in less 
than 1/10 of the period associated with the structural response mode of the structure. 
It is also prescribed that “the vertical element removal shall consist of the removal of the vertical  
element only. This removal should not impede into the connection/joint or horizontal elements that  
are attached to the vertical element at the floor levels.” This corresponds to the so called 
“immaculate removal” approach (figure 2.7).
The acceptance criteria for nonlinear analyses are given values of ductility and rotation limits for 
members. For static linear elastic analysis, the demand-capacity ratio (DCR) is used, defined as
DCR=QUD/QCE (2.11)
where
QUD is the acting force on structural member or joint, and
QCE is the expected ultimate, unfactored capacity.
The allowable DCR values for the structural elements are:
- DCR < 2.0 for typical structural configurations
- DCR < 1.5 for atypical structural configurations
A step-by-step procedure, only for the linear elastic, static analysis is given: 
“Step 1. Remove a vertical support from the location being considered and conduct a linear-static  
analysis  of  the structure as indicated in  Section 4.1.2.2.  Load the model  with  2(DL +  
0.25LL).”
Step 2.  Determine which members and connections have DCR values that exceed the acceptance 
criteria. If the DCR for any member end connection is exceeded based upon shear force,  
the member is to be considered a failed member. In addition, if the flexural DCR values for  
both ends of a member or its connections, as well as the span itself, are exceeded (creating  
a three hinged failure mechanism), the member is to be considered a failed member. Failed  
members should be removed from the model, and all dead and live loads associated with  
failed members should be redistributed to other members in adjacent bays.”
“Step 3. For a member or connection whose QUD/QCE ratio exceeds the applicable flexural DCR 
values, place a hinge at the member end or connection to release the moment. This hinge  
should be located at the center of flexural yielding for the member or connection. Use rigid  
offsets and/or stub members from the connecting member as needed to model the hinge in  
the proper location. For yielding at the end of a member the center of flexural yielding 
should not  be taken to  be more than ½ the depth of  the member from the face of  the  
intersecting member, which is usually a column).”
“Step 4.  At each inserted hinge, apply equal-but-opposite moments to the stub/offset and member 
end to each side of the hinge. The magnitude of the moments should equal the expected  
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flexural strength of the moment or connection, and the direction of the moments should be  
consistent with direction of the moments in the analysis performed in Step 1.”
“Step 5.  Re-run the analysis and repeat Steps 1 through 4. Continue this process until no DCR 
values are exceeded. If moments have been re-distributed throughout the entire building 
and DCR values are still exceeded in areas outside of the allowable collapse region, the  
structure will be considered to have a high potential for progressive collapse.”
Observations
The GSA Guidelines use a threat independent approach, “as it is not feasible to rationally examine 
all potential sources of collapse initiation.” However the choice of the elements to be removed 
(single external vertical elements at the ground floor, plus one internal element if there is an 
uncontrolled ground floor area and/or an underground parking area) suggest that consideration was 
given mainly to vehicle-related Hazards (either vehicle collision or car bombing). This is also 
corroborated by the importance given to the standoff distance in the criteria to decide if the building 
needs to be analyzed.
The proposed analysis methodology does not consider more than one single element as initial 
Damage. This is justified in the introduction of the Guidelines: “The approach taken (i.e., the 
removal of a column or other vertical load bearing member) is not intended to reproduce or 
replicate any specific abnormal load or assault on the structure. Rather, member removal is simply 
used as a “load initiator” and serves as a means to introduce redundancy and resiliency into the 
structure.” Furthermore, like in the DoD UFC 4-023-03, the “immaculate removal” approach is 
used.
It must be noticed that the DoD UFC 4-023-03 uses similar criteria to choose the elements to be 
removed, but it requires that the analysis must be repeated on several (DoD 2009) or even all floors 
(DoD 2005), not only on the ground floor.
The coefficient 2 in the the load combination for static analyses (2.9) accounts for the dynamic 
effects due to instantaneous removal. DoD UFC 4-023-03 uses a similar approach, but the increased 
load is only applied in the areas surrounding the removed element, i.e. where the dynamic effects 
really should arise. Other aspects of this approach are further discussed in section 2.2.2.4.
2.2.3 Survey of prescriptions
As a general overview, the following tables (taken from [35]) summarize the prescriptions of 
several regulations about Progressive Collapse. Some of the listed regulations are not in force 
anymore, but are included for comparison.
The surveyed regulations are the following:
– British Standard BS 5950-1:2000, Structural Use of Steelwork in Building
– BS 5628-1:1992, Code of Practice for Use of Masonry
– BS 5268-2:2002, Structural Use of Timber
– BS 8110-1:1997, Structural Use of Concrete
– BS 8110-2:1985, Structural Use of Concrete (Special Circumstances)
– National Research Council of Canada, National Building Code of Canada (NBCC) (1975)
– National Research Council of Canada, National Building Code of Canada (NBCC) (1977)
– National Research Council of Canada, National Building Code of Canada (NBCC) (1990)
– New York City Building Code (1998)
– New York City Department of Buildings, World Trade Center Building Code Task Force (2003)
– Department of Defense (2003) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 Minimum 
Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings 
– Department of Defense (2005) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-023-03, Design of Buildings 
to Resist Progressive Collapse
– General Service Administration (GSA) Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines 
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for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects (June 2003)
– American Society of Civil Engineers (1998), ASCE 7-98
– American Society of Civil Engineers (2002), ASCE 7-02
– American Society of Civil Engineers (2005), ASCE 7-05
– Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and 
Major Reorganization Projects (2001)
– Precast Concrete Institute (PCI) Committee on Precast Concrete Bearing Wall Buildings (1976)
– Swedish Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket, June 2000); Design Regulations 
BKR: Mandatory Provisions and General Recommendations, BFS 1993:58 with amendments up 
to BFS 1998:39, BFS 1999:7 and BFS 1999:46
– Swedish Board of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket, 1994): Handbook on Vibrations, 
Induced Deformations and Accidental Loads
– Eurocode 1 - Section 2 – Actions on Structures, Part 1 – Basis of Design (CEN 250 1994) (pre 
EN 2002)
– Eurocode 2 – Design of concrete structures, Part 1, (prEN 1992-1-1: July 2002): General rules 
and rules for buildings
 
Table 2.4 summarizes the maximum extent of Damage propagation admitted by the building codes. 
In some cases (British Standards, National Building Code of Canada, New York City Building 
Code, World Trade Center Building Code Task Force) this extent defines the threshold between 
“local” and “disproportionate” or “progressive” Collapse.
In the case of DoD UFC 4-023-03 2005 and GSA 2003, the reported extent is the permitted 
“Damage limit” for the spread of Damage, as determined by structural analysis, resulting from the 
notional removal of one vertical load-bearing element (i.e., in an Alternate Load Path analysis). It 
must be remembered that the 2009 version of DoD UFC 4-023-03 does not admit Damage 
propagation in the Alternate Load Path analysis.
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Table 2.4: Maximum extent of Damage propagation admitted by some 
building codes. The 2009 version of DoD UFC 4-023-03 does not admit any  
Damage propagation in Alternate Load Path analyses. (Source: [35]).
Some of the regulations that contain provisions for structural integrity apply these provisions to all 
buildings by default. Other regulations recommend that Progressive Collapse only needs to be 
considered in 
determined cases, like 
for example in buildings 
that are above a certain 
height, or whose failure 
could cause severe loss 
of human life. Table 2.5 
summarizes the 
threshold for 
consideration of 
Progressive Collapse.
Table 2.6 reports the mitigation strategies prescribed by various building codes. The first row of the 
table (labeled “Risk”) mainly corresponds to the Event Control mitigation strategy (which is 
introduced in section 2.1.1 
of the present work). The 
second row (“Layout”) 
corresponds to the Indirect 
Design Method (section 
2.1.4). The third row 
reports provisions for the 
Alternate Load Path 
strategy (section 2.1.3). 
The fourth row 
corresponds to the 
Specific Load Resistance 
strategy (section 2.1.2); 
the “Key Elements” are 
those that need to be 
designed to resist 
exceptional loads. The 
fifth row reports 
prescriptions for the 
Indirect Design Method 
(section 2.1.4).
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Table 2.5: Threshold for consideration of Progressive Collapse according to 
some building codes. (Source: [35]).
Table 2.6 (part 1 of 4): Mitigation strategies prescribed by various 
building codes. (Source: [35]).
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Table 2.6 (part 3 of 4).
Table 2.6 (part 2 of 4).
Table 2.7 reports the load combinations prescribed by various building codes for checking 
structures. The first column (“Load combinations after notional member removal”) corresponds to 
the Alternate Load Path strategy, while the third column (“Accidental load”) corresponds to the 
Specific Load Resistance strategy.
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Table 2.6 (part 4 of 4).
2.3 Summary and comments
In this chapter, section 2.1 lists and explains the four categories of strategies that have been 
identified for Progressive Collapse mitigation.
Section 2.2 presents a review of some of the most significant regulations about Progressive 
Collapse, including their historical evolution.
From this information several observations can be derived.
The level and type of attention given to Progressive Collapse has changed through the years. 
Between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s the “new phenomenon” Progressive Collapse attracted 
interest of the researchers and prompted changes in building codes. Decades later, some of these 
research results are still referenced nowadays, and some building codes requirements are still in 
force with little or no modifications.
The level of attention given to Progressive Collapse was especially boosted by three important 
cases: the Ronan Point Tower (which occurred in 1968; see section 1.4.1), the A.P. Murrah Federal 
Building (1995; section 1.4.3), and the World Trade Center (2001; section 1.4.4). In other years, less 
attention was given. A significant example is the case of the National Building Code of Canada, 
whose discussion about Progressive Collapse in the 1975 version is much longer than the 1995 
version, because “the extent of the discussion reflects the importance accorded to the topic at the 
time”([35], section A.3.3).
The type of attention also changed. Most of the early studies referred mainly to accidental gas 
explosions as prompting events of the Collapses; likewise, the regulation were giving much 
attention to precast structures. Conversely, nowadays the attention is mainly on terroristic attacks.
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Table 2.7: Load combinations prescribed by various building codes for checking structures. (Source: [35]).
Most of the currently available data about Collapses and exceptional Hazards are decades old and 
were collected in less than optimal ways (e.g. from news sources, rather than from investigations).
For example the following quote, from Leyendecker and Burnett [23], is significant: “the number of  
incidents causing damage in excess of a specific level (measured in dollars) or a brief description 
of damage is usually provided. There is rarely complete information on the type or number of  
structures affected or an adequate description of their damage. There is also no available US data 
which provide a correlation between a specified damage level and a corresponding damage loss in 
dollars. Finally there are no data on the load characteristics of the actual events.”
Furthermore, the incidence of some Hazards could have changed in the years (e.g. the probability of 
vehicular impact on buildings as a consequence of the increased number of vehicles).
It is likely that the amount and the quality of the information could be greatly improved, if a good 
methodology to collect it was devised and enforced.
The regulations could be improved. Some regulations generically request the designer to avoid or 
contain the propagation of local Damage, but give little or no guidance on how to do it.
Other regulations provide more detailed instructions, which basically consist in applying one or 
some of the strategies listed in section 2.1.
In these regulations, there often is not a real required performance. For example, the Alternate Load 
Path analysis “is not intended to reproduce or replicate any specific abnormal load or assault on 
the structure. Rather, member removal is simply used as a “load initiator” and serves as a means to 
introduce redundancy and resiliency into the structure” (GSA 2003 [15]).
With other types of Hazards it is generally assumed that, by applying the prescriptions of modern 
building codes, the probability that a given performance will not be fulfilled will be lower than an 
acceptable value. With Progressive Collapse the prescribed methodologies can apparently be 
similar, but by applying them we cannot be sure that the probability of having a given consequence 
(like the occurrence of a Collapse of a specified extent) will be lower than an acceptable value.
Furthermore, for some building code requirements and assumptions “engineering judgment was 
used” (DoD 2005 [12]) or, in other words, the used criteria are not objective.
The considerations here presented are an influence on the development of the methodologies 
proposed in chapter 5 of the this work.
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Chapter 3 - Quantification of Progressive Collapse propensity
Several ideas have been proposed for parameters to quantify the propensity to Progressive Collapse 
of structures. In literature these parameters are generally referred with various names, such as 
“Robustness Index” or “Vulnerability”. Such parameters would be useful to decide if a given 
structure is safe enough against Progressive Collapse, or if mitigation methods need to be applied.
The present chapter lists and analyzes some of these ideas.
Section 3.1 clarifies some aspects about the terms “robust” and “Robustness”.
Section 3.2 lists several of the ideas that have been proposed for the quantification of Progressive 
Collapse propensity, and elaborates on them.
Section 3.3 summarizes the chapter and elaborates on its concepts.
3.1 The concept of Robustness
The adjective “robust” and the noun “Robustness” are widely used in the literature about 
Progressive Collapse. They are also commonly used in many other fields of science and technology.
Several different definitions and meanings of “robust” and “Robustness” exist. In general, even 
inside the same field there can be multiple definitions and/or meanings. The common concept of all 
definitions is that in a robust system, a change in the input produces a small variation in the output. 
The smaller the variation, the more robust the system. As a consequence, the term “Robustness” can 
actually have several different meanings, even for the same system, because different input and 
output parameters can be considered.
For example, in the context of Progressive Collapse, the input parameters can be the intensity of a 
traumatic event, or the extension of the initial Damage, or others; the output parameters can be the 
occurrence of indirect Damage, the final extension of the Damage, short and long term monetary 
Losses, or others.
As a consequence, most of the ideas proposed in literature calculate “Robustness Indexes” that 
cannot be compared to each other, and a structure might be considered robust according to one 
index and non-robust according to another one. To avoid ambiguity, the three “components” of 
Robustness (system, input parameters and output parameters) should always be clearly stated.
Section 3.2.1.1 describes a paper in which these concepts are further discussed.
3.2 Ideas that have been proposed to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity
The following sections describe several ideas that have been proposed for the quantification of 
Progressive Collapse propensity. Each idea is also commented. Section 3.3 summarizes the listed 
ideas and elaborates.
3.2.1 Maes et al.
The article “Structural robustness in the light of Risk and consequence analysis” [29], by Maes, 
Fritzons and Glowienka, elaborates on the concept of Robustness and proposes three Robustness 
indicators; one example is proposed, in which the three indicators are applied.
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3.2.1.1 About Robustness
The paper first highlights that the meaning given to the word “robust” will likely vary from person 
to person. It quotes the Oxford dictionary, which defines “robust” as “pertaining to, or requiring 
bodily strength or hardiness and vigour; possessing or indicating great strength”. Furthermore, it 
states that in civil engineering, it is used as a synonym for stability, ductility, reserve strength 
capacity, redundancy, or as an opposite of Vulnerability and fragility.
Then definitions of “Robustness” are given for different fields of science and technology: Control 
Theory, Statistical Inference, Bayesian Decision Making, Quality Control and Product, 
Development, Design Optimization, Ecosystems and Immune Systems and Software Engineering.
According to the Authors, “the modern usage of “robustness” [...] refers to the manner in which 
certain performance objectives or system properties are affected by hazardous or extreme 
conditions” and “Robustness is also a measure of the persistence in time of certain qualitative 
features in a system in response to perturbations”.
Furthermore, “it should be noted that robustness is defined for “specified performance objectives” 
of a given system, with “specified perturbations” being applied to the system. It makes no sense to 
speak of a system being robust without first specifying both the feature and the perturbations of  
interest”.
“For civil engineering infrastructure, the “performance objectives” are almost always related to 
consequences (what happens after something goes wrong?). They can be broad, as in: system 
survival, post-disaster operational capability, limitation of financial losses, safety to people,  
sustainability, and minimal environmental impact; but they can also act as indirect objectives and 
therefore they can be narrow and geared towards concepts intrinsic to structural design, such as: 
maintaining sufficient redundancy, ductility and reserve capacity, or the containment of very 
specific consequences or followup consequences”.
“It should be noted that the aspect of insensitivity to perturbations includes the common (but  
narrower) definition of robustness as the ability of a system to sustain damage following an extreme 
disturbance. In this context, system survivability is the key performance objective and excessive 
consequences such as system failure or collapse are to be avoided”.
3.2.1.2 First proposed idea: maintaining sufficient system structural resistance
For the definition of the first Robustness indicator, it is considered a system consisting of n 
members which can be in safe or failed states. The assumed objective is to ensure that the system’s 
resistance as a whole can be maintained to a sufficient degree following an environmental load that 
causes failure in one of its components i.
The reserve strength ratio (RSR) is defined as ratio of the environmental load at system Collapse 
divided by the original design environmental load.
The first Robustness indicator is defined as
R1:=min
i
RSRi
RSR0
(3.1)
where RSRi is the reserve strength ratio of the structure when the i-th of its elements is impaired 
(“failed”), and RSR0 is the reserve strength ratio of the structure with no impaired elements.
The Authors highlight that the indicator R1 gives no consideration to consequences of failure or 
hazard likelihoods.
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3.2.1.3 Second proposed idea: maintaining sufficient system structural reliability
For the second Robustness indicator, the assumed objective is to maintain system reliability in a 
failed condition following the occurrence of a disturbance of a specified intensity.
The system failure probability of the undamaged system is notated as Ps0, while the system failure 
probability of with the i-th element impaired is notated as Psi.
The indicator is defined as
R2 :=min
i
Ps0
Psi
(3.2)
3.2.1.4 Third proposed idea: containing severe system consequences
The third Robustness indicator refers to the cases in which “the system cannot easily be expressed 
as an assembly of components or members as in the case of a complex or a continuous structural 
system”. The indicator has been developed to be suitable “to deal with the objective of containing 
the costs associated with the consequences of failure CF in a system subject to an external hazard 
X”.
First the Authors show a diagram of hazard intensity versus consequences of failure (figure 3.1, 
left), in which sample response (a) shows a very robust structure, (b) shows a structure in which 
consequences and hazard are relatively proportional and (c) shows a system with very little 
Robustness. Then the probability of exceedance of failure consequences is obtained, given the 
occurrence of an extraordinary hazard, by integrating over the probability density function of
the hazard. By plotting this probability in logarithmic scale (figure 3.1, right), “a good idea of the 
tail behaviour of the failure consequence distribution can be obtained”. The resulting graph “can be 
used qualitatively to rank system robustness. If a more quantitative ranking is desirable, then a 
suitable measure of robustness R3 can be defined as the inverse of the tail heaviness H of the log-
exceedance curve”
R3:=1/H (3.3)
It is highlighted that H is less than one for case (a), equal to one for case (b) and greater than one for 
case (c).
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Figure 3.1: Third proposed idea for a Robustness indicator by Maes et al. (Left) Diagram of hazard 
intensity versus consequences of failure. (Right) Diagram of probability of exceedance of failure 
consequences versus consequences of failure. (Source: [29]).
3.2.1.5 Proposed example
An example of the application of the proposed ideas is presented. It consists of a chemical lab 
building, which contains toxic chemicals, in which forklifts operate. The hazard consists in severe 
forklift impact on the central wall of the building, which can cause Collapse of a floor slab. The 
performance objectives is the containment of the failure consequences, in terms of: life safety of the 
occupants, prevention of excessive economic Losses due to Damage in the laboratory and the 
surrounding buildings, environmental protection against spilling of chemicals and prevention of 
long-term and indirect Losses to the company. The behavior of the structure is modeled with plastic 
analysis.
The first indicator R1 is easily calculated by comparing the ultimate load of the floor slab with and 
without the central wall, using characteristic strength values. The Authors observe that “R1 says 
nothing about the hazard itself. It serves only to contrast the intact with the impaired system”.
To calculate the second indicator R2 a reliability analysis 
of the slab, with and without the central wall, is 
performed using the Second Order Reliability Method 
(SORM); the assumed probabilistic distributions and 
parameters are taken from the Joint Committee on 
Structural Safety (JCSS) Probabilistic Model Code [19] 
(figure 3.2). The Authors do not comment after the 
calculation of R2.
Next, the third indicator R3 is considered. According to 
the Authors, “the risk/consequence analysis involves 
extensive event trees in combination with structural  
reliability analysis”. A total of 25 random variables are 
included in the reliability analysis, which is performed 
“based on the Eurocode 2 model-column-method”. The considered variables include those that 
characterize the exceptional hazard, like “Occurrence of forklift traffic” and “Probability of more 
than one critical forklift traffic impact in 50 years”. The cost of the consequences is expressed in 
Euros (figure 3.3, left). In the end, a diagram of the consequences of failure as function of their 
probability of exceedance is obtained (figure 3.3, right). The Authors comment that “it shows that  
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Figure 3.3: Example of application of the third proposed idea for a Robustness indicator by Maes et al.  
(Left) Table of costs of the consequences. (Right) Calculated diagram of probability of exceedance of  
failure consequences versus consequences of failure. (Source: [29]).
Figure 3.2: Table of the basic random 
variables used to calculate the indicators 
R2 and R3. (Source: [29]).
the structural robustness is quite sensitive to the immediate consequences of the slab failure as well  
as the volume of chemicals spilled”; a value of the parameter R3 is not actually calculated.
Observations
The first proposed Robustness indicator R1 follows a deterministic approach, while R2 and R3 
follow a probabilistic approach. The Authors stress that the indicators differ for the different 
consideration given to hazard likelihood and consequences of failure (i.e, “input” and “output” 
parameters of Robustness; see section 3.1).
All the proposed ideas only consider one impaired element at a time (i.e., they do not consider the 
events in which multiple elements are impaired), even though they could easily be extended to 
include more cases.
It is stated that R1 and R2 can be used to ensure that the system's resistance and reliability can be 
maintained to a sufficient degree; no specific criterion is presented to quantify this sufficient degree. 
For R3 the target is containing the costs associated with the consequences of failure; in the example, 
the estimated costs are represented by a diagram, rather than by parameter R3 itself.
The reported example refers to one determined exceptional hazard (the forklift impact) and only one 
case of damaged structural element (the central wall). The approach for R3 would likely work if 
several exceptional hazards were considered; it is not clear if it would work for multiple Damage 
scenarios.
Applying the idea for the third Robustness indicator R3 requires a probabilistic characterization of 
the exceptional hazard, and in the presented example it likely required an important computational 
effort. The article does not specify many details about the used computation method.
3.2.2 Starossek
Starossek proposes five approaches for the quantification of a “Robustness index” or a “Collapse 
resistance index”. The following information is taken from a thesis supervised by the Author 
himself [18], in which the ideas are presented, analyzed and commented by the Student. Some 
comments of the Student are also reported here.
The Author defines Robustness as a structure's insensitivity with respect to a local malfunction or to 
a local Damage. The Author also distinguishes between “Robustness” and “Collapse resistance”. 
Collapse resistance is defined as the property of a structure of being insensitive to accidental 
circumstances. The difference between the two definitions is that Robustness only considers a local 
malfunction or Damage, while Collapse resistance also considers the events that can cause such 
malfunction or Damage.
3.2.2.1 First proposed idea: differential Damage
Given a structure, some local Damage is introduced and its reaction is observed.
The Robustness index RI is defined as the complementary of the normalized Damage:
RI:=1-maxj(dj) (3.4)
where dj is a normalized measure of the total Damage caused by the loss of the j-th structural 
restraint condition. Because of the normalization, both dj and RI are comprised between 0 and 1.
Observations
The approach is deterministic. It is very general, in that it is not specified how the Damage is 
quantified and calculated. The considered input is the initial local Damage determined by the loss of 
restraints, while the considered consequences are the maximum final extension of the Damage. It is 
not specified how many cases of restraint loss need to be considered.
No example of the application of this approach is given. No criterion is given to define an 
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acceptable limit value of RI. Consistently with the given definition, the cause of the initial Damage 
is neglected.
3.2.2.2 Second proposed idea: integral Damage
This approach is considered by the Author as an extension of the previous one. The Robustness 
index RI is defined as:
RI :=1−2∫
0
1
[d i −i ]di (3.5)
where i is a measure of the normalized initial Damage, and d(i) is a measure of the normalized final 
Damage. It is not specified how i and d(i) are quantified and calculated.
The value of the index spans between 1 for a perfectly robust structure to 0 for total lack of 
Robustness.
The index can be graphically represented as illustrated in figure 3.4 (left), in which the horizontal 
axis represents the normalized initial Damage i, the vertical axis represents the normalized final 
Damage d(i) and the areas comprised between one of the curves (A, B or C) and the diagonal of the 
square represent the values of RI for three different cases. The line labeled B represents a 
particularly robust structure, while the line labeled C represent a particularly non-robust structure. It 
is observed that line A and B should give values of RI in the same order of magnitude, even though 
structure B would be considered more robust than structure A according to the given definition of 
Robustness, because for lower values of the initial Damage the structure B has a smaller final 
Damage.
It is also observed that, since the considered definition of Progressive Collapse includes the concept 
of disproportion between initial Damage and its consequences, and the considered definition of 
Robustness considers a local initial Damage, lower values of i should be more important than 
higher values. Thus, starting from the definition (3.5), the following new definition is formulated:
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Figure 3.4: Second proposed idea for a Robustness index by Starossek. (Left) Graphical representation of  
definition (3.5). (Right) Graphical representation of definition (3.6). (Source: [18]).
RI :=1− 2
i grenz∗2−igrenz 
∫
0
igrenz
[d  i−i ]di (3.6)
in which igrenz is the maximum considered value of the initial Damage.
This new definition is represented in figure 3.4 (right). Like in the previous definition, the value of 
the index spans between 1 and 0.
Three more observations are given.
One is that the integrals in (3.5) and (3.6) need to be discretized, since the parameters in the 
integrals cannot be determined continuously.
The second is that for each intensity i of the initial Damage there are different final Damage 
configurations j, which differ for type, location and shape of the Damage. Thus it is proposed to 
define the normalized final Damage as:
d i =max
j
d i j (3.7)
The third given observation is that the proposed Robustness index is currently not calculable 
because of the big effort that it would require.
Observations
As with the first proposed idea, it is not specified how the Damage is quantified and calculated. The 
cause of the initial Damage is neglected and no criterion is given to define an acceptability limit 
value of RI. No example of the application of this approach is given.
With reference to figures 3.4, the slope angle of the curves for low values of i could be more 
meaningful than the subtended areas. 
3.2.2.3 Third proposed idea: differential energy
This approach is based on the comparison of three types of energy:
• Ei (initial): energy necessary for the occurrence of an initial failure
• Er (released): energy released through the initial failure
• Es (subsequent): energy necessary for the failure of a subsequent element
It is observed that, in order to have Damage progression, the released energy must be bigger than 
than the energy necessary to damage a subsequent element:
Er ≥ Es (3.8)
From this necessary (but not sufficient) condition a Robustness index is derived.
The condition (3.8) is only valid for failure of a second element. To take into account the 
progression of failure to other elements, the following generalization is considered:
Er,j ≥ Es,j+1 (3.9)
where Er,j is the energy released from failure of the j-th element; Es,j+1 is the energy necessary for the 
failure of the (j+1)-th element; and Er,0=Er.
Complete progression of the Damage up to total failure does not occur if the following condition is 
respected and no external energy is given to the structure:
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∑
k=0
j
E r ,k∑
k=0
j
E s, k1 with j=1,...,n-1 (3.10)
where n is the total number of elements of the considered Damage scenario.
From condition (3.10) the following definition of Robustness index is derived:
RI :=
∑
k=0
n
Es , k1
∑
k=0
n
E r ,k
(3.11)
If RI>1, then total failure does not occur; if RI≤1, then total failure is possible.
Since n is defined as the total number of elements of the considered Damage scenario, in the 
previous text line “total failure” should mean “failure of all the elements of the considered final  
Damage scenario”, and not “failure of all the elements of the structure”. It is highlighted that, in 
order to apply the proposed idea, all possible Damage scenarios must be investigated, which would 
require a very big effort.
Observations
This approach is deterministic. It is not stated how the energies can be calculated. The index is 
based on a necessary but not sufficient condition; as a consequence it should tell if a Collapse 
scenario is possible, not if it actually happens.
3.2.2.4 Fourth proposed idea: integral energy
This approach is aimed at measuring a Collapse resistance index (CRI). It's worth to remember that 
the Author defines “Collapse resistance” as the property of a structure of being insensitive to 
accidental circumstances; while the proposed definition of “Robustness” only considers a local 
malfunction or Damage, “Collapse resistance” also considers the events that can cause such 
malfunction or Damage.
The Collapse resistance index is based on the comparison of the energy necessary for the complete 
destruction of the structure Ed and its total mass or weight M:
CRI:=min Ed/M (3.12)
Another version of the index is obtained by substituting the mass M with the potential energy of the 
structure prior to failure Ep (which is given by the structural masses multiplied by their elevation 
from a reference level):
CRI*:=min Ed/Ep (3.13)
Another proposed variant of the index is similar to (3.13), but substitutes the bounding energy Eb 
for the potential energy Ep.
Observations
The proposed indexes refer to the total Collapse of the structure, and it seems that they should not 
give information about partial Collapses. It is not stated how the energy necessary for the complete 
destruction of the structure can be calculated. No criterion is given to assess from the proposed 
indexes if the studied structure is to be considered acceptable.
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3.2.2.5 Fifth proposed idea: stiffness
Two Robustness indexes are defined by comparing the stiffness of a structure in damaged and 
undamaged state.
The first index is calculated on the basis of an average of all damaged configurations:
RI := 1
n∑i=1
n
K i/K0 (3.16)
the second index is calculated on the basis of the most unfavorable Damage scenario:
RI :=min
i
K i/K0 (3.17)
where n is the number of the elements or of the system restraints; Ki=det(Ki) is the determinant of 
the modified stiffness matrix, obtained by removing one element from the structure or one restraint 
from the model; and K0=det(K0) is the determinant of the stiffness matrix of the undamaged 
structure. The value of both indexes can vary within 0 and 1.
In [18] it is highlighted that these indexes are easier to calculate than the other ones, because they 
don't require solution of static or dynamic problems. However, they should provide less information 
than other ones because they do not consider Damage progression or impact of structural elements. 
It is also stated that, according to some test calculations, the indexes quickly assume very low 
values, thus a scaling of the parameters is suggested.
Observations
Again, no criterion is given to assess from the proposed indexes if the studied structure is to be 
considered acceptable. It is not taken into account that the entry values of a stiffness matrix is likely 
to change during a Collapse, because of the non-linear effects involved. For example, in order to 
model a catenary effect (section 2.1.3) geometrical nonlinearities must be considered. Thus the 
considered stiffness matrices could be not representative of the structure's actual behavior.
3.2.3 Giuliani et al.
The paper “Strategie per il Conseguimento della Robustezza Strutturale: Connessione e 
Compartimentazione” [17], (italian for “Strategies to Achieve Structural Robustness: Connection 
and Compartmentalization”) by Giuliani and Wolff, gives two definitions of structural Robustness 
and proposes one algorithm to quantitatively estimate it.
The first definition is qualitative: Robustness is the ability of a structure to maintain an adequate 
level of structural integrity after a critical event that directly provokes failure of a localized part of 
the structure.
The second definition is quantitative: Robustness is defined as the ratio between an increase of the 
structural Damage level ΔD and the corresponding resistance decrease ΔR. Furthermore, a structure 
can be deemed robust if the ratio is lower than a limit value L:
robust structure ↔ |ΔR|/ΔD<L (3.18)
The Damage level D is quantified as the number of failed structural elements. The limit value L 
must be chosen according to the importance of the structure and exposure to threatening events; the 
paper does not provide more specific criteria, nor examples, to quantify the limit value L.
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The algorithm to calculate the Robustness of a structure is the following:
1. The structure is modeled, undamaged (D=0) and subjected to loads.
2. A nonlinear static analysis is performed, increasing the load. The ultimate resistance is given by 
the load multiplier λ that causes kinematic indeterminacy of the structure.
3. The Damage level D is increased by one unit.
4. D elements are removed from the structure and the static analysis is repeated.
Step 4 is reiterated for all the possible combinations of D elements removed.
Then the algorithm goes back to step 3, i.e. the Damage level is increased by one unit and step 4 is 
performed again for all the possible combinations of the new Damage level.
The algorithm stops at a determined Damage level.
The results of the analysis can be represented in a 
digram like the one in figure 3.5, in which the 
horizontal axis reports the Damage level D and the 
vertical axis reports the critical load multipliers λ. 
For each value of the Damage D, many values of 
the load multiplier λ are calculated; the blue and 
red lines in the diagram represent the maximum 
and minimum calculated values of λ, respectively.
The structural Robustness, as defined, can be read 
from the diagram as the slope of the lower curve.
Since the number of possible combinations 
quickly becomes very high, probabilistic 
optimization methods are used to identify the two 
most significant combinations, i.e. the ones that 
give maximum and minimum resistance.
Observations
The proposed method follows a deterministic approach. Robustness is defined in terms of loss of 
resistance as a consequence of a localized 
Damage. The resistance is quantified as the 
maximum applied load that causes kinematic 
indeterminacy.
Rather than a single value of structural 
Robustness, the proposed method gives one value 
for each increment of Damage level ΔD. 
The paper gives a quantitative criterion to assess if 
a structure can be deemed “robust”, by comparing 
the calculated ratio |ΔR|/ΔD with a limit value L 
(3.18), but only generic qualitative criteria are 
given to quantify L.
It must be observed that the slope of the 
Damage/lowest resistance curve might not be the 
best (or the only) parameter to look for in 
assessing if a structure is to bee deemed safe 
enough. For example, it might be more useful to 
look for the Damage level for which the resistance 
of the structure becomes lower than the design 
loads; this condition should correspond to the start 
of the propagation of the Damage (figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.5: Idea for Robustness quantification by 
Giuliani et al. Diagram of Damage versus  
critical load multiplier. (Source: [17]).
Figure 3.6: In this example, the structure 
represented by the red line would be deemed less 
robust than the one represented by the blue line,  
according to the definition by Giuliani et al. Yet,  
if Radm is the load that the structures need to bear,  
the blue structure reaches the critical condition 
for a lower Damage level D.
3.2.4 Lind
The paper “A Measure of Vulnerability and Damage Tolerance” [25] by Lind, presents probabilistic 
definitions of “Vulnerability” and “Damage tolerance”, which are considered complementary 
concepts and thus are expressed by reciprocal numbers. The paper looks on any type of system, 
including (but not limited to) structures subjected to Progressive Collapse. 
Damage tolerance is defined as tolerance of Damage unforeseen or not considered in the design. 
The sinking of the Titanic and the Ronan Point Collapse (see section 1.4.1) are reported as 
examples lack of Damage tolerance.
Damage tolerance is also defined as tolerance of localized or minor harm to the system. Collapse of 
long electric transmission lines in “domino style” after one conductor snapped is reported as an 
example of the second definition.
The paper lists some qualities that are desirable in a quantitative measure of Vulnerability:
– it should be a decision-making tool for design or redesign;
– it should be calculable;
– it should be valid.
The meaning given to the word “valid” is:
– the measure actually expresses the tolerance of Damage and little else;
– it provides the ability to distinguish reliably between systems that are tolerant of Damage and 
those that are sensitive to Damage;
– it must be reproducible;
– it should be objective, i.e. independent of any choice the analyst may make;
– it should be general, i.e. applicable to all systems.
The Author maintains that the usefulness of any candidate for a measure of Vulnerability can be 
assessed against these requirements. Furthermore, according to the Author the measure must be 
probability-based, because deterministic measures fail to capture the reduction in reliability of a 
damaged structure, which is considered one essential feature of Damage tolerance.
Vulnerability is quantitatively defined as the ratio between the probabilities of failure of a system in 
a damaged state and in the pristine state:
V=V(rd,S)=P(rd,S)/P(r0,S) (3.19)
where
P(r,S) denotes the probability of failure of the system in a state r for a prospective loading S, r0 
denotes a pristine system state, and rd denotes a particular damaged state.
Then another definition is proposed in which a set of ordinary undamaged states R0 and a Damage 
spectrum Rd are considered:
V=P(Rd,S)/P(R0,S) (3.20)
Damage tolerance is defined as the mathematical reciprocal of Vulnerability:
Td=P(R0,S)/P(Rd,S) (3.21)
The paper states that research is necessary to develop practical methods for the calculation of 
Damage tolerance, and that quantitative definition of Damage tolerance makes it possible to specify 
a minimum allowable value in a code and to set a target value in design for particular classes of 
systems, but does not provide criteria to decide these values.
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The paper includes three simple examples in which Vulnerability and Damage tolerance are 
calculated. The first two proposed examples refer to a system composed by a finite number of 
components, and the failure probability of each system component is given.
The third example refers to a structural problem, in which a girder is supported at three points; only 
one “damaging loading” is considered (the differential settlement of the supports) and only one 
damaged state is considered (expressed by the stress in the center support). It is given the 
probabilistic characterization (type of distribution, mean value and variance) of the yield point of 
the center support, of the stress produced in the support by the ordinary loads, and of the stress 
produced in the support by the differential settlement; the probabilities needed to apply the 
definition (3.19) are calculated from these three random variables.
Observations
The work is not targeted specifically to Progressive Collapse, but its concepts can be applied to it.
The paper gives a list of qualities that are desirable in a measure of Vulnerability, and stresses the 
necessity to use a probability-based approach.
The proposed quantitative definition of Damage tolerance is similar to the second Robustness 
indicator proposed by Maes et al. (section 3.2.1.3).
The proposed definitions are valid for a “spectrum” (or “set”, or “random field”) of loadings, 
ordinary (undamaged) states and damaged states. The first two proposed examples are easily 
calculated because the failure probability of the components is given. The third example is one-
dimensional, i.e. only one loading variable, one ordinary state and one damaged state are 
considered. It would be useful to have an example in which the definitions are applied to a multi-
dimensional case.
3.3 Summary and comments
Section 3.1 clarifies some aspects about the terms “robust” and “Robustness”, because they are 
widely used in literature with some ambiguity. Moreover, section 3.2.1.1 describes a paper in which 
the concept of Robustness is further discussed.
Section 3.2 presented ten ideas that have been proposed for indexes to quantify Progressive 
Collapse propensity of structure, or that could be applied for this purpose. Several other ideas can 
be found in literature.
These ideas should be useful to decide if a given structure is safe enough against Progressive 
Collapse, or if mitigation methods need to be applied. Currently, no building code has adopted any 
of these methodologies yet; as shown in section 2.2, most building code prescribe conventional 
verifications to assess if a structure is to be deemed acceptable.
This fact could probably be explained with some considerations:
– some of these ideas are just theoretical constructions and it is not clear how (or even if) they can 
be actually implemented.
– In some cases only a very general criterion (or no criterion at all) is given to estimate an 
admissible value of the index and decide if the studied structure is to be considered acceptable. 
This is very important, because without an admissible value the calculated indexes could just be 
used to rank the safety of different structures, at the most. For example: according to my index, 
structure 1 is more vulnerable (or less robust, less resistant...) than structure 2; thus I know that 
structure 2 is safer than structure 1, but I don't know if it is “safe enough”.
– Most of these ideas require modeling the behavior of a structure, but it is unknown how detailed 
the models must be to correctly represent the analyzed structure.
– Some ideas follow a deterministic approach, thus the calculated results might not be actually 
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representative of physical reality.
– In some proposed ideas the calculated parameters refer to just one traumatic event scenario or 
initial Damage scenario, or to the one scenario that produces the most undesirable 
consequences. In reality, a traumatic event/initial Damage can happen virtually everywhere in 
the structure, and with different intensity/extension; by considering only some of these cases, 
the calculated results might not be actually representative.
– In particular, some ideas quantify an index of Progressive Collapse propensity on the basis of 
the most undesirable consequence scenario (typically, when the definition requests to consider 
only the initial Damage scenario that causes a “max” or “min” consequences). This type of 
indexes do not provide information on how many critical components or areas of the structure 
exist. As an extreme example, let's consider two structures: in the first one every initial Damage 
scenario has very small consequences, except one scenario that leads to total Collapse; in the 
second one every Damage scenario leads to total Collapse. If only the most undesirable 
consequence scenario is considered, both structures would have the same value of the index.
Section 3.2.4 describes a paper that lists some qualities that are desirable in a quantitative measure 
of Vulnerability (“it should be a decision-making tool for design or redesign; it should be 
calculable; it should be valid”).
The methodologies that the present work proposes (chapter 5) are based on the considerations here 
summarized.
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Chapter 4 - Incorporating Progressive Collapse in a Risk framework
In this chapter, section 4.1 introduces the concept of Risk.
Section 4.2 describes the probabilistic Risk management framework, developed by the University 
of Braunschweig, whose concepts are used in this work. Some explanations about the used 
nomenclature are included.
Section 4.3 describes and analyzes several facts that make it difficult to incorporate Progressive 
Collapse in a Risk framework.
Section 4.4 summarizes the chapter.
4.1 The concept of Risk
Several different definitions of the term “Risk” exist. As an example, one definition is the 
following: “Risk is the potential that an event will lead to an undesirable outcome”.
Every definition shares three elements:
– an event (or a series of events);
– the system affected by the event;
– the consequences of the event on the system.
The concept of Risk involves probability, since the event, or the behavior of the system, or both are 
not deterministic. In other words, there is never absolute certainty that given consequences will 
happen (or, conversely, that they will not happen).
The concept of Risk is useful in order to minimize the possibility of unwanted consequences using 
limited available resources. In order to do it, Risk must be quantified. Thus, numerous quantitative 
definitions of Risk have been formulated, like the following ones, quoted from [39]:
1. Risk = hazard x vulnerability x exposure
2. Risk = hazard x vulnerability
3. Risk = probability x consequences
4. Risk = probability x loss
5. Risk = probability x damage
where “hazard”, “vulnerability”, “exposure”, “probability”, “consequences” and “damage” are 
defined and quantified in several ways.
Nowadays almost every type of Hazard is studied by the technical community within a probabilistic 
Risk framework, because this approach proved to be effective in reducing Losses. Yet, Progressive 
Collapse is still not studied this way. It is still unknown if it is even possible to do it. The present 
work is an attempt to understand if, and up to which extent, a Risk framework can be applied to 
Progressive Collapse.
4.2 The Probabilistic Risk Management Framework
The following excerpts are taken from the paper “The Probabilistic Risk Management Chain -  
General Concept and Definitions”, by Pliefke et al. [38]. They are included to explain several 
concepts of Risk management that will be used in the rest of this work. The used nomenclature will 
be adopted in the present work, with some modifications to avoid possible confusion.
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“RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The general Risk Management framework consist of three major steps that are performed 
chronologically. The Risk Management process itself consists of three dependent parts which are 
Risk Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Treatment.
After the termination of the three major steps the Risk 
Review step is induced. The primary purpose of this step 
is to constantly include all new information, knowledge 
and experience about the Risk and to indicate its  
evolution within the process. Accompanying all these 
steps the Risk Monitoring procedure captures the 
exchange of information of all persons actively or  
passively involved or participating in the Risk 
Management process. As Risk Identification constitutes  
simply a prerequisite for performing the Risk 
Management process. The most important tasks can 
clearly be classified in the Risk Assessment and the Risk 
Treatment procedure, which will be characterized 
subsequently.”
“Risk Identification
The prerequisite for performing the Risk Identification phase and therefore to induce the 
initialization of the Risk Management chain is the condition of being aware of a dangerous 
situation. If this is met first of all the boundaries of the model domain have to be circumscribed by 
defining the System under analysis. Next all sources of Hazards that are able to endanger the 
functionality of the System have to be identified. Thus, the Risk Identification leads to an answer of  
the question “what can happen and where???” Eventually, it is proceeded with the Risk 
Assessment phase.”
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Figure 4.1: The concept of Risk  
Management and first order subdivision. 
(Source: [38]).
Figure 4.2: The Risk Assessment phase. (Source: [38]).
“Risk Assessment
Given the precondition of having identified the dangerous situation, the Risk Assessment phase 
represents the first major step of the Risk Management framework. The Risk Assessment itself  
consists of two important procedures that are described more in detail subsequently.”
“Risk Analysis
The Risk Analysis procedure is the introductory part of the Risk Assessment phase, whose major  
objective lies in the quantification of the Risk, most desirably in monetary units per time unit (e.g.  
$/year). In order to reach this objective, after having defined the System under consideration, a 
Hazard Analysis is being performed where the intensity and frequency of each identified Hazard 
type is estimated. Once the Hazard data are quantified, the structural behavior of all the exposed 
items of the System, denoted as Elements at Risk (EaR), has to be predicted depending on the 
Hazard intensity.”
“It should be mentioned that the Structural Damage captures only the material harm and may be 
expressed by a larger variety of measures, e.g. water height, crack width or displacement drift. It is  
not expressed in monetary values. The relation between the Hazard intensity and the resulting 
Damage is called Structural Vulnerability. Thus, the Structural Vulnerability is an indication for the 
degree of susceptibility of an EaR towards the impact of the Hazard.
The Consequences that might go in line with a given Damage of the System have to be analyzed.
It is distinguished between Direct Consequences, that occur simultaneously to the time the disaster  
takes place, and Indirect Consequences, that occur with a time shift as a result of the Direct 
Consequences. Furthermore each consequence class can be subdivided into tangible or economic 
consequences, that are directly measurable in monetary terms and intangible consequences, where 
it is not possible to assign a monetary value in a direct way, e.g. injuries and fatalities, pollution of  
environment etc. Indirect Consequences are to be classified into economic, humanitarian,  
ecological and CSH (cultural, social, historical) consequences.
After all possible consequences have been determined, Loss appraises and eventually accumulates  
all Direct and Indirect Consequences at the time the disaster takes place. Thus, the Indirect 
Consequences that occur later in time have to be discounted with a properly defined discount rate 
that is specific for each consequence class. In this context System Vulnerability is an EaR specific  
characteristic, that indicates the total potential of a Hazard of a given intensity has on the EaR.  
Thus, System Vulnerability assigns a Loss value to each given Damage state of an EaR by taking 
the value of the EaR itself as well as its designated functionality within the System into account.
To conclude the Risk Analysis phase Risk can be expressed in two distinctive ways. Firstly, Risk 
can be calculated by taking the product of the annual probability of occurrence for a Damage 
multiplied by the Damage itself.
Structural Risk = Probability x Damage [Damage measure / year] (4.1)
Consequently, the Structural Risk is of importance primarily to civil engineers in the attempt to 
predict the behavior and the Response of a structure or structural elements. The second way to 
express the Risk is to take the product of the annual probability of occurrence of the Loss and the 
Loss itself.
Total Risk = Probability x Loss [Loss unit / year] (4.2)
It is being referred to as Total Risk. Thus, by this equation the Risk is quantified in a more 
extensive way as it takes all the possible consequences of the damaged System into account.”
“Risk Treatment
After all the Risks to the predefined System have been analyzed and evaluated the last procedure of  
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the Risk Management framework, the Risk Treatment phase, begins to operate. This phase is  
assigned to the task to create a rational basis for judging on the different Risks to the predefined 
System by conducting cost benefit analysis as well as by applying methods from mathematical  
Decision theory. Based on these tools, a Decision whether to accept, to transfer, to reject or to 
reduce a given Risk can be derived. In the latter case Risk Mitigation initiatives are implemented.”
“When judging on Risk in the Risk Treatment phase, a critical issue might be seen in the broad 
variety of different individual Risk perceptions existing in a society. Whereas one particular 
individual or group of individuals might have preferences to control one particular Risk, another  
group of individuals might favor the reduction of a distinctive Risk to a subjective acceptable level.  
As there are only limited resources available for Risk Mitigation in a society, the public Risk 
reduction interventions cannot focus on one particular group of individuals and manage the Risk in  
line with their interests. Instead, the main objective should rather be to achieve the maximum 
potential benefit for society as a whole.”
“If the Risk is to be mitigated, Decision makers are given several opportunities to implement a Risk 
reduction project. Firstly, pre-disaster interventions such as Prevention and Preparedness are 
available. By definition Prevention includes technical measures as well as structural reinforcement 
projects that are to be performed with an accurate time horizon before the disaster takes place.  
Typical examples are dykes against floods or dampers against dynamic actions. Preparedness 
contains all social activities, e.g. evacuation plans and emergency training, that are necessary to 
limit harm shortly before the disaster takes place. Secondly, post-disaster strategies can be followed 
to reduce the Risk. Among these Response covers all activities that are taken immediately after the 
disaster, such as the organization of help and shelter for the injured and harmed as well as 
communication between the different emergency forces. Recovery subsumes all the activities that  
need to be taken until the pre-disaster status of the system is reached again. Obviously also a 
combination of the mentioned possibilities can be used to mitigate the Risk.”
Some definitions given in [38] include:
“System:
The object of investigation for which all sources of Hazard are identified and Risk Analysis is being 
performed. The System can be composed by a single building or infrastructure element, a suburb of 
a city, a whole urban region or even an entire country.”
“Hazard:
A potentially adverse physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause harm to the 
predefined System. Harm can include injury or Loss of life, property Damage, cultural, social,  
historical and economic disruption or environmental degradation.”
“Element-at-Risk (EaR):
A single or a group of persons or objects within the predefined System that are susceptible and 
exposed to the impact of a Hazard. In order to guarantee a complete coverage, all Element at Risk 
collectively should compose the entire System that is being investigated. This will be referred to as 
the 'principle of completeness'.”
“Structural Vulnerability: (for each EaR and Hazard intensity)
Is a specific characteristic of an Element at Risk that indicates the susceptibility towards the impact  
of a Hazard. Thus, Structural Vulnerability links the Hazard intensity to the Damage of an Element 
at Risk.”
“Damage: (for each EaR and Hazard intensity)
Describes the physical, biological or chemical effect on an Element at Risk caused by the impact of  
a Hazard of a given intensity. Damage captures the material harm and is not expressed in monetary 
terms.”
“System Vulnerability: (for each EaR and Hazard intensity)
Is a specific characteristic of an Element at Risk, that indicates the total potential of a Hazard of a 
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given intensity. Thus, System Vulnerability assigns a Loss value to each given Damage state of an 
Element at Risk. It is best described by a function that evaluates the Consequences of a certain 
Damage state by taking into account the value of the Element at Risk itself as well as its designated 
functionality within the System.”
“Risk Management:
Risk Management is defined as the systematic application of management policies, procedures and 
practices to the tasks of identifying, assessing, treating, communicating, reviewing and monitoring 
Risk.”
4.2.1 About the nomenclature
Chapter 3 describes several ideas that “have been proposed for parameters to quantify the 
propensity to Progressive Collapse of structures”. Most of these ideas link an event (mostly the 
occurrence of a localized Damage, but in some cases the event that causes the localized Damage) to 
some of its direct consequences (like for example: reduction of the ultimate load, final spread of the 
Damage, reduction of the determinant of the stiffness matrix, and so on). One exception is the 
approach described in section 3.2.1.4, in which indirect consequences (monetary Losses) are 
considered. This basic idea is illustrated in figure 4.4, top row.
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the whole Risk Management process. (Source: [38]).
These ideas share a similarity with the concept of Structural Vulnerability, as defined in [38], whose 
definition is reported here again:
“Structural Vulnerability: (for each EaR and Hazard intensity)
Is a specific characteristic of an Element at Risk that indicates the susceptibility towards the impact  
of a Hazard. Thus, Structural Vulnerability links the Hazard intensity to the Damage of an Element  
at Risk.”
This concept is illustrated in figure 4.4, middle row.
The similarity is that they both relate an event (which in [38] is called Hazard) to some of its 
consequences (called Damage in [38]). Thus, some of the parameters described in chapter 3 would 
comply with the definition of Structural Vulnerability given in [38] (namely, those that follow a 
probabilistic approach).
Particular attention must be given to the nomenclature.
In [38]:
– the term Hazard is defined as “a potentially adverse physical event, phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause harm to the predefined System”,
– and the term Damage “describes the physical, biological or chemical effect on an Element at  
Risk caused by the impact of a Hazard of a given intensity.”
Now, in the context of Progressive Collapse, two stages can be identified:
– a traumatic event causes a localized Damage;
– the localized Damage causes some direct consequences.
Confusion can ensue because in each stage there are an event, some consequences and a relationship 
that links the two. In particular, localized Damage is both consequence (in the first stage) and event 
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between the basic idea of the quantification parameters (top row), the  
nomenclature used by Pliefke et al. [38] (middle row) and the distinction of the two stages of  
Progressive Collapse (bottom row).
(in the second stage).
Furthermore, both the relationship that links traumatic event and localized Damage, and the one 
that links localized Damage and the direct consequences, comply with the definition of Structural  
Vulnerability.
These concepts are illustrated in figure 4.4, bottom row.
To avoid confusion, in this work the following nomenclature is used:
– Hazard is any event that can cause a localized Damage in the structure;
– the initial localized Damage (or, for short, local Damage) is the direct effect of the Hazard 
on the structure;
– the term consequences denotes the direct consequences of the localized Damage;
– the expression Structural Vulnerability denotes a function that links a localized Damage 
and its consequences.
Furthermore, the term “Hazard” will also be used to denote an entire hazardous phenomenon, when 
the context of the sentence does not generate ambiguity (for example, “Earthquake, flood and 
Progressive Collapse are Hazards that can produce consistent monetary and social Losses”).
4.3 Risk and Progressive Collapse
As stated in section 4.1, “Nowadays almost every type of Hazard is studied by the technical 
community within a probabilistic Risk framework, because this approach proved to be effective in 
reducing Losses. Yet, Progressive Collapse is still not studied this way. It is still unknown if it is  
even possible to do it. The present work is an attempt to understand if, and to which extent, a Risk 
framework can be applied to Progressive Collapse.” These statements deserve to be elaborated on.
4.3.1 Three types of approach
Section 4.1 lists the three basic elements of every definition of Risk:
“- an event (or a series of events);
  - the system affected by the event;
  - the consequences of the event on the system”.
Furthermore, “the concept of Risk involves probability, since the event, or the behavior of the 
system, or both are not deterministic.”
In most cases, including in Progressive Collapse, both the event and the system's behavior are non-
deterministic. Thus, in order to fully apply the Risk framework, they both need to be 
probabilistically characterized.
The event is typically characterized by a probability distribution and its parameters, while the 
system's behavior generally depends on multiple random parameters (such for example the 
resistance of the materials, their modulus of elasticity, and so on), which in turn can be 
characterized by probability distributions and their parameters.
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Figure 4.5: Scheme of the nomenclature used in this work. The step between Hazard and localized 
Damage does not have a specific denomination. The expression “Structural Vulnerability” links the  
localized Damage and the consequences, exclusively.
If the event and/or the system are not adequately characterized, then it is not possible to calculate a 
“real” Risk. There are, however, other ways to link event and consequences:
– if the system is adequately characterized but the characterization of the event is missing, then a 
conventional representation of the event can be used. In this case, the calculated consequences 
do not fully represent the reality;
– if both the characterization of the event and of the system are missing, then the consequences of 
the event can be evaluated with a fully “pragmatic” approach. The calculated consequences will 
be even less representative of reality than the previous described approach.
These three ways to link event and consequences can be summarized as:
(a) both event and system are probabilistically characterized;
(b) the system is probabilistically characterized, the event is conventional;
(c) the event is conventional and the system is deterministic.
Each one of the ideas for parameters to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity listed in chapter 3 
falls into one of the three categories (a), (b) or (c), as illustrated in table 4.1.
In particular, table 4.1 summarizes the analyzed ideas and their characteristics:
– the first column identifies the Author of the idea;
– the second column reports the section of this work in which the idea is described;
– the third column identifies which of the above defined categories the idea belongs to;
– the fourth column specifies if the considered event is a Hazard or the occurrence of a localized 
Damage;
– the fifth column specifies if a probabilistic characterization of the event is considered, or if the 
event is considered deterministic;
– the sixth column specifies if a probabilistic characterization of the system's behavior is 
considered, or if the system's behavior is assumed as deterministic;
– the seventh column specifies if the considered consequences are direct or indirect (Losses).
It can be observed that the majority of the listed ideas consider a localized Damage as the event, 
follow a fully deterministic approach and consider the direct consequences. The cells highlighted by 
the gray background in table 4.1 are the exceptions.
Out of 10 ideas, 2 are fully probabilistic (category (a)), 1 falls in category (b) and 7 fall in category 
(c).
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Table 4.1: Summary of the ideas for parameters to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity listed in chapter 3. 
Event System Consequences
ID Section Category
3.2.1.2  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.1.3 (b) Damage Deterministic Probabilistic Direct
3.2.1.4 (a) Hazard Probabilistic Probabilistic Losses
3.2.2.1  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.2.2  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.2.3  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.2.4  (c) Hazard Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.2.5  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
3.2.3  (c) Damage Deterministic Deterministic Direct
Lind 3.2.4 (a) Damage Probabilistic Probabilistic Direct
Hazard vs 
Localized 
Damage
Probabilistic vs 
Deterministic
Probabilistic vs 
Deterministic
Direct 
Consequences 
vs Losses
Maes 1
Maes 2
Maes 3
Starossek 1
Starossek 2
Starossek 3
Starossek 4
Starossek 5
Giuliani
4.3.2 Fully probabilistic vs deterministic approaches
What are the advantages of using a fully probabilistic (Risk) approach?
As already stated, this approach gives results that are “closer to reality” than the other ones.
Furthermore, it gives more rigorous criteria to decide if a system is acceptable or not.
Although a completely objective acceptability criterion does not exist, one of the most effective 
ways to decide if a system is safe enough against a given Hazard is to express the Total Risk of that 
Hazard, i.e. the potential Losses due to that Hazard.
In very simple terms, decision makers (such as politicians, insurers, owners) establish admissible 
limit values of the Total Risk. By comparing the calculated Total Risk of a system and the 
admissible value(s), it can be assessed if the system is acceptable or not.
In reality, the safety verifications of modern building codes follow a probabilistic or semi-
probabilistic approach, but they are not carried out by explicitly calculating a Risk. Instead, it is 
implicitly assumed that, if a structure is designed and built according to such codes, the resulting 
Risk will be lower than an established acceptability limit.
Most of the ideas found in literature for parameters to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity do 
not have a similarly effective method to establish an acceptability limit.
Without such limit, structures can only be compared and ranked, at the most. For example, one can 
analyze several different structural configurations of the same building and calculate a Progressive 
Collapse propensity parameter for each configuration. This will make it possible to answer the 
question: “which structural configuration should be preferred?”. The answer, of course, is: “the 
configuration whose calculated parameter has the most favorable value”.
But it will not be possible to answer the question “is this structural configuration sufficiently safe?” 
if there is not an absolute reference to compare the calculated parameter to.
4.3.3 Probabilistic characterization of the Hazard
A Risk framework has never been fully applied to Progressive Collapse. This is probably because of 
two main reasons:
– a Risk framework requires the probabilistic characterization of the considered Hazard;
– applying a probabilistic approach requires a big computational effort.
The first of these issues is discussed in this section.
The occurrence of Progressive Collapse is relatively rare, thus data about it are scarce.
Some Authors consider Progressive Collapse a “low probability/high consequences” Hazard, i.e. an 
Hazard whose consequences can be severe, but whose probability of occurrence is so low that 
typical probabilistic methods cannot be applied to it. For example, Bontempi [8] states that1 “safety  
in simple situations is estimated through qualitative deterministic analyses which, as the complexity 
of the structural problem increases, are replaced by more refined analyses based on probabilistic 
considerations. As complexity further increases this trend is reversed, going back to deterministic 
approaches, i.e. pragmatic analyses are considered, which are based on risk scenarios based on 
expert judgment, which transcend the mere statistical descriptions”.
It must be noticed that most building regulations follow this “pragmatic” approach. For example, 
the Alternate Load Path analysis is threat independent (the location and extension of the initial 
Damage is chosen conventionally, rather than following probabilistic criteria) and the structure's 
behavior is modeled as deterministic.
In the surveyed ideas (table 4.1), only 2 out of 10 follow a fully probabilistic approach, and in the 
presented examples very specific Hazards are considered and characterized (the event that a forklift 
impacts on a wall and the event of differential settlement of beam supports). It must be remembered 
1 Translated from italian.
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that, in the general case, many types of event can provoke the localized Damage that can prompt a 
Progressive Collapse, as highlighted in sections 1.3 and 2.2.1.1.
Now, one question arises: are the available data really insufficient to adequately characterize the 
events that can prompt a Progressive Collapse? This is still unknown. One thing is objectively sure: 
there is a consistent amount of available information that has not been collected yet.
It is worth to remember (see section 2.2.1.1) that:
– Allen and Schriever [4] found that 15% to 20% of surveyed Collapses had to be considered 
progressive;
– the mean occurrence rate of some exceptional Hazards (vehicle impact, gas explosion, bomb 
explosion) has been deemed not negligible (in the order of 10-6 to 10-4/yr; Leyendecker and 
Burnett [23]);
– most of the available statistics were carried out in the 1970s (following the resonance of the 
Ronan Point Collapse) and typically refer to events of that decade and of the previous one;
– in their 1976 work [23], Leyendecker and Burnett stated that “a number of assumptions have 
been necessary in order to analyze the data presented in this report. These are related primarily 
to the lack of detailed descriptions of damage accompanying the various abnormal loading 
events and the lack of detailed descriptions of the buildings involved in the incidents” and 
advise that “the statistical reporting of abnormal loading events needs to be considerably 
improved in order to obtain load data and damage data in particular types of building 
construction”.
Thus, our knowledge would undoubtedly increase by performing extensive surveys and by creating 
databases to be updated according to specific criteria after each new event.
4.3.4 Reliability methods
In order to calculate a Risk, reliability methods must be used. By definition, these methods estimate 
the probability that a system fulfills its required performance during a specified period of time 
under stated conditions.
This is typically done numerically, by means of models that simulate the behavior of the system. 
Most reliability methods require a consistent number of model runs, up to the order of magnitude 
106 and more.
In Progressive Collapse, detailed non-linear models are often required. Applying typical reliability 
methods to these models would generally require computation times in the order of years with the 
current technologies, which would be deemed unacceptable.
Thus, in the methodologies presented in chapter 5 of the present work the First Order Reliability 
Method (FORM) is used, which is more approximated than other methods but faster. The detailed 
description of the used FORM procedures is reported in section 5.3.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the concept of Risk is introduced in section 4.1. 
Section 4.2 describes the probabilistic Risk management framework and points out some aspects of 
the nomenclature used in this work.
Section 4.3 presents and elaborates on aspects that make it difficult to incorporate Progressive 
Collapse in a Risk framework.
This information will be the basis for the methodologies presented in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5 - The proposed methodologies
In this chapter, two methodologies to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity of frame structures 
are presented.
Section 5.1 lists the motivations to the development of these methodologies and the targets they aim 
to.
Section 5.2 explains the basic ideas of the methodologies.
Section 5.3 explains the details of how the methodologies can actually be implemented.
Section 5.4 summarizes the chapter and elaborates on it.
In the following chapter, the first proposed methodology is applied to several examples.
5.1 Motivations and target
From the information given in the previous chapters, several considerations can be obtained.
– Progressive Collapse is a phenomenon that can produce consistent Losses.
– Its occurrence is relatively rare, but it has been deemed not negligible.
– Many building codes require measures to contrast Progressive Collapse, but these measures 
generally follow a conventional, “pragmatic” approach and it is unknown how effective they 
really are.
– Several ideas for parameters to quantify the propensity to Progressive Collapse have been 
proposed in literature.
– No one of these ideas has been incorporated in a building code, yet.
– The majority of the proposed ideas follow a deterministic approach.
– Those that follow a probabilistic approach usually refer to a single predetermined Hazard and 
one single initial Damage scenario, and might require a considerable amount of work and time 
to be applied.
– With some ideas, only theoretical reasonings are given, and it is unclear how you actually 
calculate the parameter.
– In general, there is not an objective criterion to decide from the calculated parameter if a 
structure is to be considered safe enough against Progressive Collapse.
This led to the following “wish list”, i.e. a list of qualities that are desirable in a quantification 
methodology:
(a) It should be reliable.
(b) It should be usable in common practice.
(c) It should be a decision tool.
(d) It should consider the entire studied structure.
More in detail:
(a) The methodology should be reliable. Reliability is generally defined as the ability of a 
system to perform its required functions. In our context the system is the quantification 
methodology and the required function is the quantification of Progressive Collapse 
propensity of a given structure. Our methodology should give us results that really represent 
the physical reality. Since no model will ever replicate reality exactly, having a reliable 
methodology means that we always should be aware of how distant from physical reality 
our results can be.
(b) The methodology should be practical, i.e. it should be actually usable. In particular, it 
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should not contain steps that are theoretically valid but not actually feasible and should not 
require excessive effort to be implemented and used. If it was possible to devise a 
methodology that provides high quality information but requires excessive effort (like 
months or years of computation time), then none would use it in practice and it would be 
like having no methodology.
(c) This is its ultimate target: the methodology should be a decision tool (“is the analyzed 
structure acceptable or not?”).
(d) The methodology should consider the entire studied structure, because the traumatic event 
that prompts a Progressive Collapse can occur virtually everywhere, and with different 
intensities.
Since perfection does not exist, it will be impossible to have all the qualities of the wish list 
completely fulfilled. Thus, some compromises will be accepted. In particular, it will be considered 
acceptable to introduce approximations, or to reduce the quality of the obtained information, if the 
problem becomes too complex or cumbersome. If approximations are introduced, then we would 
like to have an idea of the maximum error introduced and we would prefer if they are on the “safe 
side”. Of course, every approximation could be reduced in future improvements of the 
methodology. 
In short, the target of the present work can be summarized as:
attempting to understand if, and up to which extent, it is possible to devise a reliable and 
practical method to quantify the propensity to Progressive Collapse of a given structure, as well  
as to quantify an acceptable level of this propensity.
5.2 The proposed methodologies
The target of this work, expressed at the end of the previous section, can be reformulated as trying 
to answer to these two questions:
– Given a structure, how safe is it against Progressive Collapse?
– How much safety do we need?
This is done by trying to incorporate Progressive Collapse in a probabilistic Risk framework. In 
terms of Risk, the previous questions can be reformulated as:
– Given a structure, what is its Risk of Progressive Collapse?
– How much Risk can we accept?
5.2.1 Solving the problem – The basics
The logic of the proposed methodologies originates from the following equation, which is presented 
by Ellingwood in many of his works (for example in [35]) and that can be traced back to 
Leyendecker and Burnett (1976) [23]:
P(C)=P(C|LD)P(LD|H)P(H) (5.1)
where P(C) is the probability of occurrence of a Progressive Collapse;
P(H) is the probability of occurrence of a given Hazard;
P(LD|H) is the probability of having a Local Damage given the Hazard;
P(C|LD) is the probability of having a Collapse given the Local Damage.
Several observations about equation (5.1) can be pointed out.
– Each term of equation (5.1) corresponds to one of the first three mitigation strategies described 
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in section 2.1. Each strategy aims at reducing P(C) by reducing one of the three terms: the Event 
Control strategy aims at reducing P(H); Specific Load Resistance aims at reducing P(LD|H); 
Alternate Load Path aims at reducing P(C|LD).
– The equation has never been actually used to calculate a probability of Collapse P(C). 
Ellingwood uses it mainly to illustrate principles of reliability analysis such as those to obtain 
the formula (2.3) (i.e. the load combination for the Alternate Load Path analysis of ASCE 7).
– In [35] the same Author provides additional useful information: he reports and elaborates on 
P(H) for some Hazard types; he states that in an Alternate Load Path approach Local Damage is 
accepted and thus P(LD|H)≈1; he states that P(C|LD) can be calculated with reliability methods. 
Furthermore, he states that “...[the] risk below which society normally does not impose any 
regulatory guidance, is on the order of 10-7/yr. [...] we may take 10-7/yr as a target value [of  
P(C)], with the understanding that final decisions regarding acceptable building risk are 
outside the scope of this document”.
– In this formulation C is a binary random variable, which for example may assume the value 1 if 
the initial Local Damage extends and 0 if it does not. The final extension of the Damage is not 
considered. While a sound estimate of P(C) for a given structure would be useful information 
for decision makers (legislators, building owners, insurers...), a probabilistic description of the 
Final Damage extension would be better. This can be achieved by defining the random variable 
C to represent the final extension of the Damage. In this work, two methodologies are 
presented; one that does not consider the extension of the Damage, and one that does. The 
extension from the first to the second methodology is conceptually simple, but it requires a 
much bigger effort.
– The value of P(C) will actually be given by the sum of many contributions, since the Local 
Damage can happen in many areas of the structure and with many intensity levels.
5.2.2 First methodology
The following assumptions are made:
– Eq. (5.1) is rewritten as
P(C)=P(C|LD)P(LD) (5.2)
where P(LD)=P(LD∩H)=P(LD|H)P(H).
– The initial Local Damage LD and the Collapse C are assumed as discrete random variables. 
Thus, the notation P( ) denotes a probability mass function, i.e. a function that gives the 
probability that a discrete random variable is exactly equal to some value.
– The random variable C can only assume the two values 0 (when the Damage does not extend) 
and 1 (when it does). 
– The methodology is restricted to frame structures.
– The Local Damage level is quantified as the number of “failed” structural elements, i.e. as the 
number of elements that are not able to fulfill any of their functions anymore (see figure 5.1). 
Thus, we can have LD=0 (undamaged structure), LD=1 (one structural element is failed, while 
the other ones are not), LD=2 (two elements are failed), and so on. This assumption is further 
discussed in section 8.1.3.
– The statistical description of P(LD) is known for the analyzed structure. This assumption is 
further discussed in section 5.3.1.3.
– Geometry and materials of the structure are known; they depend on some random variables, 
whose probability distribution is known.
– The loads are random parameters, of known probability distribution.
– The behavior of the structure can be modeled with sufficient accuracy (section 8.1.2 discusses 
the meaning of “sufficient accuracy”).
It must be noticed that the methodology could be improved, in the future, by changing some of 
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these assumptions. Chapter 8 presents and discusses several of these possible improvements.
To simplify the explanation, let's assume at first that only one Damage scenario is possible for each 
value of the Local Damage level LD. Under all these hypotheses equation (5.2) can be rewritten as
P C=1=∑
0
n
i
PC=1∣LD= iPLD=i 
or, with a more concise notation,
P C=1=∑
0
n
i
PC=1∣LDiPLDi (5.3)
where n is the total number of structural elements in the structure.
Equation (5.3) basically states that the total probability of having a Collapse is the sum of the 
probabilities for each initial Local Damage level.
If we remove the assumption that only one Local Damage scenario can happen for each initial Local 
Damage level, the equation becomes
P C=1=∑
0
n
i∑
1
t
k
P Cik=1=∑
0
n
i∑
1
t
k
PC=1∣LDik PLD ik (5.4)
where t is the total number of Local Damage scenarios for the i-th Local Damage level.
Equation (5.4) basically states that the total probability of having a Collapse is the sum of the 
probabilities of Collapse for each initial Local Damage scenario and for all initial Local Damage 
levels.
In the used notation the first index refers to the Local Damage level and the second to the Local 
Damage scenario. For example, P(LDik) is the probability of occurrence of the k-th scenario of the i-
th Local Damage level. P(Cik=1)=P(C=1∩LDik) is a concise notation for the joint probability of 
Collapse occurrence and a given Local Damage scenario.
In order to calculate P(C=1) using equation (5.4), three main elements are needed:
– the P(C=1|LDik) terms need to be calculated;
– the P(LDik) terms must be evaluated;
– it must be assessed how many Local Damage scenarios need to be considered.
These aspects are analyzed in section 5.3.
5.2.3 Second methodology
The second methodology differs from the first one in that it considers the final extension of the 
Damage.
The following assumptions are made:
– The methodology is restricted to frame structures.
– The geometry and the materials of the structure are known; they both depend on some random 
variables, whose probability distribution is known.
– The loads are random parameters, of known probability distribution.
– The statistical description of the initial Local Damage P(LD) is known for the analyzed type of 
structure.
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– Given an initial Local Damage, its progression in the structure can be modeled with sufficient 
accuracy.
– For each initial Local Damage scenario, every set of the random variables corresponds to one 
Final Damage scenario.
– The final extension of the Damage is expressed as the number of failed structural elements; the 
Final Damage level FD is assumed as a discrete random variable.
Under these assumptions the total probability of having the Final Damage level f is:
P FD=f =∑
0
f
i∑
1
t
k
P FDik=f =∑
0
f
i∑
1
t
k
PFD=f∣LDikPLDik (5.5)
In order to calculate P(FD=f) using equation (5.5), three main elements are needed:
– the P(FD=f|LDik) terms need to be calculated;
– the P(LDik) terms must be evaluated;
– it must be assessed how many Local Damage scenarios need to be considered.
As with the first methodology, these aspects are analyzed in section 5.3.
5.2.4 Observations
With reference to the probabilistic Risk management framework developed by the University of 
Braunschweig [38] (described in section 4.2) some observations can be made about equation (5.2), 
which is reproduced here again:
P(C)=P(C|LD)P(LD)
Since
– the Local Damage LD is “a potentially adverse physical event, phenomenon or human activity  
that may cause harm to the predefined System”, i.e. it complies with the definition of Hazard 
according to [38];
– and the occurrence of a Collapse C “describes the physical, biological or chemical effect on an 
Element at Risk caused by the impact of a Hazard of a given intensity”, i.e. it complies with the 
definition of the term Damage;
then
– the term P(C|LD), which “links the Hazard intensity to the Damage”, complies with the 
definition of Structural Vulnerability;
– and P(C) complies with the definition of Structural Risk.
It is important to remind that in the present work the terms Hazard and Damage have a different 
meaning than in [38], as explained in section 4.2.1. In this section [38] is quoted to show the terms 
that comply with the definitions of Structural Vulnerability and Structural Risk.
Similarly, in equation (5.5):
P FD=f =∑
0
f
i∑
1
t
k
P FD=f∣LDikP LDik 
– the terms P(FD=f|LDik) comply with the definition of Structural Vulnerability,
– and the term P(FD=f), multiplied by f, complies with the definition of Structural Risk.
Thus, calculating P(C=1) or P(FD=f) gives an answer to the question “Given a structure, what is its  
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Risk of Progressive Collapse?”, formulated in section 5.2 as one of the targets of the present work, 
in terms of Structural Risk (i.e., expressed in terms of direct consequences).
The answer to the second question “How much Risk can we accept?” in general can only be decided 
when it is expressed in terms of Total Risk, i.e. in terms of Losses, and is usually demanded to 
decision makers.
This decision is case-specific, because both the acceptable Losses and the relation between direct 
consequences and Losses (i.e., between Structural Risk and Total Risk) generally depend on the 
specific context. Thus, in this work the relationship between Structural Risk and Total Risk is not 
studied, and the question “How much Risk can we accept?” is not explicitly answered.
In the examples presented in chapter 6 the acceptable “target value” of the Risk suggested by 
Ellingwood P(C=1)acc=10-7/yr is used (as reported in section 5.2.1). Of course, specific cases can 
lead to different values of the acceptable Structural Risk.
5.3 Implementation of the methodologies
The following sections describe how each element needed to implement of the proposed 
methodologies can be obtained.
5.3.1 Implementing the first methodology
In order to calculate the Structural Risk P(C=1) by using equation (5.4):
– the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C=1|LDik) need to be calculated;
– the P(LDik) terms must be evaluated;
– it must be assessed how many Local Damage scenarios must be considered.
The following sections deal with these issues.
5.3.1.1 Calculation of the Structural Vulnerability
The defined Structural Vulnerability P(C=1|LDik) is the 
probability that a Collapse originates after the structure 
has suffered a Local Damage scenario LDik.
In the present context, “Collapse” means that at least one 
connection in the structure is lost or, in other words, a 
section has lost all its resistance properties, resulting in 
physical separation. It must be highlighted that a section 
might lose some of its resistance properties (e.g. bending 
moment) while retaining others (e.g. axial force), as in the 
example of figure 5.1.
P(C=1|LDik) can be calculated with reliability methods. 
By definition, these methods estimate the probability that 
a system fulfills (or, equivalently, that it does not fulfill) 
its required performance during a specified period of time 
under stated conditions. In our case the system is a 
structure that has suffered a given Local Damage and the 
required performance is the avoidance of Collapse.
The basic principle of reliability methods is that:
– given a vector x of the random variables xi of the problem (such as system properties, loads, 
model uncertainties),
– and its joint probability density f(x),
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Figure 5.1: In this example, in  
configuration (b) the beam has lost  
bending moment resistance in three  
sections but is still able to bear the load 
through axial force. In configuration (c)  
one section becomes detached and the  
element is considered “failed”.
– a performance function g(x) is defined as an arbitrary function of the random variables vector x, 
which assumes positive values when the required performance is fulfilled by the system 
(“success” condition) and negative values when the it is not (“failure” condition).
Then the probability of failure Pf is given by
P f=∫gx0 f xd x (5.6)
In the general case the integral (5.6) does not have an analytical solution, so numerical methods 
must be used. Numerical solution with simulation methods (such as Monte Carlo integration and its 
variants) requires a considerable amount of calculations, so the presented methodologies would take 
unacceptable time to be performed (in the order of years with the current technologies). Thus, in the 
present work the First Order Reliability Method (FORM) is used, which is approximated but faster.
Other, more precise methods might also work. It must also be noticed that section C2.5 of ASCE 7 
suggests the use of the FORM to calculate this probability, but it does not elaborate further (as 
reported in section 2.2.2.2).
In this work, two FORM procedures are used, both devised by Val et al. ([49], [50], [51], [52]). 
They are hereinafter referred as “standard FORM procedure” and “simplified FORM procedure”; as 
the name suggests, the second procedure is more approximated than the first one, but it is much 
faster to run.
The following sections illustrate the basic principles of the FORM and the two used FORM 
procedures.
5.3.1.1.1 The First Order Reliability Method (FORM)
With the First Order Reliability Method (FORM) an approximated value of the integral (5.6) is 
calculated with the methodology herein described.
Each random variable xi of the vector x is characterized by a probability distribution and its 
parameters (such for example the mean value µi and the standard deviation σi). It is assumed that the 
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Figure 5.2: Representations of a probability space (left) and of the corresponding standardized Gaussian 
space (right).
type of distribution, as well as the necessary parameters, are known for each variable.
The random variables vector x is transformed into a vector of standard Gaussian variables y, i.e. a 
vector in which each entry yi is a Gaussian random variable with mean value equal to zero and 
standard deviation equal to one. For example, a generic Gaussian variable xi becomes the standard 
Gaussian variable
yi=(xi-µi)/σi (5.7)
For non-Gaussian variables, the probability distribution is replaced with a local Gaussian 
approximation, which is then standardized.
In the standard Gaussian space the performance function g(x) becomes the function G(y) such that, 
if y0 is the standardized vector of x0, then G(y0)=g(x0). The locus of G(y)=0 is called limit state  
surface and it is the boundary that separates the success states (in which G(y)>0) from the failure 
states (G(y)<0).
The limit state surface is then approximated with a linear expansion at the point y*, which is the 
point of the limit state surface closest to the origin of the standardized space.
By approximating the limit state surface with the linear expansion, the integral (5.6) can be 
calculated as
Pf=1-Φ(β)=Φ(-β) (5.8)
where
– Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian distribution,
– and the parameter β=(y*t·y*)1/2 is called reliability index and is defined as the distance between 
the approximated limit state surface and the origin.
The relationship (5.8) can be best comprised by imagining to “slice” the standardized Gaussian 
space along the direction of β; in figure 5.2 (right), this is indicated as “section A-A”.
Figure 5.3 (left) represents the section, which is assumed to be an approximated1 representation of 
the probability density function φ of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Calculating the reliability index β is basically a minimization problem, which can be concisely 
expressed as
1 The relationship (5.8) is actually approximated. According to Rackwitz and Fiessler [41] the actual probability of 
failure Pf corresponding to β lies in the range 1-Φ(β)<Pf<1-χn2(β2), where χn2 is the chi-square distribution with n 
degrees of freedom, but “in general, the lower bound is a sufficiently accurate estimate of the exact failure 
probability”.
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Figure 5.3: (Left) Representation of section A-A from figure 5.2. (Right) Relationship between reliability  
index β and probability of failure Pf.
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β=min{(yt·y)1/2} given the condition G(y)=0 (5.9)
The main approximation of the FORM is that the area comprised between the real limit state surface 
and the approximated one (figure 5.2, right) is included in the “failure” condition, even though in 
that area G(y)>0. Thus, compared to the rigorous solution of equation (5.6), the probability of 
failure Pf is overestimated.
If α is the unit vector of the direction cosines of vector y*, then it is
y*= βα (5.10)
The entries of α are called sensitivity factors, because they provide an indication of the relative 
importance of the corresponding random variable in determining Pf. In particular, it has been shown 
[50] that if the i-th random variable is replaced with its mean value, then the reliability index β 
increases by a factor of 1/(1-αi2)0.5.
5.3.1.1.2 The standard FORM procedure - Explanation
This section explains how the standard FORM procedure works. The next section presents an 
example of its application.
The presented procedures are specifically targeted at Progressive Collapse, thus in this context:
– the considered system is a structure;
– the required performance is the avoidance of Collapse;
– “failure” condition is identified with the occurrence of Collapse and “success” with the 
avoidance of it;
– the calculated probability of failure corresponds to the generic Structural Vulnerability term, i.e. 
Pf ≡P(C=1|LDik).
The performance function is defined as
g=ξR−S (5.11)
where
– R is the resistance of the structure;
– S is the total applied load,
– and ξ represents the uncertainty of the structural model.
The basic concept behind the formula (5.11) is quite simple: Collapse occurs when the applied loads 
are higher than the structure's resistance. An extra term ξ is included to take into account the 
uncertainty of the used structural model.
The applied load S is generally given by the sum of several contributions, such as permanent + live 
load. Each contribution can be identified by a random variable, whose probability distribution and 
parameters is assumed to be known; their characterization can be obtained from several literature 
sources.
The resistance R is defined as the maximum load that the structure is able to bear without inducing 
spread of the Damage. It will depend on several random parameters, such as the structure's material 
properties. The probabilistic characterization of these parameters can be obtained from literature 
and it is assumed to be known.
In general an analytical description of the resistance R cannot be formulated, thus R can be 
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considered an unknown function of known random variables. Single values of R, for a given set of 
values of its random parameters, can be calculated by means of a model.
The model uncertainty ξ is also considered as a random variable of known characteristics.
The performance function (5.11) is a function of several known random variables, but its analytical 
description is not available because the analytical description of R is missing. As a consequence, the 
probability of failure Pf can only be calculated numerically.
As stated, calculating Pf is basically corresponds to the minimization problem (5.9). This type of 
problems is usually solved numerically with gradient methods, such as Hasofer-Lind/Rackwitz-
Fiessler [41]. The Authors of the FORM procedures [49] report that the usual numerical gradient 
methods often fail to converge with this specific problem, because the calculated values of the 
gradient are too approximated. Thus, the conjugate direction method is used (Brent [9]); compared 
to the gradient methods it has few convergence problems, although it requires more model runs.
To implement the conjugate direction method, first the m-dimensional vector x is defined, in which 
each entry xi is a random variable of the problem. Then x is transformed into the corresponding 
vector of standard Gaussian variables y.
Then y is expressed in polar coordinates, according to the following relations:
ym=r sin φ1
ym-1=r cos φ1 sin φ2
...
yi=r cos φ1 cos φ2 ... cos φm-i sin φm-i+1
...
y2=r cos φ1 cos φ2 ... cos φm-2 sin φm-1
y1=r cos φ1 cos φ2 ... cos φm-2 cos φm-1
Now the problem (5.9) can be rewritten as
β=min{r} given the condition G(r,φ)=0 (5.12)
where r is the radius coordinate and φ is the (m-1)-dimensional vector of the angle coordinates.
It must be highlighted that, in the used notation, φ (bold) represents a vector, while φi (normal) 
represents one entry of the vector. Thus a notation like φi means “the i-th vector”, while φi means 
“the i-th entry of a vector”.
To solve the problem (5.12), the performance function g is first calculated in an arbitrary starting 
point x0.
The values of the random variables of the total applied load S, as well as the uncertainty of the 
structural model ξ, are entries of x0, so they are known.
The value of the resistance R must be calculated by means of a model of the structure, in which the 
value of the random parameters is given by x0.
One method to evaluate R is to perform a static nonlinear analysis for increasing vertical loads 
(a.k.a.”pushdown analysis”). The vertical load is applied in small increasing steps; R is taken as the 
load corresponding to the last step before Collapse condition occurs.
Another, more laborious method to evaluate R is to perform dynamic analyses, in which the 
damaged part is suddenly removed from the loaded structure. This way, each analysis run can result 
in Damage spread or not. The runs must be repeated for different values of the load, in order to 
obtain an estimate of the critical load, i.e. of the minimum load value that results in Damage spread. 
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Section 8.1.1 further elaborates on the dynamic analysis.
Once the value of the resistance R is obtained, the value of the performance function is calculated 
with equation (5.11). By definition, the calculated value g(x0) is equal to G(r,φ0).
From this starting point, the critical condition G=0 is found moving along r. This involves changing 
the value of r while maintaining φ0 fixed, calculating the corresponding x vector and repeating the 
previously described step.
The minimum of r(φ) given the condition G(r,φ)=0 is reached by moving along conjugate directions 
in the m-1 dimensional space of the angles φ.
By definition, the vectors d1, d2, ..., dm-1 constitute a set of conjugate directions with respect to a 
definite positive matrix A if they are linearly independent and ditAdj=0 for all i≠j.
Brent [9] shows that the minimum of the quadratic function f(u)=utAu/2+btu+c can be found by 
m-1 one-dimensional minimizations along these directions, in whatever order.
It is suggested that the initial search directions d1, d2, ..., dm-1 are taken as the columns of the 
identity matrix. The radius r is minimized by moving along these m-1 directions. Then a new set of 
directions is defined, in which di=di+1 for i=1 to m-2 and dm-1=φm-1-φ0. One more minimization 
along the direction φm-1-φ0 is then performed; the reached point is chosen as the new φ0.
After m-1 repetitions the directions d1, d2, ..., dm-1 will be conjugate. If the problem is quadratic, the 
minimum is reached; otherwise, the algorithm can be repeated until a stop criterion is satisfied.
5.3.1.1.3 The standard FORM procedure – Example
This section presents a step by step example of how the algorithm works with two random variables 
(thus, y∈R2 and the polar coordinates r,φ1 are both scalars). In the end, the extension to more 
variables is explained.
A starting vector of the random variables x0 is arbitrarily chosen. In the standard Gaussian space it 
corresponds to vector y0=(y1(0), y2(0))≡(r(0), φ1(0)). (The upper right index between parentheses denotes 
the current step of the algorithm).
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Figure 5.5: Section B-B of figure 5.4. Example of  
Newton's method application.
Figure 5.4: Example of application of the standard 
FORM procedure. Representation of the starting 
vector y0 in the standardized Gaussian space.
Figure 5.4 represents the starting vector in the standard Gaussian space. There is an area where 
G(y)<0 (failure) and one where G(y)>0 (success). The first target is to determine where the critical 
condition G(y)=0 is reached by moving along the direction of r and keeping φ1 fixed.
If figure 5.4 is “sliced” along section B-B, figure 5.5 is obtained.
At first the critical point G(r)=0 is approached with Newton's method. When two consecutive values 
of G have opposite sign (i.e., G(r(i))∙G(r(i-1))<0) the algorithm switches to bisection method (figure 
5.6).
The algorithm goes on until the stop criterion |r(i+1)-r(i)|<rtolerance is satisfied.
Once the critical value rc0 is obtained, the φ1 coordinate is slightly changed and another critical 
value rc1 is calculated. Then φ1 is changed one more time and a third critical value rc2 is calculated 
(figure 5.7).
Then, the function r(φ1) given the condition 
G(r,φ1)=0 is minimized through successive 
parabolic interpolation, i.e. fitting a parabola at 
three points of the function, taking the minimum of 
the fitted parabola as a new point and discarding 
the “old” point in which the value of the function 
is higher, repeating until a stop criterion is reached.
With reference to figure 5.8, the parabola that goes 
through the three critical points (rc0,φ1(0)), (rc1,φ1(1)), 
(rc2,φ1(2)) is calculated. The value φ1(new) 
corresponding to the minimum of the parabola is 
taken, while the point with the higher value of r is 
discarded.
The critical value of r corresponding to φ1(new) is 
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Figure 5.7: Example of application of the standard 
FORM procedure. Representation of the first three 
calculated critical points in the standardized 
Gaussian space.
Figure 5.8: Example of parabolic interpolation.
Figure 5.6: Section B-B of figure 5.4. Example of  
bisection method application.
calculated and the parabola minimization is repeated with the new set of points. This step is 
reiterated until a stop criterion is satisfied.
In the 2-dimensional example, the resulting value of r corresponds to the reliability index β. If the 
number of random variables m is higher than 2, then the vector space φ has dimension m-1 and 
minimization must be performed along m-1 conjugate directions.
In the conjugate direction method, a basis of the φ space is arbitrarily chosen. In the example 
illustrated in figure 5.9, φ∈R2 and the basis is composed of the columns of the identity matrix, i.e. 
the vectors {1,0}t and {0,1}t.
The minimization procedure is performed along 
all the directions of the basis. If the starting point 
is labeled P0 and the point reached after the 
minimization along the i-th direction is labeled Pi, 
then after m-1 minimizations the point Pm-1 is 
reached (point P2 in figure 5.9). Another 
minimization is then performed along the 
direction (Pm-1-P0) (reaching point P3 in figure 
5.9).
The basis is then redefined by substituting one of 
its vectors with the (Pm-1-P0) direction.
The described steps (minimization along m 
directions and redefinition of the basis) are 
repeated m-1 times. After a total of m·(m-1) 
minimizations the elements of the basis are 
conjugated. If the problem is quadratic, the 
minimum is reached; otherwise the procedure 
might need to be performed again.
5.3.1.1.4 The simplified FORM procedure
Even though the standard FORM procedure is faster than other methods, it still requires 
considerable effort. Val et al. ([50], [52]) propose an approximated FORM procedure that reduces 
drastically the required computational effort. It basically consists in formulating an approximated 
analytical expression of the resistance R and, consequently, of the performance function g(x); then 
the probability is calculated with gradient methods.
This FORM procedure is more approximated than the standard one, but it is much faster; with static 
analysis the characterization of R requires only one model run. Furthermore, in the tests reported by 
the Authors, as well as in those performed in this work the approximation always resulted on the 
safe side (i.e., overestimating the probability of failure Pf).
For the resistance R a Gaussian distribution is used. A deterministic analysis is performed, in which 
all random variables controlling the resistance are set to their mean value. The resulting Collapse 
load is is taken as the mean value of the resistance μR.
The coefficient of variation2 of the resistance VR is taken as that of the most important variable 
controlling the resistance. In the examples reported by the Authors, where reinforced concrete 
structures are analyzed, this corresponds to the yield strength of steel reinforcement when the 
failure mode of the structure has predominantly plastic behavior and to the compressive strength of 
2 The coefficient of variation of a random variable is defined as the ratio between its standard deviation and its mean 
value: Vi=σi/μi.
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Figure 5.9: Representation of the first steps of the 
conjugate direction minimization method.
the concrete when the failure mode has predominantly brittle behavior. In the examples 
implemented in this work, where steel frame structures are studied, the yield strength of the material 
is used.
The adopted gradient method is the Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm [41], which is implemented on a 
worksheet (figure 5.10).
The basic principle of gradient methods is to generate a sequence of trial points y1, y2, ..., in the 
standardized Gaussian space according to the rule
yk+1=yk+sdk (5.13)
where dk is the search direction vector and s is a parameter defining the step length.
In the Hasofer-Lind Method, at each step the direction vector is defined by
dk= [ykt∇G(yk)-G(yk)] ∇G(yk)-yk (5.14)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
|∇G(yk)|2
where ∇G(yk) is the gradient vector of the performance function and s equals unity.
This method was later extended by Rackwitz and Fissler to include the case of non-Gaussian 
random variables, which are locally approximated to Gaussian distributions in which the values of 
probability density function and cumulative distribution function is equal to the values of the 
original distribution.
5.3.1.2 Number of LD levels and LD scenarios to consider
To obtain the actual probability of Collapse P(C=1) using equation (5.4), in theory all the possible 
Local Damage scenarios need to be considered.
The chosen convention is to quantify the Local Damage level as the number of “failed” structural 
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Figure 5.10 : (Left) Worksheet of the Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm. (Right) Table and diagram of the 
convergence of β.
Xi, R, D=Gauss
Media Media 397'000'000 sigma_L 960
Xi 1 0.075 Xi 1 0.075 0.075 32'000'000 mi_D 10'255
1.74664 0.14079 R 22'102 1'782 0.0806 0.080605 sigma_D 516
0.81042 0.04078 D 10'255 516 0.050 mi_L 2'399 R 22'101.93
0.18958 0.07587 L 2'399 960 0.400 1.746636
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
y1 0 -2.266 -2.065 -1.825 -1.726 -1.690 -1.678 -1.674 -1.672 -1.672 -1.672
y2 0 -2.435 -2.292 -2.033 -1.915 -1.870 -1.854 -1.849 -1.847 -1.846 -1.846
y3 0 0.705 0.800 0.697 0.643 0.622 0.615 0.613 0.612 0.612 0.611
y4 0 1.255 1.994 2.317 2.464 2.523 2.543 2.550 2.553 2.554 2.554
g(y) 0.7595 0.0409 -0.0168 -0.0043 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Delta_g1 0.13100 0.10528 0.10680 0.10953 0.11077 0.11125 0.11142 0.11148 0.11149 0.11150 0.11150
Delta_g2 0.14079 0.11686 0.11899 0.12152 0.12256 0.12294 0.12307 0.12311 0.12313 0.12313 0.12313
Delta_g3 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078 -0.04078
Delta_g4 -0.07254 -0.10166 -0.13559 -0.15633 -0.16534 -0.16865 -0.16978 -0.17015 -0.17027 -0.17031 -0.17033
Delta_g 2^ 0.04391 0.03674 0.04561 0.05287 0.05629 0.05760 0.05805 0.05820 0.05825 0.05826 0.05827
-17.298 -19.610 -17.086 -15.761 -15.257 -15.081 -15.022 -15.003 -14.997 -14.994 -14.994
Beta 0.00000 3.62463 3.75870 3.64901 3.62385 3.61989 3.61940 3.61934 3.61934 3.61934 3.61934
x1 1.000 0.830 0.845 0.863 0.871 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875
x2 1.747 1.404 1.424 1.460 1.477 1.483 1.486 1.486 1.487 1.487 1.487
x3 0.810 0.839 0.843 0.839 0.837 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835
x4 0.190 0.268 0.360 0.421 0.449 0.460 0.463 0.464 0.465 0.465 0.465
0.577 1.898 3.461 4.491 4.963 5.141 5.202 5.222 5.229 5.231 5.232
F(x4) 0.570 0.861 0.969 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
0.17727 1.08429 1.86758 2.28515 2.45892 2.52196 2.54336 2.55044 2.55276 2.55352 2.55377
f(x4) 5.41405 2.18010 0.51439 0.18748 0.11738 0.09836 0.09255 0.09070 0.09010 0.08990 0.08984
Dev Standard 0.07254 0.10166 0.13559 0.15633 0.16534 0.16865 0.16978 0.17015 0.17027 0.17031 0.17033
Media 0.17673 0.15752 0.10694 0.06383 0.04246 0.03422 0.03136 0.03041 0.03009 0.02999 0.02996
Xi 1.000 0.830 0.845 0.863 0.871 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875
R 22'102 17'763 18'019 18'480 18'690 18'771 18'799 18'808 18'811 18'812 18'813
D 10'255 10'619 10'668 10'615 10'587 10'576 10'572 10'571 10'571 10'571 10'571
L 2'399 3'388 4'558 5'328 5'682 5'815 5'861 5'876 5'881 5'883 5'883
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elements, so in a structure with n elements:
– there are n+1 Local Damage levels (from 0 to n);
– the number of scenarios for the i-th LD level is ni = n!i! n−i! ;
– and the total number of scenarios is∑
0
n
i ni =2n .
In reality, in oder to have an effective decision tool it is not necessary to consider so many terms, as 
the next two sections illustrate.
5.3.1.2.1 Local Damage levels
For the sake of simplicity, in the following explanation equation (5.3) is used instead of equation 
(5.4), but the concepts are equally valid.
If the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C=1|LDi) are calculated up to the Damage Level p, with p<n, 
then equation (5.3) can be rewritten as
P C=1=∑
0
p
i
PC=1∣LDiPLDi∑
p1
n
i
PC=1∣LDiPLDi (5.15)
where the value of the first summation is known and the second is unknown.
Since 0≤P(C=1|LDi)≤1 ∀i, the second summation is a number comprised between 0 and 
∑
p1
n
i
PLDi . As a consequence, the exact value of P(C=1) is surely comprised between
 P C=1min=∑
0
p
i
P C=1∣LDiP LDi0
and
P C=1max=∑
0
p
i
PC=1∣LDiPLDi∑
p1
n
i
PLDi .
Thus, for each value of p you get to know an interval in which P(C=1) is situated; moreover, you 
can estimate P(C=1) and calculate the maximum approximation error of the estimate. Of course, as 
p increases, the interval and the maximum error decrease.
In particular,
– if the estimate P(C=1)=[P(C=1)max+ P(C=1)min]/2 is taken, then
– the maximum absolute approximation error is [P(C=1)max- P(C=1)min]/2=ΔP(C=1)/2
– and the maximum relative approximation error is ΔP(C=1)/[2·P(C=1)min].
– If instead it is assumed P(C=1)=P(C=1)min or P(C=1)=P(C=1)max, then
– the maximum absolute approximation error is ΔP(C=1)
– and the maximum relative approximation error is ΔP(C=1)/P(C=1)min.
If it has already been established a target value P(C=1)acc (i.e., a value of P(C=1) that the studied 
structure must not exceed), then:
– If P(C=1)max is lower than P(C=1)acc, then P(C=1) is also lower and the structure is acceptable; 
there is no need to calculate other terms of the equation.
– Conversely, if P(C=1)min is higher than P(C=1)acc, then P(C=1) is also higher and the structure is 
not acceptable.
– If P(C=1)min<P(C=1)acc<P(C=1)max, then further calculations are needed. If you do not want or 
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cannot make them, you still have the estimate of P(C=1) and of its approximation error.
Furthermore, if the structure is deemed not acceptable, the calculated Structural Vulnerability terms 
P(C=1|LDik) will be useful to identify the parts of the structure where an intervention is more 
effective in order to reduce the Structural Risk P(C=1).
5.3.1.2.2 Local Damage scenarios
In a structure with n elements there are ni = n !i! n−i!  combinations for the i-th Local Damage 
level. But it is extremely unlikely that a Hazard will damage structural elements that are distant 
without damaging the ones located in between. Thus, in the proposed methodologies only the 
combinations of elements that are located close to each other are considered in the calculation of 
Risk.
Further reduction of the number of calculations can be obtained by taking advantage of symmetries 
in the structure.
Figure 5.12 illustrates these concepts.
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Figure 5.11 : A simple example to illustrate the  
concepts presented in this section. The parameters 
reported in the table are fictitious (not calculated), just  
for the sake of the example. The structure is composed 
of n=4 elements. It can be seen that, after the  
calculation of P(C=1|LDi) up to i=2, it is ascertained 
that P(C=1) is below the target value.
LD
0 1.00E+000 1.00E-09 1.00E-009 1.00E-09 2.59E-07 2.58E-07
1 1.80E-007 0.19 3.42E-008 3.52E-08 1.13E-07 7.80E-08
2 5.20E-008 0.31 1.61E-008 5.13E-08 7.73E-08 2.60E-08
3 1.60E-008 0.74 1.18E-008 6.32E-08 7.32E-08 1.00E-08
4 1.00E-008 1.00 1.00E-008 7.32E-08 7.32E-08 0.00E+00
P(LDi) P(C=1|LDi) P(Ci=1) P(C=1)min P(C=1)max P(C=1)max-P(C=1)min
Figure 5.12 : A very simple example to illustrate the concepts of this section. Assuming that in this structure  
only the four columns can fail, there are six possible Damage scenarios for Local Damage level LD=2.  
Scenarios (b), (c) and (e) can be excluded because the damaged elements are not close to each other.  
Scenarios (a) and (f) are symmetrical. Thus, only two scenarios need to be investigated.
5.3.1.3 Evaluation of the P(LDik) terms
Each term P(LDik) is the probability of occurrence of the initial Local Damage scenario k of 
intensity i. To apply the presented methodologies, at least some of these terms need to be estimated.
In reality, at present time, a good description of P(LDik) is not known yet.
In the examples presented in the chapter 6, a conventional one is used, made from the available 
statistics augmented with fictitious information. Thus, with reference to section 4.3.1, the presented 
examples belong to category (b), in which “the system is probabilistically characterized, the event  
is conventional”.
As stated in section 4.3.3 it is unknown if the the available data is sufficient to adequately 
characterize the events that can prompt a Progressive Collapse, but there is a consistent amount of 
information that has not been collected yet. Only by performing extensive surveys and by creating 
specific databases it will be possible to ascertain if Progressive Collapse can be included in category 
(a), where a “real” Risk is calculated.
5.3.1.3.1 Collecting the data
In this section, some basic ideas on how to estimate the P(LDik) terms are presented. These ideas are 
very simplified, and are just meant to give a hint on how a suitable description of P(LDik) could be 
obtained. Many aspects must be further studied, and experiments could be needed.
Every time a traumatic event happens, information about it should be collected. This can be done by 
collecting data about the characteristics of the Hazard and/or about the direct Local Damage that it 
provokes.
If the characteristics of the Damage are surveyed, the information to look for should be:
– the type of Hazard that provoked it;
– the extension of the Damage directly provoked by the Hazard;
– construction technology of the structure (steel, concrete, masonry...);
– the type of use of the structure (because some structures might be more exposed than others to 
specific Hazards);
– the area of the structure where the Damage occurred (e.g., lower/higher floors, external/internal 
bays, areas where gas systems are located, and so on).
This way, if the number of surveyed events is sufficiently high, an estimate of P(LDi) for several 
Hazards could be obtained, and for different types of structures. Unlike the currently available 
statistics, these would consider not only the occurrence of Damage, but also its extension. In other 
words, this methodology should provide a set of values {P(LD=1), P(LD=2), ..., } for each surveyed 
type of Hazard. Furthermore, the survey should highlight the areas of the structures where the 
Damage is more likely to happen, because with some Hazards some elements are more exposed 
then others. With other Hazards (like for example material corrosion, material defects, misuse of the 
structure) it can be assumed that the exposure is the same for all areas of the structure.
Alternatively, the characteristics of the Hazard can be collected. In this case the information to look 
for should be:
– the type of Hazard;
– its intensity;
– construction technology of the structure;
– the type of use of the structure;
– the area of the structure where the Hazard occurred.
This way the probability of occurrence of each Hazard could be estimated. Again, the estimates 
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would consider not only the occurrence of the Hazard, but also its intensity, which can be expressed 
with one of the characteristic parameters of the Hazard. For example, for explosions the peak 
overpressure can be used; for vehicle impact the kinetic energy of the vehicle, and so on.
To link the characterization of the Hazard P(H) to the characterization of the Local Damage P(LD), 
in theory a probabilistic study is required, using the relation
P(LD)=P(LD∩H)=P(LD|H)P(H)
This would require calculating the P(LD|H) terms, i.e. the probability of occurrence of a given 
Local Damage level for different intensities of the Hazard. To avoid the effort of probabilistic 
analyses, a deterministic approach could be adopted, by assuming that a structural element of given 
characteristics (geometry, materials) will fail if the Hazard intensity acting on it is equal or higher 
than a critical value HIcrit, and will not be damaged otherwise.
By applying the presented ideas, the contribution of several Hazards to the total value of P(LDik) 
can be figured out, at least for some values of i and k. Furthermore, since most Progressive 
Collapses have happened because of unforeseen Hazards or because of Hazards of bigger intensity 
than expected, it should be wise to take in account these unexpected events by adding a default 
contribution to P(LDik).
Once all these contributions to P(LDik) are estimated, they must be combined together. In general, 
given two independent events A and B, the probability of occurrence of at least one event is
P(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B)-P(A)·P(B)
Since in the considered context the product P(A)·P(B) is of a smaller order of magnitude compared 
to the other terms, it can be neglected with minimal approximation. Thus P(LDik) can be assumed as 
the sum of the contribution of all the Hazards. For example, it could be:
P(LDik)=P(LDik)gas explosion+P(LDik)vehicle impact+P(LDik)deterioration+P(LDik)misuse+P(LDik)unexpected event
5.3.2 Implementing the second methodology
The second methodology differs from the first one in that it considers the final extension of the 
Damage. In order to calculate the Structural Risk P(FD=f)·f using equation (5.5) three main 
elements are needed:
– the Structural Vulnerability terms P(FD=f|LDik) need to be calculated;
– the P(LDik) terms must be evaluated;
– it must be assessed how many Local Damage scenarios need to be considered.
The second and third point have already been discussed in sections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.3, respectively.
The following section deals with the first point.
5.3.2.1 Calculation of the Structural Vulnerability
In the second methodology, the defined Structural Vulnerability P(FD=f|LDik) is the probability that 
a Collapse occurs, whose final extension corresponds to the failure of f structural elements, after the 
structure has suffered a Local Damage scenario LDik.
Like with the first methodology, this probability can be calculated with reliability methods.
The conceptual difference between the two methodologies is that, while in the first one the basic 
problem to solve consisted in identifying the sets of random variables for which a performance 
function g(x) is negative or positive, in the second one the goal is to identify the sets of random 
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variables for which the Final Damage level FD assumes a given value f.
This section explains how this can be done.
For simplicity's sake, it is assumed at first that the problem only depends on one random variable x, 
whose probability density function p(x) is known.
Given an initial Local Damage scenario LDik, if the Final Damage level FD for different values of x 
is calculated, then a diagram like the one represented in figure 5.13 (left) can be drawn. More 
specifically, in figure 5.13 (left):
– the horizontal axis represents the random variable x;
– the red lines represent the value of the Final Damage level FD as a function of x, measured on 
the vertical axis;
– the blue line represents the probability density function p(x);
– the hatched areas are the Structural Vulnerability terms P(FD=f|LDik).
Figure 5.13 (right) represents the same concept in the case of two random variables. Each value of 
P(FD=f|LDik) is the part of volume of the joint probability density function above one hatched area. 
In the general case of m random variables, P(FD=f|LDik) is an m+1 dimensional volume.
Calculation of the P(FD=f|LDik) terms requires reliability methods.
As stated in section 5.3.1.1, reliability methods estimate the probability that a system fulfills (or, 
equivalently, that it does not fulfill) its required performance during a specified period of time under 
stated conditions.
In the present case the required performance can be defined as the Final Damage level being higher 
than a given value. This way, calculating a probability P(FD>f|LDik) is conceptually identical than 
calculating P(C=1|LDik) in the first methodology. Then, the Structural Vulnerability terms will 
simply be given by the difference of two of such terms, like for example
P(FD=3|LDik)=P(FD>2|LDik)-P(FD>3|LDik).
If the trend of FD (as a function of the random variables) is regular enough, then the First Order 
Reliability Method could be used, but since the problem is highly non linear, it might be not 
suitable. Thus other methods should be used.
In any case, applying the second methodology would require much more effort than the first one, 
because it requires modeling the evolution of Collapse, because multiple FD levels are considered 
and because it likely involves a higher number of random parameters. For these reasons, in the next 
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Figure 5.13 : Two representations of the probability 
space of P(FD=f|LDik). (Left) Case of one single  
random variable. (Right) Case of two random 
variables.
chapter only the first methodology is implemented and tested.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, two methodologies to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity of frame structures 
are presented.
The motivations to the development of these methodologies, as well as the targets they aim to, are 
presented in section 5.1.
The basic ideas of the methodologies is presented in section 5.2, and how they can be implemented 
is explained in section 5.3.
The following chapter presents several examples in which the first proposed methodology is 
applied.
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Chapter 6 - Applying the first methodology
In this chapter, some test applications of the first proposed methodology are presented.
Section 6.1 describes the used structural models.
Section 6.2 presents examples in which the Structural Vulnerability is calculated on three different 
structures.
Section 6.3 presents two examples of Structural Risk calculation.
Section 6.4 summarizes the chapter.
6.1 Description of the used structural models
The presented examples are implemented using Finite Element models derived from one developed 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for an ongoing research program 
([20], [21], [42]) aimed at understanding the behavior of structures during Progressive Collapse 
(figure 6.1).
The models can be used to perform both dynamic and static analyses, with geometrical and material 
nonlinearities; furthermore, they are able to spot the moment in which a section becomes detached, 
which corresponds to Collapse condition in the first proposed methodology.
In most studies carried on so far, element behavior derived from seismic engineering studies has 
been used to model Progressive Collapses. The NIST tests highlight that, in some cases, the actual 
behavior can be very different. Thus, for certain aspects the used models are advanced. On the other 
side, they still need improvement under several aspects, which will be highlighted in the text.
6.1.1 The structural details
NIST had an external company design five 
steel frame buildings according to regulations 
and common practice of the USA, specifically 
for this research program [16].
Physical testing of sub-assemblies of the 
structural components used in these designs is 
carried out, recreating the failure modes of 
Progressive Collapse.
The tests are then reproduced with “High 
Fidelity Connection” models, i.e. with very 
detailed Finite Element models, using 3D and 
2D elements (figure 6.2).
Then simplified models, called “Reduced 
Coarse Shell Connection” models, are 
implemented using 2D elements (shown in the 
bottom right corner of figure 6.3, left).
Another type of simplified models, called “Reduced Component Connection” is also implemented, 
in which the connections are modeled as assemblies of very stiff beam elements and elasto-plastic 
spring elements, while the frame members are modeled with “normal” beam elements (shown in the 
top left corner of figure 6.3, left). 
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Figure 6.1 : Summary of testing and analysis of  
structural sub-assemblies carried out by NIST, as of  
march 2008. (Source: [43]).
All the models are implemented with the Finite Element software LS Dyna; its explicit solver has 
the advantage of having very few convergence problems.
In the end, the models achieve similar results, as shown in figure 6.3 (right).
The Writer was asked to implement simplified models of two of the steel building designs, to be 
used in a multi hazard study (wind, earthquake and Progressive Collapse), using the software 
ANSYS.
In these models the frame members are modeled with normal beam elements, while the connections 
are modeled with “MultiPoint Constraint” (MPC) elements (i.e. special 0-dimensional elements), 
which replicate the behavior of the Reduced Component Connection (“stiff beams/spring”) 
assemblies.
With this further simplification, the buildings are modeled in their entirety (previous models only 
included parts of them). To ensure compliance with the experimental results, models of the 
structural components with the “stiff beams/spring” connections were replicated with ANSYS. 
Then, the same components were modeled using MultiPoint Constraint elements.
Studying the connections and developing simplified MultiPoint Constraint elements with an 
appropriate behavior required considerable time, mainly because of convergence problems (unlike 
LS Dyna, ANSYS uses an implicit solver).
In common practice in the USA, resistance to lateral loads (such as wind and earthquake) of steel 
103
Figure 6.2 : High Fidelity Connection model of a structural sub-assembly. (Elaborated from [43]).
Figure 6.3 : (Left) Reduced Component Connection model (top left corner), Reduced Coarse Shell  
Connection model (bottom right corner) and simplified force/deformation diagram of a gravity  
connection. (Right) Comparison of results of the three types of models. (Source: [43]).
frame buildings is concentrated in a few frames, called moment frames; the other ones are called 
gravity frames.
During design, resistance to horizontal loads of 
gravity frames is usually neglected, and their 
beams are considered hinged to the columns 
(even though in reality some flexural resistance 
is always present).
During a Collapse, plasticity develops mainly at 
the extremes of the beams and in the panel 
zones (i.e., the part of the column next to the 
beam joint; see figure 6.4). Thus, the plastic 
behavior of moment resisting connections, 
gravity connections and panel zones must be 
assessed and adequately modeled.
According to the NIST tests, the actual behavior 
of structural components under Progressive 
Collapse can be very different compared to the 
behavior under earthquake. In particular, beam 
axial force plays a major role in connections.
As an example, figure 6.5 illustrates the 
relationship between bending moment and 
rotation in a gravity connection. The blue line 
represents the relationship when the influence of 
the axial force is neglected, the red line represents 
one case in which it is considered.
More in general, figure 6.6 represents 3D 
diagrams of bending moment and axial force as 
functions of rotation (theta) and axial strain (delta) 
in a gravity connection.
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Figure 6.4 : Typical moment resisting connection 
(left) and gravity connection (right), the latter  
including a concrete floor slab.
Figure 6.5 : Moment/rotation diagram of a  
gravity connection with and without axial force.
Figure 6.6 : 3-dimensional diagrams of bending moment (left) and axial force (right) of a gravity  
connection, as a function of its axial strain (delta) and rotation (theta).
Figure 6.7 is a 2-dimensional, “top view” representation of the diagrams of figure 6.6. The lines 
correspond to the delta-theta (axial strain-rotation) path followed by the connection in different 
Finite Element analyses. Each line corresponds to a different length of the beam represented on top 
of figure 6.2.
Diagrams such as those of figure 6.5 correspond to the section of the 3D diagrams with the vertical 
surface defined by a path line. The path corresponding to the blue line in figure 6.5 is actually not 
represented in figure 6.7; it corresponds to a straight line, parallel to the theta axis and through the 
origin.
6.1.2 The designs
Both modeled steel building designs are 10 story 5x5 bay office buildings, with a plan dimension of 
45.72 x 30.48m (150' x 100') and a height of 43.053m (141'-3''). The floor systems consist of steel 
beams and a metal deck with a lightweight concrete topping.
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Figure 6.7: 2-dimensional representations of the diagrams shown in figure 6.6 (left: bending moment;  
right: axial force), with added lines representing the delta-theta paths followed by the connection in 
different Finite Element analyses.
Figure 6.8: Plan layout of the used model. The moment  
resisting frames are highlighted in orange. (Source: [16]).
Figure 6.9: Elevation of the used model. Each 
color corresponds to a frame section type.  
(Source: [21]).
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate the plan layout and the elevation of the one used as a basis for this 
work. It is designed according to the design Standard ASCE 7-02 [5], to be located in Atlanta, 
Georgia.
All the employed beam section types follow the 
nomenclature of the American Institute of Steel 
Construction (AISC) [3].
The lateral force resisting system is composed by 
Intermediate Moment Frames (IMF), as defined by 
the AISC Seismic Provisions (2002) [2]. These 
frames “are expected to withstand limited inelastic  
deformations in their members and connections 
when subjected to the forces resulting from the 
motions of the Design Earthquake” [2].
Beam-column connections in gravity frames are 
single-plate shear tab type, as specified in in AISC 
LRFD [1]. This type of connection is represented 
in figure 6.2.
Beam-column connections in moment frames are 
WUF-B type (Welded Unreinforced Flange-Bolted 
Web), as specified in FEMA 350 [14]. This type of 
connection is represented in figure 6.10.
The employed materials are A992 structural steel (yielding stress fy=345 MPa) for beams and 
columns, and A36 steel (fy=248 MPa) for shear tabs and continuity plates.
In the implementer models, each beam is divided into 10 segments and each column in 5 segments, 
to capture the effects of geometrical nonlinearities. This segmentation was adopted because it is 
common practice at NIST. Further testing is needed to assess if a denser segmentation is needed (for 
more accuracy) or if coarser would be acceptable (thus making the models smaller and faster). 
Beams are modeled with ANSYS' one-
dimensional BEAM188 element, with a 
bilinear isotropic (elastic-perfectly 
plastic) material behavior (i.e., beam 
sections can have some or all of their 
fibers in plasticity). 
Panel zones and beam-column 
connections in gravity frames are 
modeled with ANSYS' zero-dimensional 
MPC184 (MultiPoint Constraint) 
element, to replicate the behavior 
obtained from the Reduced Component 
Connection (“stiff beams/spring”) 
models. MPC184 are a general class of 
elements that apply kinematic 
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Figure 6.10: Welded Unreinforced Flange –  
Bolted Web (WUF-B) connection. (1) Both the 
top and bottom flange of the beam are welded to 
the column flange. (2) The shear tab is welded 
to the column flange and bolted to the beam 
web. (3) Panel zone and continuity plate.  
(Source: [14]).
Figure 6.11 : Schematic representation of the arrangement of the  
MPC184 elements in a generic node of the model. In reality, the  
elements have no dimension and the seven points are in the very  
same position. 
constraints between nodes. In all, each beam/column node required up to six MPC184 elements, as 
illustrated in figure 6.11.
Since experimental data about the WUF-B connection were not available, it was assumed that in 
moment resisting frames the beam-column interface cannot fail (i.e., become detached) and the 
beam-column connection is modeled as a perfectly rigid joint. However, plastic hinges can form in 
the BEAM188 elements because of the adopted elastic-perfectly plastic material behavior. The 
element can reach the ultimate limit state (Collapse condition) when all its fibers have reached 
yielding point and equilibrium cannot be satisfied anymore. Phenomena like flange instability or 
fracture are not considered, so the modeled ultimate limit state is conventional.
The completed models can perform both dynamic and static analyses, with geometrical and material 
nonlinearities. The models are able to spot the moment in which a section becomes detached. The 
analysis can go on after the detachment, as shown in figure 6.14, but in this phase the model does 
not follow the correct laws of physics.
The models still need improvement. In particular, they do not include floor slabs and partitions, 
which can play an important role in Collapse behavior (as shown in the example of figure 2.2). 
NIST developed some very detailed models that include floor slabs, using 2- and 3-dimensional 
elements (figure 6.15), but the considerable number of elements makes them impractical to use. 
Further research is needed to find a way to realistically replicate the influence of slabs and wall 
panels in simplified models.
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Figure 6.12 : One of the complete 3D models. Figure 6.13 : A Collapse sequence of a 2D model.
Figure 6.14 : Collapse sequence of a simple structure,  
as computed by ANSYS. Figure 6.15 : Model of a floor system. (Source:  
[43]).
6.2 Structural Vulnerability calculation
In this section the Structural Vulnerability term P(C|LDik) is calculated for several different 
scenarios on three types of models (a simple portal, a three-story structure and a nine-story 
structure). For comparison, both FORM procedures (described in section 5.3) are applied to each 
analyzed scenario.
It must be pointed out that the main target of the performed analyses is not the testing of the 
structures, but the testing of the algorithms used for the analyses, to study the the feasibility of the 
proposed approaches, to find out their problems, and to debug the implemented algorithms.
Attention is given to the required computation times, because in order to calculate a Structural Risk 
the Structural Vulnerability must be computed for a large number of Local Damage scenarios.
All the presented models and probabilistic analyses are directly implemented in ANSYS with its 
parametric language APDL; no other software is used. All input consists in text files, while results 
are reviewed by exporting them into a spreadsheet program.
Static nonlinear analysis is used to calculate the resistance of the structure. The maximum load is 
applied in 50 evenly spaced substeps, and the resistance R is taken as the load at the substep in 
which Collapse condition is occurs. If the maximum load does not provoke Collapse, then the 
maximum load is doubled and the analysis repeated. If Collapse is reached in less than 25 substeps, 
the maximum load is halved.
All the computations were carried out on a computer with a 2.40GHz Intel P8600 CPU.
6.2.1 Simple portal
The first tested structure is a simple portal. It was decided to start by studying a very simple 
structure to test and debug the implemented algorithm itself, as well as to devise suitable 
worksheets to visualize the results (the output of the probabilistic calculations provided by ANSYS 
consists merely in columns of numbers).
The portal consists of two 5.334m (17'6'') long columns connected to a 9.144m (30') long beam. 
One column is W18X1191 with minimum stiffness orientation, the other column is W14X120 and 
the beam is W14X22 (as previously stated, all the employed beam section types follow the 
nomenclature of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) [3]).
Each column is modeled with 5 BEAM188 type elements, while the beam is modeled with 10 
elements. The constitutive behavior of steel is linear elastic-perfectly plastic. The beam-column 
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Figure 6.16 : The simple portal structure.(Left) Undeformed shape. (Right) Deformed shape and x-direction 
stresses at the ultimate limit state (i.e., prior to the detachment of one beam/column connection).
connections are shear-tab type, each one modeled with one MPC184 element with the behavior 
obtained from NIST's research.
In all, the model consists of 20 beam type elements and 2 MPC type elements.
Four random variables are considered:
The characteristic values of the loads and of the steel are taken from the original design. Their types 
of distribution, the relationships between characteristic values, mean values, and standard 
deviations, as well as the characterization of ξ, are taken from Val et al. [50].
To apply the First Order Reliability Method, the performance function
g=ξR-S (6.1)
is defined, where
– S=L+D is the total applied vertical load, which is uniformly distributed on the beam;
– R is the Resistance of the structure, i.e. the vertical load that prompts Collapse.
In this particular case, Collapse condition corresponds to the detachment of one beam-column 
connection (shear-tab connections are always much less resistant than the structural elements they 
connect). No initial Damage is introduced.
6.2.1.1 The standard FORM procedure
The probability of failure Pf of the portal is calculated with the standard FORM procedure, as 
described in section 5.3.1.1.1. As stated, the solution of the problem corresponds to finding the 
reliability index β, which corresponds to the minimum value of the polar coordinate r (radius) given 
the critical condition G(r,φ)=0 (equation 5.12).
Figure 6.17 illustrates one analysis run.
In the top diagram:
– the horizontal axis represents the number of iterations;
– the vertical axis represents the value of the radius r;
– the blue line represents all the computed values of r;
– the blue squares represent converged values, in which G(r,φ)=0;
– the orange triangles represent the minimum value of r, as the computation progresses.
The middle diagram represents the value of the estimated failure probability, as the computation 
progresses.
The bottom diagram illustrates the first minimization of r along the direction φ1, including the first 
four calculated parabolas (as explained in section 5.3.1.1.3).
The table summarizes the parameters of the analysis run.
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Table 6.1
Variable Type of distribution Mean value Standard deviation
Gauss 3.97E+008 3.20E+007
Live load L (N/m) 2399 960
Dead load D (N/m) Gauss 10255 516
Gauss 1.00 0.075
Yielding stress of steel fy (N/m2)
Gumbel
Model uncertainty ξ
The computation was tested on several variations of the model. By changing the tentative initial 
values of the random variables (but no other parameters), the results vary slightly, as shown in table 
6.2.
The variation of the results is attributable to the stop criterion in the calculation of the radius r:
once the condition |r(i+1)-r(i)|<rtolerance is satisfied, the last calculated value r(i+1) is taken as the 
converged value, while the actual critical value is comprised between r(i+1) and r(i) but unknown.
In general, the relative difference between the estimates of the reliability index β resulted within 1% 
and the relative difference of the corresponding probability of failure Pf resulted within 3%. The 
difference can be reduced by adopting a smaller value of the tolerance; in the performed tests it was 
set to rtolerance=0.005.
For some choices of the initial values of the variables the computation diverges.
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Figure 6.17 : Data of a standard FORM analysis run. (Top) Diagram of the computed values of the 
radius r. (Middle) Diagram of the corresponding failure probabilities. (Bottom) First parabolic 
minimizations along the direction φ1. The table summarizes the parameters of the analysis run.
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Iteration Phi1 Phi2 Phi3
14 0.000000 0.000000 1.570796 4.613126 1.98E-006
23 0.157080 0.000000 1.570796 5.027586 2.48E-007
33 -0.157080 0.000000 1.570796 4.348063 6.87E-006
42 -0.357233 0.000000 1.570796 4.159601 1.59E-005
49 -0.482646 0.000000 1.570796 4.115431 1.93E-005
54 -0.517214 0.000000 1.570796 4.112670 1.96E-005
56 -0.523387 0.000000 1.570796 4.111290 1.97E-005
58 -0.558164 0.000000 1.570796 4.111980 1.96E-005
62 -0.523387 -0.157080 1.570796 4.240522 1.12E-005
70 -0.523387 0.157080 1.570796 4.065865 2.39E-005
77 -0.523387 0.163678 1.570796 4.063136 2.42E-005
79 -0.523387 0.320757 1.570796 4.064501 2.41E-005
87 -0.523387 0.163678 1.727876 3.868284 5.48E-005
94 -0.523387 0.163678 1.884956 3.715607 1.01E-004
100 -0.523387 0.163678 2.375049 3.663124 1.25E-004
105 -0.523387 0.163678 2.217969 3.653284 1.29E-004
110 -0.605601 0.189388 2.319627 3.666984 1.23E-004
115 -0.441174 0.137967 2.116312 3.648135 1.32E-004
118 -0.432775 0.135341 2.105927 3.633752 1.40E-004
123 -0.432775 0.292420 2.105927 3.665548 1.23E-004
127 -0.432775 -0.021739 2.105927 3.717929 1.00E-004
134 -0.432775 0.170815 2.105927 3.628260 1.43E-004
141 -0.432775 0.170815 1.948847 3.707605 1.05E-004
148 -0.432775 0.170815 2.263006 3.649223 1.32E-004
153 -0.432775 0.170815 2.151638 3.645575 1.33E-004
158 -0.514988 0.196525 2.207584 3.632039 1.41E-004
162 -0.350561 0.145104 2.004269 3.690934 1.12E-004
169 -0.469206 0.182208 2.150974 3.620349 1.47E-004
174 -0.474929 0.189570 2.158050 3.624875 1.45E-004
176 -0.463484 0.174846 2.143898 3.627137 1.43E-004
178 -0.469778 0.182944 2.151682 3.626006 1.44E-004
184 -0.469206 0.182208 2.308054 3.675777 1.19E-004
189 -0.469206 0.182208 1.993895 3.654002 1.29E-004
192 -0.469206 0.182208 2.131776 3.640455 1.36E-004
197 -0.386993 0.156498 2.049316 3.672309 1.20E-004
203 -0.551420 0.207918 2.252632 3.637945 1.37E-004
207 -0.489515 0.188559 2.176086 3.642240 1.35E-004
212 -0.474929 0.189570 2.158050 3.628717 1.42E-004
220 -0.463484 0.174846 2.143898 3.638065 1.37E-004
222 -0.470232 0.183527 2.152242 3.633391 1.40E-004
227 -0.474929 0.189570 2.158050 3.619901 1.47E-004
230 -0.480651 0.196932 2.165126 3.631145 1.41E-004
233 -0.472287 0.186171 2.154783 3.621229 1.47E-004
r 
(converged)
Failure 
Probability
An indication of the relative importance of the random variables is provided by the sensitivity 
factors α (see section 5.3.1.1.1). It has been shown [50] that if the i-th random variable is replaced 
with its mean value, then the reliability index β increases by a factor of 1/(1-αi2)0.5.
From the performed calculations (table 6.3) it can be seen that the dead load D could be considered 
deterministic with little influence on the results.
Calculating the reliability index β of the simple portal structure with the standard FORM procedure 
required between 200 and 400 iterations, depending on the initial value of the random variables, 
meaning about 20 to 40 minutes of computation time with the employed hardware.
6.2.1.2 The simplified FORM procedure
The simplified version of the FORM consists in formulating an approximated analytical description 
of the random variable R (resistance), thus obtaining an analytical formulation of the performance 
function (6.1), and then solving the minimization problem (5.9) with a gradient method.
The resistance R is taken as a Gaussian random variable.
A deterministic analysis is performed, in which all random variables controlling the resistance are 
set to their mean value. The resulting Collapse load is taken as the mean value of the resistance μR.
A parameter called Central Safety Factor (CSF), which will be useful in the comparison between 
the two types of FORM, is defined as the ratio between the mean value of the resistance and the 
mean value of the load:
CSF:=μR/(μL+μD) (6.2)
The coefficient of variation of the resistance VR is taken as that of the most important variable 
controlling the resistance. In the present case, the only variable is the yield stress fy of the A992 
steel, whose coefficient of variation is Vfy≈0.08060.
Once μR and VR are obtained, they are inserted in a worksheet where the Rackwitz-Fiessler gradient 
method [41] is implemented (figure 5.10).
Since the analysis requires only one run of the model, computation time was always less than a 
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Table 6.2: Initial values of the random variables and corresponding results of five different  
analyses. All the other parameters of the model are unchanged.
Run ID Initial Values Results
L (N/m) D (N/m) ξ r min (beta) Fail Prob
Status61 345000000 3651.0 11096.0 1.0 3.621603 1.464E-004
Status63 310500000 4016.1 12205.6 1.1 3.621176 1.466E-004
Status62 379500000 3285.9 9986.4 0.9 3.628654 1.425E-004
Status64 396000000 2400.0 10300.0 1.0 3.628783 1.424E-004
Status65 397000000 2399.0 10255.0 1.0 3.619901 1.474E-004
fy (N/m2)
Table 6.3: Sensitivity factors and relative variation of the reliability index β,  
calculated for some of the performed tests on the simple portal structure.
Alpha coefficients
Run ID L D ξ L D ξ
Status61 -0.5507 0.6740 0.1939 -0.45255 19.81% 35.37% 1.94% 12.14%
Status63 -0.4556 0.7350 0.1493 -0.47954 12.34% 47.47% 1.13% 13.96%
Status62 -0.4557 0.7462 0.2193 -0.43292 12.34% 50.21% 2.50% 10.93%
Status64 -0.4344 0.7648 0.1603 -0.44794 11.02% 55.22% 1.31% 11.85%
Status65 -0.4839 0.7271 0.1676 -0.45728 14.27% 45.65% 1.43% 12.44%
Max -0.4344 0.7648 0.2193 -0.43292 19.81% 55.22% 2.50% 13.96%
Min -0.5507 0.6740 0.1493 -0.47954 11.02% 35.37% 1.13% 10.93%
Variation of beta by neglecting the random 
variable
fy fy
minute, i.e. approximately 20 to 50 times faster than the standard procedure.
6.2.1.3 Comparison of the two FORM procedures
Several cases were analyzed with both FORM procedures.
The different cases were obtained by varying mean value and standard deviation of the random 
variables; the geometry of the structure was not altered. Furthermore, some cases were computed 
several times, starting from different tentative initial values of the random variables. 
The results of the analyses are illustrated in figure 6.18.
From the table and the diagram in figure 6.18 it can be observed that: 
– the results of the two types of FORM follow similar trends;
– the simplified FORM always gives lower values of β than the standard FORM, i.e. the 
approximation is always on the safe side;
– the maximum relative difference of β calculated with the two procedures always resulted less 
than 3%;
– the maximum relative difference of the failure probabilities is about 59%.
6.2.2 Three-story structure
The second tested structure has 2x2 bays and 3 stories.
Geometry, beam sections and connection types are taken 
from the three upper stories of the original 5x5 bays, 10 story 
design developed for NIST, with the exception of the beams 
of the gravity frames in the north-south direction, which are 
W14x22 instead of W16x26.
The design includes both gravity and moment-resisting 
frames.
The beam-column connections are shear-tab type for the 
gravity frames and WUF-B type for the moment-resisting 
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Figure 6.18 : Comparison of the results of several analyses on the simple portal structure. Each color 
corresponds to a variation of the model. In the Reliability Index/Central Safety Factor diagram, the 
geometrical shapes represent the results of the standard FORM analyses, while the continuous lines represent  
the trend of the results of the simplified FORM analyses as the Central Safety Factor varies.
Run ID Beta
Simplified FORM 1.74664 4.52388 3.04E-006
Status86 1.74664 4.62130 1.91E-006 0.021 0.592
Simplified FORM 1.74664 3.99146 3.28E-005
Status82 1.74664 4.05694 2.49E-005 0.016 0.321
Status84 1.74664 3.99222 3.27E-005 0.000 0.003
Status85 1.74664 4.00121 3.15E-005 0.002 0.042
Status66 1.74664 3.99546 3.23E-005 0.001 0.017
Status68 1.74664 4.00121 3.15E-005 0.002 0.042
Simplified FORM 1.94081 4.36867 6.25E-006
Status69 1.94081 4.37340 6.12E-006 0.001 0.022
Status70 1.94081 4.37853 5.97E-006 0.002 0.046
Simplified FORM 1.51882 3.36552 3.82E-004
Status71 1.51882 3.44551 2.85E-004 0.023 0.340
Status73 1.51882 3.37318 3.72E-004 0.002 0.028
Simplified FORM 1.74664 3.61934 1.48E-004
Status61 1.74664 3.62160 1.46E-004 0.001 0.009
Status63 1.74664 3.62118 1.47E-004 0.001 0.007
Status62 1.74664 3.62865 1.42E-004 0.003 0.037
Status64 1.74664 3.62878 1.42E-004 0.003 0.037
Status65 1.74664 3.61990 1.47E-004 0.000 0.002
Simplified FORM 1.57197 2.93765 1.65E-003
Status87 1.57197 2.97354 1.47E-003 0.012 0.123
Simplified FORM 1.30996 1.95515 2.53E-002
Status88 1.30996 1.99477 2.30E-002 0.020 0.098
Central Safety 
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Probability
Relative 
Difference 
(Beta)
Relative 
Difference 
(Probability)
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
Central Safety Factor
Re
lia
bil
ity
 In
de
x
Figure 6.19 : Schematic plan layout  
of the 2x2x3 structure. Each color 
identifies an AISC beam shape type.  
The moment-resisting frames are  
characterized by the W21x50 beams.
frames, and are modeled with MultiPoint Constraint (MPC) elements as illustrated in figure 6.11.
As with the simple portal, to take into account the geometrical nonlinearities each column is 
modeled with 5 beam type elements and each beam is modeled with 10 elements.
In all, the model consists of 615 beam type elements and 72 MultiPoint Constraint type elements.
In the performed analyses, the same performance function (6.1) and the same four random variables 
(table 6.1) as the simple portal structure are used. In some tests one more variable is included by 
distinguishing the yielding stress of the steel fy of the roof floor from that of the other floors. The 
live load L and the dead load D are vertical and uniformly distributed on the floors.
A series of Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) 
of the three-story model were calculated with both 
FORM procedures.
This time, the parameters of the random variables 
(mean value and standard deviation) were not 
altered. Some Local Damage scenarios were 
computed twice, starting from different tentative 
initial values of the random variables.
The calculated terms correspond to
– the LD0 case (Damage Level=0, i.e. undamaged 
structure);
– and 15 LD1 cases (Damage Level=1, i.e. one 
element at a time is removed). They correspond 
to 15 scenarios in which one column is removed. 
The Structural Vulnerability of the 12 remaining 
LD1 scenarios does not need to be calculated, 
because of the symmetry of the structure.
The Local Damage scenarios are identified by the 
element lines nomenclature used in ANSYS, as 
depicted in figure 6.21.
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Figure 6.20 : (Left) The used 2x2x3 Finite Element model, with color-coded beam section types.  
(Right) Deformed shape of the structure at the ultimate limit state after the removal of a column; the 
colors indicate the vertical displacement.
Figure 6.21 : Schematic representation of the 
model and nomenclature of the element lines. The 
lines in red were removed, one at a time, to model  
the LD1 scenarios.
It was observed that both the standard and the simplified FORM algorithms are not able to calculate 
the probability of failure Pf when this is higher than 50%. This condition approximately corresponds 
to a value of the Central Safety Factor lower than one or, in other words, to the mean value of the 
load being higher than the estimated mean value of the resistance. The correspondence would be 
exact if the model uncertainty term ξ was not present in the definition of the performance function; 
with the adopted definition (formula 6.1), the probability of failure Pf can be slightly lower than 
50% even when the Central Safety Factor is slightly lower than one.
Since with most LD1 scenarios the probability of failure Pf was not computable, to obtain more 
results a new structure with beam spans scaled to 70% was implemented. The analyzed cases are 
listed in table 6.4.
The standard FORM procedure was first implemented on the three-story structure model 
considering four random variables (yielding stress of steel fy, live load L, dead load D and 
uncertainty of the model ξ). In the performed tests, convergence required about 150 to 300 model 
runs and 2 to 4 hours of computation time.
For some scenarios, analyses were also carried out considering five random variables (yielding 
stress of steel of the roof floor fy1, yielding stress of steel of the other floors fy2, live load L, dead 
load D and uncertainty of the model ξ), for which the computation required about 400 to 460 
iterations and 4 to 5 hours.
For the simplified FORM procedure the necessary single model run always required less than two 
minutes of computation time.
6.2.2.1 Comparison of the two FORM procedures
Figure 6.22 reports the results of the analyses.
114
Table 6.4: Summary of the analyses on the three-story structure model.  
When the Central Safety Factor is lower than 1, the reliability index β and 
the probability of failure Pf cannot be calculated. In these cases, the cells of  
the “Run ID” column are empty.
   First structure – Unmodified geometry
Run ID
Undamaged 2.0261
Line 19 0.6725
Line 20 0.3930
Line 21 0.6113
Line 11 0.1528
Line 10 0.6288
Line 22 0.9257
Line 23 0.4716
Line 24 0.7511
Line 14 0.1659
Line 13 0.8384
3D_IMF_28 Line 25 1.8864
Line 26 0.8209
3D_IMF_29 Line 27 1.3624
Line 17 0.2009
3D_IMF_30 Line 16 1.5894
Damage (element 
removed)
Central Safety 
Factor
3D_IMF_18, 5var_1, 
5_var2
Second structure – Beam lengths reduced to 70%
Run ID
3D_IMF_27 Undamaged 4.1221
Line 19 1.5021
Line 20 0.9781
3D_IMF_31 Line 21 1.4846
Line 11 0.3144
Line 10 1.3973
Line 22 1.9562
3D_IMF_33 Line 23 1.0480
Line 24 1.6418
Line 14 0.3406
Line 13 1.7816
Line 25 3.8426
Line 26 1.7117
Line 27 2.8383
Line 17 0.4367
3D_IMF_34 Line 16 3.2749
Damage (element 
removed)
Central Safety 
Factor
3D_IMF_19, 
3D_IMF_20
3D_IMF_32, 5var4, 
5var5
From the table and the diagram in figure 6.22 it can be observed that: 
– the results of the two types of FORM follow a similar trend;
– the simplified FORM always resulted on the safe side, i.e. the reliability index β is 
underestimated and the probability of failure Pf is overestimated;
Furthermore, for high values of the Central Safety Factor (CSF) the absolute distance between the 
two estimates of the reliability index β tends to increase. Yet, the relative difference is relatively 
steady; as figure 6.23 (left) illustrates, the only value higher than 20% corresponds to the lower 
value of the CSF.
Since the relationship (5.8) between β and Pf is highly nonlinear, the relative difference between the 
probabilities of failure gets higher for high CSF values (figure 6.23, center). 
In particular, for values of the CSF up to 2.026 the estimates of Pf always resulted in the same order 
of magnitude, while for higher values of the CSF the difference becomes two or three orders of 
magnitude.
It must also be observed that no worksheet was able to calculate the failure probability for β=9.344 
(case 3D_IMF_27).
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Figure 6.23 : (Left) Diagram of the relative difference in the estimates of the reliability index β as the Central  
Safety Factor varies, in the performed tests. (Center) Diagram of the relative difference of the probability of  
failure Pf as the CSF varies, in the performed tests. (Right) Table of the relationship between β and Pf .
Beta
0.00000 5.00E-001
1.28155 1.00E-001
2.32635 1.00E-002
3.09023 1.00E-003
3.71902 1.00E-004
4.26489 1.00E-005
4.75342 1.00E-006
5.19934 1.00E-007
5.61200 1.00E-008
5.99781 1.00E-009
6.36134 1.00E-010
6.70602 1.00E-011
7.03448 1.00E-012
7.34880 1.00E-013
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Failure 
Probability
Figure 6.22 : Comparison of the results of the analyses on the three-story structure model. Each color 
corresponds to a different Local Damage scenario, as listed in table 6.4. In the Reliability Index/Central  
Safety Factor diagram, the continuous line represents trend of the results of the simplified FORM analyses  
as the Central Safety Factor varies; each square represents the result of a standard FORM procedure  
computation with 4 random variables (identified by the label “3D_IMF_”), while the triangles refer to  
computations with 5 variables (identified by the label “5var_”).
Run ID Beta
Simplified FORM 1.04798 0.43016 3.34E-001
3D_IMF_33 1.04798 0.92850 1.77E-001 0.537 0.889
Simplified FORM 1.36238 2.18477 1.45E-002
3D_IMF_29 1.36238 2.58976 4.80E-003 0.156 2.010
Simplified FORM 1.48464 2.70474 3.42E-003
3D_IMF_31 1.48464 3.04781 1.15E-003 0.113 1.965
Simplified FORM 1.50211 2.77343 2.77E-003
3D_IMF_19 1.50211 3.17608 7.46E-004 0.127 2.716
3D_IMF_20 1.50211 3.18105 7.34E-004 0.128 2.780
Simplified FORM 1.58944 3.09874 9.72E-004
3D_IMF_30 1.58944 3.53072 2.07E-004 0.122 3.689
Simplified FORM 1.88637 4.02660 2.83E-005
3D_IMF_28 1.88637 4.50283 3.35E-006 0.106 7.439
Simplified FORM 2.02610 4.39325 5.58E-006
3D_IMF_18 2.02610 4.47346 3.85E-006 0.018 0.451
Simplified FORM 2.02610 4.39325 5.58E-006
5var_1 2.02610 4.50480 3.32E-006 0.025 0.681
5var_2 2.02610 4.40685 5.24E-006 0.003 0.065
Simplified FORM 2.83828 6.02268 8.58E-010
5var_4 2.83828 6.65347 1.43E-011 0.095 58.929
5var_5 2.83828 6.66239 1.35E-011 0.096 62.678
Simplified FORM 2.83828 6.02268 8.58E-010
3D_IMF_32 2.83828 6.97415 1.54E-012 0.136 556.494
Simplified FORM 3.27494 6.68104 1.19E-011
3D_IMF_34 3.27494 7.39056 7.31E-014 0.096 161.388
Simplified FORM 4.12206 7.70935 6.33E-015
3D_IMF_27 4.12206 9.34445 n/a 0.175
Central 
Safety 
Factor
Failure 
Probability
Relative 
Difference 
(Beta)
Relative 
Difference 
(Probability)
6.2.3 Nine-story structure
The original design of the full structure has 10 stories and 5x5 bays (figure 6.12). Its model was 
implemented on a version of the software ANSYS that admits an unlimited number of elements and 
nodes.
Because of limitations of the available software license, for the tests a 9 story, 5x4 bays model was 
implemented. With reference to figure 6.8, the central span in the north-south direction (between the 
reference lines 3 and 4) was removed; with reference to figure 6.9, the ground floor was removed, 
and for the “new” ground floor the 5.33 m height was retained.
The model consists of 7560 beam type elements and 1062 MultiPoint Constraint elements (as 
opposed to 10300 and 1460, respectively, of the original model). As usual, columns and beams are 
respectively composed of 5 and 10 elements.
Four random variables were considered (yielding stress of steel fy, live load L, dead load D and 
uncertainty of the model ξ).
One value of the Structural Vulnerability was calculated with the standard FORM procedure. It 
required four restarts of the algorithm and a total computation time of more than 88 hours, as 
illustrated in table 6.5. The analysis refers to the Local Damage scenario illustrated in figure 6.24, in 
which one ground floor column is removed.
The simplified FORM procedure required about 12 minutes of computation time, i.e. about 440 
times less than the standard FORM.
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Figure 6.25: Comparison of results of the 
performed analysis on the nine-story structure 
model. The square represents the result of the 
standard FORM analysis; the continuous line 
represents the trend of the results of the simplified 
FORM analysis as the Central Safety Factor  
varies.
Figure 6.24: The Finite Element model of the nine-
story structure, in the analyzed Local Damage 
scenario (the column on the ground floor, second 
from left is removed).
Table 6.5: Summary of the calculation time that  
was required to perform the standard FORM 
analysis.
Run ID Computation time
BigStructure3 97 19h 26min
BigStructure4 99 20h 13min
BigStructure5 135 27h  7min
BigStructure7 106 21h 20min
Total 437 88h  6min
Performed 
iterations
Beta
2.1658 4.727199 1.14E-006
2.1658 5.247502 7.71E-008
   Relative difference 0.099 13.764
Central Safety 
Factor
Failure 
Probability Pf
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The results of the analyses are reported figure 6.25.
Similarly to the other two analyzed structures, the results of the two types of FORM follow a 
similar trend, and the simplified FORM overestimates the probability of failure.
The relative difference of the reliability index β resulted about 10%, and there are two orders of 
magnitude of difference in the estimates of the probability of failure Pf.
6.2.4 Structural Vulnerability calculation - Summary
The previous sections presented examples in which Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) are 
calculated on structures of increasing size and complexity. 
The examples were performed to test and debug the algorithms used for the analyses, to study the 
feasibility of the proposed approaches, and to find out their problems and limitations.
All performed tests showed that the results obtained with the simplified FORM procedure, which is 
more approximated, follow the same trends of those obtained with the standard FORM, and always 
resulted on the “safe” side.
The estimated values of the Structural Vulnerability terms resulted in the same order of magnitude 
for lower values of the Central Safety Factor, while for higher values the difference resulted 2 to 3 
orders of magnitude.
It was observed that both the standard and the simplified FORM algorithms are not able to calculate 
the probability of failure Pf when this is higher than 50%.
The simplified procedure always resulted much faster to perform than the standard, with the ratio of 
the required computation time getting bigger as the model size increases (up to 50 times for the 
simple portal, 150 times for the three-story structure and 440 times for the nine-story structure).
Time constraints prevented from performing more testing, which will be required to further validate 
the methodology. 
6.3 Example of Structural Risk calculation
The first proposed methodology to calculate the Structural Risk (section 5.2.2) was tested on the 
three-story structure described in section 6.2.2. An incomplete test was also performed on the nine-
story structure described in section 6.2.3. The following sections describe these tests.
The target of the tests is the assessment of feasibility and computational effort of the methodology, 
rather than studying the structure itself. It must be pointed out that the obtained results are not really 
representative of the structure, because the used characterization of the Local Damage is partially 
conventional and because some details that might have important effects are not included in the 
structural model (namely, the dynamic effects and the interaction of the frame with wall panels and 
floor slabs; section 8.1.1 describes how the dynamic effects can be included in the methodology).
6.3.1 Three-story structure
The Structural Risk of the three-story structure is estimated using equation (5.4). To do it, a 
characterization of the Local Damage terms P(LDik) is needed, and the Structural Vulnerability 
terms P(C|LDik) must be calculated.
6.3.1.1 Characterization of the Local Damage terms P(LDik)
In this example three Hazards are considered: gas explosion, bomb explosion and vehicle collision. 
Table 6.6 reports the probability of Damage occurrence because of these Hazards according to 
Leyendecker and Burnett [23] (section 2.2.1.1).
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Since information about the intensity of the Hazards and their 
consequent direct Damage is not available, the proportions listed 
in table 6.7 are adopted arbitrarily (i.e, it is assumed that, of all gas 
explosions, 85% will damage only one structural element, 8% will 
damage two elements, and so on).
A total of 416 scenarios are considered, with Local Damage level 
ranging from 0 to 5 (i.e., from undamaged structure to 5 damaged 
elements). Because of the symmetry of the structure, only 210 
scenarios need to be actually computed.
The nomenclature of the beam and column elements of the three-
story structure is illustrated in figure 6.26.
Table 6.8 lists the considered Local Damage scenarios and their 
probabilities. For ease of reading, the scenarios are subdivided in 
three groups: those in which only columns are damaged (reported 
in blue in the table), those in which only beams are damaged 
(yellow), and those mixed (pink).
More in detail, in table 6.8:
– The first column identifies the Local Damage intensity and the floor of the damaged element(s).
– The second column reports the multiplicity of the scenario. If this is 2, then only one term needs 
to be calculated for two scenarios.
– The third column identifies each scenario with a progressive number.
– The fourth column lists the removed structural element(s) of each scenario, according to the 
nomenclature of figure 6.26. Some structural elements are identified by two numbers, that are 
reported within parentheses; for example, finite elements 68 and 69 together make a single 
structural element.
– The fifth column reports coefficients that take into account different levels of exposure for gas 
explosions. For each floor, the product of these coefficients with the respective multiplicity 
sums up to the value 2 (this is because the probabilities of table 6.6 are per dwelling unit, and it 
is assumed that the structure houses two dwelling units per floor).
– The sixth column reports the probability of occurrence of each scenario due to a gas explosion. 
Its values are given by the product of P(LD)gas (from table 6.6), proportion coefficient (from 
table 6.7), multiplicity (second column), relative exposure coefficient (fifth column) and in 
some cases are divided by 2 or 3. This last division is necessary because the scenarios were 
subdivided in three groups (blue, yellow and pink). For example the case LD1 at first floor is 
divided by 2 because it happens in two groups (blue and yellow).
– The seventh column reports the exposure coefficients for bomb explosion and vehicle collision. 
It is postulated that only elements at the first (ground) floor can be damaged by these Hazards.
– The eighth column reports the probability of occurrence of each scenario due to bomb explosion 
and vehicle collision. It is calculated similarly to the elements of the sixth column.
– The ninth column reports the total probability of occurrence of each scenario; it is obtained by 
summing columns six and eight.
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Table 6.6: Probabilities of  
Damage occurrence for the 
considered Hazards, as 
reported by Leyendecker and 
Burnett [23].
P(LD)
(/yr, /dwelling unit)
2.50E-006
3.40E-007
8.60E-005
Gas 
explosion
Bomb 
explosion
Vehicle 
collision
Table 6.7: Proportions of the 
Local Damage levels caused by  
the considered Hazards.
LD1 85% 85%
LD2 8% 10%
LD3 4% 5%
LD4 2% 0%
LD5 1% 0%
Total 100% 100%
Gas 
explosion
Bomb and 
collision
From table 6.8 it can be seen that the probability of occurrence P(LDik) of scenarios 53, 54, 63 and 
64 results equal to zero. This is because it was assumed that such Damage scenarios (three columns 
in a row) can occur only at the ground floor, as a consequence of vehicular impact or bomb 
explosion.
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Figure 6.26: Nomenclature of beams and columns of the three-story  
building model.
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Table 6.8 (part 1 of 3): Considered Local Damage scenarios and their probabilities. The term 
P(LDik) for scenario #1 (undamaged structure) is taken as the complementary of the sum of the  
other terms.
Multiplicity Scenario ID#
LD0 1 1 0 0    - - - 9.99812E-01
2 2 19  1/6 3.54E-007  1/4 3.67E-005 3.70E-005
2 3 20  1/3 7.08E-007  1/4 3.67E-005 3.74E-005
LD1 2 4 21  1/6 3.54E-007  1/4 3.67E-005 3.70E-005
First floor 2 5 10  1/6 3.54E-007  1/4 3.67E-005 3.70E-005
1 6 11  1/3 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
2 7 22  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
2 8 23  1/3 7.08E-007 0    0.00E+000 7.08E-007
LD1 2 9 24  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
Second floor 2 10 13  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
1 11 14  1/3 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
2 12 25  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
2 13 26  1/3 7.08E-007 0    0.00E+000 7.08E-007
LD1 2 14 27  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
Third floor 2 15 16  1/6 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
1 16 17  1/3 3.54E-007 0    0.00E+000 3.54E-007
2 17 19+20  1/7 1.90E-008  1/4 4.32E-006 4.34E-006
2 18 20+21  1/7 1.90E-008  1/4 4.32E-006 4.34E-006
LD2 2 19 19+10  1/7 1.90E-008  1/4 4.32E-006 4.34E-006
First floor 2 20 21+12  1/7 1.90E-008  1/4 4.32E-006 4.34E-006
2 21 20+11  2/7 3.81E-008 0    0.00E+000 3.81E-008
2 22 11+12  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 23 22+23  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 24 23+24  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
LD2 2 25 22+13  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
Second floor 2 26 24+15  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 27 23+14  2/7 3.81E-008 0    0.00E+000 3.81E-008
2 28 14+15  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 29 25+26  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 30 26+27  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
LD2 2 31 25+16  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
Third floor 2 32 27+18  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 33 26+17  2/7 3.81E-008 0    0.00E+000 3.81E-008
2 34 17+18  1/7 1.90E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.90E-008
2 35 19+20+10  1/8 8.33E-009  1/4 2.16E-006 2.17E-006
2 36 19+20+11  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 37 19+10+11  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 38 20+10+11  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
LD3 2 39 21+11+12  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
First floor 2 40 21+20+11  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 41 21+20+12  1/8 8.33E-009  1/4 2.16E-006 2.17E-006
2 42 20+11+12  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 43 19+20+21 0    0.00E+000  1/4 2.16E-006 2.16E-006
2 44 21+12+3 0    0.00E+000  1/4 2.16E-006 2.16E-006
2 45 22+23+13  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 46 22+23+14  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 47 22+13+14  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 48 23+13+14  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
LD3 2 49 24+14+15  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
Second floor 2 50 24+23+14  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 51 24+23+15  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 52 23+14+15  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 53 22+23+24 0    0.00E+000 0    0.00E+000 0.00E+000
2 54 24+15+6 0    0.00E+000 0    0.00E+000 0.00E+000
2 55 25+26+16  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 56 25+26+17  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 57 25+16+17  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 58 26+16+17  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 59 27+17+18  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
LD3 2 60 27+26+17  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
Third floor 2 61 27+26+18  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 62 26+17+18  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 63 25+26+27 0    0.00E+000 0    0.00E+000 0.00E+000
2 64 27+18+9 0    0.00E+000 0    0.00E+000 0.00E+000
LD4 2 65 19+20+10+11  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
First floor 2 66 20+11+21+12  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
LD4 2 67 22+23+13+14  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
Second floor 2 68 23+14+24+15  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
LD4 2 69 25+26+16+17  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
Third floor 2 70 26+17+27+18  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
Damage Level 
and Floor
Removed 
Elements ID#
Relative P(LDik) 
Gas explosion P(LDik) gas
Relative P(LDik) 
Collision+Bomb
P(LDik) 
collision+bomb P(LDik)
121
Table 6.8 (part 2 of 3): Considered Local Damage scenarios and their probabilities.
Multiplicity Scenario ID# Removed Elements ID# P(LDik) gas P(LDik)
2 71 52  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 72 53  1/9 2.36E-007 0    0.00E+000 2.36E-007
LD1 2 73 46  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
First floor 2 74 47  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 75 40  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 76 54  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 77 55  1/9 2.36E-007 0    0.00E+000 2.36E-007
LD1 2 78 48  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
Second floor 2 79 49  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 80 42  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 81 56  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 82 57  1/9 2.36E-007 0    0.00E+000 2.36E-007
LD1 2 83 50  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
Third floor 2 84 51  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
2 85 44  2/9 4.72E-007 0    0.00E+000 4.72E-007
LD2 2 86 (60+61)+46  1/3 4.44E-008 0    0.00E+000 4.44E-008
First floor 2 87 (84+85)+47  2/3 8.89E-008 0    0.00E+000 8.89E-008
LD2 2 88 (64+65)+48  1/3 4.44E-008 0    0.00E+000 4.44E-008
Second floor 2 89 (88+89)+49  2/3 8.89E-008 0    0.00E+000 8.89E-008
LD2 2 90 (68+69)+50  1/3 4.44E-008 0    0.00E+000 4.44E-008
Third floor 2 91 (92+93)+51  2/3 8.89E-008 0    0.00E+000 8.89E-008
LD3 First f loor 2 92 (72+73)+46+47 1    6.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 6.67E-008
LD3 Second f loor 2 93 (76+77)+48+49 1    6.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 6.67E-008
LD3 Third f loor 2 94 (80+81)+50+51 1    6.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 6.67E-008
LD4 2 95 (60+61)+46+52+40  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
First floor 2 96 (84+85)+47+53+41  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
LD4 2 97 (64+65)+48+54+42  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
Second floor 2 98 (88+89)+49+55+43  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
LD4 2 99 (68+69)+50+56+44  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
Third floor 2 100 (92+93)+51+57+45  1/2 1.67E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.67E-008
2 101 19+52  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
2 102 21+53  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
2 103 20+52  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
2 104 20+53  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
2 105 12+41  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
LD2 2 106 11+41  1/6 2.22E-008 0    0.00E+000 2.22E-008
First floor 2 107 22+52  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 108 24+53  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 109 23+52  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 110 23+53  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 111 15+41  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 112 14+41  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 113 22+54  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 114 24+55  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 115 23+54  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 116 23+55  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 117 15+43  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
LD2 2 118 14+43  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
Second floor 2 119 25+54  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 120 27+55  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 121 26+54  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 122 26+55  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 123 18+43  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 124 17+43  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 125 25+56  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 126 27+57  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
LD2 2 127 26+56  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
Third floor 2 128 26+57  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 129 18+45  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 130 17+45  1/9 1.11E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.11E-008
2 131 19+52+20  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 132 20+53+21  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 133 11+41+12  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 134 22+52+23  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 135 23+53+24  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 136 14+41+15  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 137 19+(60+61)+46  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
LD3 2 138 21+(84+85)+47  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
First floor 2 139 10+(60+61)+46  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 140 12+(84+85)+47  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 141 22+60+61  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 142 24+84+85  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 143 13+60+61  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 144 15+84+85  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 145 20+52+53  1/8 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
Damage Level 
and Floor
Relative exposure 
Gas explosion
Relative exposure 
Collis ion+Bomb
P(LDik) 
collis ion+bomb
6.3.1.2 Calculation of the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik)
The Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) are calculated with the simplified FORM procedure 
and static non linear analysis, as in the examples of section 6.2.
An algorithm was implemented in ANSYS to automatically calculate the estimates of the resistance 
R in the 210 considered Local Damage scenarios. Then the P(C|LDik) terms are obtained by 
inserting the values of R in the implemented Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm worksheet. Since the 
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Table 6.8 (part 3 of 3): Considered Local Damage scenarios and their probabilities.
Multiplicity Scenario ID# Removed Elements ID# P(LDik) gas P(LDik)
2 147 22+54+23  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 148 23+55+24  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 149 14+43+15  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 150 25+54+26  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 151 26+55+27  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 152 17+43+18  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 153 22+(64+65)+48  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
LD3 2 154 24+(88+89)+49  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
Second floor 2 155 13+(64+65)+48  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 156 15+(88+89)+49  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 157 25+(64+65)+48  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 158 27+(88+89)+49  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 159 16+(64+65)+48  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 160 18+(88+89)+49  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 161 23+54+55  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 162 26+54+55  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 163 25+56+26  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 164 26+57+27  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 165 17+45+18  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
LD3 2 166 25+(68+69)+50  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
Third floor 2 167 27+(92+93)+51  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 168 16+(68+69)+50  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 169 18+(92+93)+51  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 170 26+56+57  1/9 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 171 19+10+(60+61)+46  1/4 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 172 19+52+(60+61)+46  1/4 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
2 173 21+12+(84+85)+47  1/4 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
LD4 2 174 21+53+(84+85)+47  1/4 8.33E-009 0    0.00E+000 8.33E-009
First floor 2 175 22+13+(60+61)+46  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 176 22+52+(60+61)+46  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 177 24+15+(84+85)+47  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 178 24+53+(84+85)+47  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 179 22+13+(64+65)+48  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 180 22+54+(64+65)+48  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 181 24+15+(88+89)+49  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
LD4 2 182 24+55+(88+89)+49  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
Second floor 2 183 25+16+(64+65)+48  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 184 25+54+(64+65)+48  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 185 27+18+(88+89)+49  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 186 27+55+(88+89)+49  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 187 25+16+(68+69)+50  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
LD4 2 188 25+56+(68+69)+50  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
Third floor 2 189 27+18+(92+93)+51  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 190 27+57+(92+93)+51  1/8 4.17E-009 0    0.00E+000 4.17E-009
2 191 19+10+(60+61)+46+52  1/4 1.25E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.25E-008
2 192 19+20+(60+61)+46+52  1/4 1.25E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.25E-008
2 193 21+12+(84+85)+47+53  1/4 1.25E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.25E-008
LD5 2 194 21+20+(84+85)+47+53  1/4 1.25E-008 0    0.00E+000 1.25E-008
First floor 2 195 22+13+(60+61)+46+52  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 196 22+23+(60+61)+46+52  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 197 24+15+(84+85)+47+53  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 198 24+23+(84+85)+47+53  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 199 22+13+(64+65)+48+54  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 200 22+23+(64+65)+48+54  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 201 24+15+(88+89)+49+55  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
LD5 2 202 24+23+(88+89)+49+55  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
Second floor 2 203 25+16+(64+65)+48+54  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 204 25+26+(64+65)+48+54  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 205 27+18+(88+89)+49+55  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 206 27+26+(88+89)+49+55  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 207 25+16+(68+69)+50+56  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
LD5 2 208 25+26+(68+69)+50+56  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
Third floor 2 209 27+18+(92+93)+51+57  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
2 210 27+26+(92+93)+51+57  1/8 6.25E-009 0    0.00E+000 6.25E-009
Sum= 416 1.5000E-005 1.7268E-004 1.8768E-004
Damage Level 
and Floor
Relative P(LDik) Gas 
explosion
Relative P(LDik) 
Collis ion+Bomb
P(LDik) 
collision+bomb
algorithm is not able to calculate the probability of failure Pf when this is higher than 50%, in these 
cases the P(C|LDik) terms are conservatively assumed equal to 1.
The parameters of the calculations are reported in table 6.9, in which:
– the first column identifies the scenario ID number, as defined in table 6.8;
– the second column reports the calculated values of the resistance R;
– the third column reports the values of the Central Safety Factor;
– the fourth column reports the values of the reliability index β;
– the fifth column reports the calculated Structural Vulnerability terms;
– the sixth column reports the probability of occurrence of each considered Local Damage 
scenario, taken from table 6.8;
– the seventh column reports the contributions of each scenario to the Structural Risk.
It must be noticed that, in the scenarios in which only beams were removed, the resistance resulted 
the same as in the undamaged structure. This is because no horizontal loads or column eccentricities 
were included in the model.
123
Table 6.9 (part 1 of 2): Parameters of the Structural Risk calculation.
CSF β CSF β
1 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 9.99899E-01 6.33E-015 54 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 0.00E+000 0.00E+000
2 12'672 1.50 2.77 2.77E-003 3.70E-005 1.03E-007 55 2'063 0.24 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
3 8'251 0.98 0.07 4.72E-001 3.74E-005 1.77E-005 56 3'389 0.40 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
4 12'524 1.48 2.70 3.42E-003 3.70E-005 1.27E-007 57 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
5 11'788 1.40 2.34 9.62E-003 3.70E-005 3.56E-007 58 3'242 0.38 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
6 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 3.54E-007 3.54E-007 59 3'389 0.40 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
7 16'503 1.96 4.21 1.25E-005 3.54E-007 4.43E-012 60 1'031 0.12 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
8 8'988 1.07 0.55 2.92E-001 7.08E-007 2.07E-007 61 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
9 13'998 1.66 3.34 4.20E-004 3.54E-007 1.49E-010 62 3'242 0.38 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
10 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 3.54E-007 3.45E-011 63 1'179 0.14 n/a 1.00E+000 0.00E+000 0.00E+000
11 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 3.54E-007 3.54E-007 64 n/a 0.00 n/a 1.00E+000 0.00E+000 0.00E+000
12 32'416 3.84 7.40 6.84E-014 3.54E-007 2.42E-020 65 1'179 0.14 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
13 14'587 1.73 3.57 1.82E-004 7.08E-007 1.29E-010 66 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
14 23'870 2.83 6.01 9.37E-010 3.54E-007 3.32E-016 67 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
15 27'406 3.25 6.64 1.52E-011 3.54E-007 5.39E-018 68 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
16 3'684 0.44 n/a 1.00E+000 3.54E-007 3.54E-007 69 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
17 8'546 1.01 0.19 4.26E-001 4.34E-006 1.85E-006 70 1'031 0.12 n/a 1.00E+000 1.67E-008 1.67E-008
18 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 4.34E-006 4.34E-006 71 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
19 2'063 0.24 n/a 1.00E+000 4.34E-006 4.34E-006 72 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 2.36E-007 1.49E-021
20 11'788 1.40 2.34 9.62E-003 4.34E-006 4.17E-008 73 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
21 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 3.81E-008 3.81E-008 74 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
22 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 75 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
23 9'135 1.08 0.66 2.54E-001 1.90E-008 4.83E-009 76 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
24 1'621 0.19 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 77 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 2.36E-007 1.49E-021
25 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 78 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
26 12'819 1.52 2.84 2.25E-003 1.90E-008 4.28E-011 79 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
27 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 3.81E-008 3.81E-008 80 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
28 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 81 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
29 14'145 1.68 3.40 3.40E-004 1.90E-008 6.48E-012 82 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 2.36E-007 1.49E-021
30 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 83 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
31 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 84 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
32 22'397 2.65 5.71 5.66E-009 1.90E-008 1.08E-016 85 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.72E-007 2.99E-021
33 3'389 0.40 n/a 1.00E+000 3.81E-008 3.81E-008 86 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.44E-008 2.81E-022
34 3'536 0.42 n/a 1.00E+000 1.90E-008 1.90E-008 87 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 8.89E-008 5.63E-022
35 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 2.17E-006 2.17E-006 88 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.44E-008 2.81E-022
36 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 89 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 8.89E-008 5.63E-022
37 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 90 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.44E-008 2.81E-022
38 2'358 0.28 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 91 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 8.89E-008 5.63E-022
39 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 92 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 6.67E-008 4.22E-022
40 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 93 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 6.67E-008 4.22E-022
41 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 2.17E-006 2.17E-006 94 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 6.67E-008 4.22E-022
42 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 95 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
43 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 2.16E-006 2.16E-006 96 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
44 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 2.16E-006 2.16E-006 97 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
45 2'063 0.24 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 98 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
46 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 99 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
47 1'621 0.19 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 100 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.67E-008 1.05E-022
48 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 101 15'324 1.82 3.83 6.44E-005 2.22E-008 1.43E-012
49 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 102 13'556 1.61 3.16 7.88E-004 2.22E-008 1.75E-011
50 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 103 8'841 1.05 0.43 3.34E-001 2.22E-008 7.41E-009
51 1'621 0.19 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 104 8'693 1.03 0.31 3.78E-001 2.22E-008 8.41E-009
52 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 105 13'851 1.64 3.28 5.18E-004 2.22E-008 1.15E-011
53 1'473 0.17 n/a 1.00E+000 0.00E+000 0.00E+000 106 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 2.22E-008 2.22E-008
Scenario 
ID#
Resistance 
(N/m) P(C|LDik) P(LDik) P(Cik=1)
Scenario 
ID#
Resistance 
(N/m) P(C|LDik) P(LDik) P(Cik=1)
The total Structural Risk results P(C=1)= 3.95·10-5/yr. 
This value is higher than the assumed target value P(C=1)acc=10-7/yr, thus the analyzed structure 
would be deemed not acceptable.
124
Figure 6.27: Diagram of the 210 calculated values of the P(Cik=1) terms. Blue line: original structure. Red 
line: modified structure.
Table 6.9 (part 2 of 2): Parameters of the Structural Risk calculation.
CSF β CSF β
107 16'797 1.99 4.30 8.35E-006 1.11E-008 9.28E-014 160 27'112 3.21 6.60 2.12E-011 4.17E-009 8.85E-020
108 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 1.11E-008 1.08E-012 161 12'966 1.54 2.91 1.82E-003 4.17E-009 7.60E-012
109 8'988 1.07 0.55 2.92E-001 1.11E-008 3.24E-009 162 14'440 1.71 3.51 2.24E-004 4.17E-009 9.34E-013
110 9'430 1.12 0.88 1.88E-001 1.11E-008 2.09E-009 163 19'155 2.27 4.96 3.53E-007 4.17E-009 1.47E-015
111 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 1.11E-008 1.08E-012 164 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
112 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 165 3'684 0.44 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
113 23'575 2.79 5.95 1.34E-009 1.11E-008 1.49E-017 166 1'179 0.14 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
114 19'450 2.31 5.03 2.40E-007 1.11E-008 2.67E-015 167 31'827 3.77 7.32 1.26E-013 4.17E-009 5.26E-022
115 10'314 1.22 1.49 6.80E-002 1.11E-008 7.55E-010 168 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
116 10'314 1.22 1.49 6.80E-002 1.11E-008 7.55E-010 169 31'237 3.70 7.23 2.34E-013 4.17E-009 9.74E-022
117 19'450 2.31 5.03 2.40E-007 1.11E-008 2.67E-015 170 3'242 0.38 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
118 3'094 0.37 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 171 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009
119 32'416 3.84 7.40 6.84E-014 1.11E-008 7.60E-022 172 16'503 1.96 4.21 1.25E-005 8.33E-009 1.04E-013
120 24'165 2.86 6.07 6.58E-010 1.11E-008 7.31E-018 173 13'114 1.55 2.97 1.48E-003 8.33E-009 1.23E-011
121 14'440 1.71 3.51 2.24E-004 1.11E-008 2.49E-012 174 14'735 1.75 3.62 1.48E-004 8.33E-009 1.23E-012
122 17'387 2.06 4.48 3.74E-006 1.11E-008 4.16E-014 175 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
123 27'406 3.25 6.64 1.52E-011 1.11E-008 1.69E-019 176 16'797 1.99 4.30 8.35E-006 4.17E-009 3.48E-014
124 3'684 0.44 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 177 12'819 1.52 2.84 2.25E-003 4.17E-009 9.37E-012
125 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.11E-008 7.03E-023 178 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 4.17E-009 4.06E-013
126 4'715 0.56 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 179 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
127 19'450 2.31 5.03 2.40E-007 1.11E-008 2.67E-015 180 29'175 3.46 6.93 2.14E-012 4.17E-009 8.90E-021
128 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 181 15'324 1.82 3.83 6.44E-005 4.17E-009 2.68E-013
129 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 1.11E-008 7.03E-023 182 22'986 2.72 5.83 2.74E-009 4.17E-009 1.14E-017
130 3'684 0.44 n/a 1.00E+000 1.11E-008 1.11E-008 183 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
131 8'988 1.07 0.55 2.92E-001 8.33E-009 2.43E-009 184 30'648 3.63 7.15 4.36E-013 4.17E-009 1.82E-021
132 1'768 0.21 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 185 22'397 2.65 5.71 5.66E-009 4.17E-009 2.36E-017
133 2'652 0.31 n/a 1.00E+000 8.33E-009 8.33E-009 186 24'165 2.86 6.07 6.58E-010 4.17E-009 2.74E-018
134 9'135 1.08 0.66 2.54E-001 4.17E-009 1.06E-009 187 1'179 0.14 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009
135 1'621 0.19 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 188 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.17E-009 2.64E-023
136 2'800 0.33 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 189 31'237 3.70 7.23 2.34E-013 4.17E-009 9.74E-022
137 13'261 1.57 3.04 1.20E-003 8.33E-009 9.99E-012 190 34'774 4.12 7.71 6.33E-015 4.17E-009 2.64E-023
138 13'556 1.61 3.16 7.88E-004 8.33E-009 6.56E-012 191 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 1.25E-008 1.25E-008
139 12'377 1.47 2.63 4.21E-003 8.33E-009 3.51E-011 192 9'578 1.14 0.99 1.61E-001 1.25E-008 2.01E-009
140 12'230 1.45 2.56 5.18E-003 8.33E-009 4.32E-011 193 12'672 1.50 2.77 2.77E-003 1.25E-008 3.47E-011
141 16'797 1.99 4.30 8.35E-006 4.17E-009 3.48E-014 194 1'768 0.21 n/a 1.00E+000 1.25E-008 1.25E-008
142 13'998 1.66 3.34 4.20E-004 4.17E-009 1.75E-012 195 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
143 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 4.17E-009 4.06E-013 196 9'135 1.08 0.66 2.54E-001 6.25E-009 1.59E-009
144 15'029 1.78 3.73 9.75E-005 4.17E-009 4.06E-013 197 13'556 1.61 3.16 7.88E-004 6.25E-009 4.92E-012
145 8'546 1.01 0.19 4.26E-001 8.33E-009 3.55E-009 198 1'621 0.19 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
146 9'430 1.12 0.88 1.88E-001 4.17E-009 7.84E-010 199 n/a 0.00 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
147 10'462 1.24 1.58 5.65E-002 4.17E-009 2.36E-010 200 11'128 1.32 1.98 2.37E-002 6.25E-009 1.48E-010
148 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 201 18'860 2.24 4.88 5.20E-007 6.25E-009 3.25E-015
149 3'242 0.38 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 202 n/a 0.00 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
150 14'145 1.68 3.40 3.40E-004 4.17E-009 1.42E-012 203 1'916 0.23 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
151 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 204 14'145 1.68 3.40 3.40E-004 6.25E-009 2.13E-012
152 3'536 0.42 n/a 1.00E+000 4.17E-009 4.17E-009 205 23'575 2.79 5.95 1.34E-009 6.25E-009 8.36E-018
153 17'682 2.10 4.56 2.51E-006 4.17E-009 1.05E-014 206 1'326 0.16 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
154 15'619 1.85 3.93 4.27E-005 4.17E-009 1.78E-013 207 2'505 0.30 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
155 16'208 1.92 4.12 1.88E-005 4.17E-009 7.83E-014 208 24'165 2.86 6.07 6.58E-010 6.25E-009 4.11E-018
156 18'860 2.24 4.88 5.20E-007 4.17E-009 2.17E-015 209 31'237 3.70 7.23 2.34E-013 6.25E-009 1.46E-021
157 30'648 3.63 7.15 4.36E-013 4.17E-009 1.82E-021 210 2'210 0.26 n/a 1.00E+000 6.25E-009 6.25E-009
158 23'870 2.83 6.01 9.37E-010 4.17E-009 3.91E-018 Sum= 3.95E-005
159 26'522 3.14 6.49 4.16E-011 4.17E-009 1.73E-019
Scenario 
ID#
Resistance 
(N/m) P(C|LDik) P(LDik) P(Cik=1)
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The blue line in figure 6.27 illustrates all the 210 values of the P(Cik=1) terms and gives useful 
information for mitigation measures.
It can be seen that there are several peaks, the highest of which corresponds to scenario #3 (removal 
of element 20). Several other peaks correspond to scenarios in which element 20 is removed. By 
applying the Event Control strategy or the Specific Load Resistance strategy the probability of 
occurrence P(LDik) of these scenarios can be lowered.
The red line in figure 6.27 represents the diagram of P(Cik=1) if element 20 (and its symmetrical 
element 2) are made less prone to suffer a direct Damage. For the sake of the example, the red line 
was obtained by simply substituting very small values of the P(Cik=1) terms in the scenarios that 
correspond to element 20, rather than actually computing the Structural Risk again with a lower 
probability of Local Damage occurrence (Event Control) and/or with elements 20 and 2 reinforced 
(Specific Load Resistance).
The resulting Structural Risk of this modified structure is P(C=1)=9.11·10-6/yr.
This value is still higher than the target value P(C=1)acc=10-7/yr, but the choice of this element is 
more effective in reducing the Risk than any other element (i.e., by applying the Event Control and/
or the Specific Load Resistance strategies to any other element, the reduction of the Structural Risk 
would be smaller than with element 20).
The same information would be useful with the Alternate Load Path strategy, to figure out which 
elements need to be improved in order to bridge over a critical area of the structure. In the present 
example, if the values of the P(LDik) terms relative to element 20 cannot be reduced, structural 
measures can be applied to decrease the corresponding Structural Vulnerability terms P(C=1|LDik).
It was observed (section 6.2.2.1, figure 6.23) that for lower values of the Central Safety Factor the 
estimates of the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) obtained with standard and simplified 
FORM procedures are in the same order of magnitude, while for higher values of the CSF the 
difference becomes one or two orders of magnitude. This could lead to a considerable difference in 
the estimates of the Structural Risk P(C=1) with the different FORM procedures.
To take into account this possibility, the Structural Risk P(C=1) was calculated again, this time with 
the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) divided by 100 in the cases where the Central Safety 
Factor is higher than the value 2.0 (and leaving the terms unvaried in the other cases). The resulting 
estimate of the Structural Risk is virtually equal to the first one; the difference between the two 
estimates results 7.30·10-14/yr, i.e nine orders of magnitude smaller than the value of the Structural 
Risk itself P(C=1)=3.95·10-5/yr.
The very small difference is explained by noticing that higher values of the Central Safety Factor 
correspond to lower orders of magnitude of the probability of failure Pf; as a consequence, the more 
approximated terms of the summation (5.4) are much smaller than the other terms.
Completing the automatic analysis required a total of 337 model runs (the effective number of 
model runs is higher than the number of analyzed cases; this is because, as explained in section 6.2, 
in the static analyses a tentative maximum load is applied and, if Collapse condition is not reached, 
the computation is repeated with the maximum load doubled).
The analysis had to be restarted three times because Local Damage cases 64, 199 and 202 did not 
converge; for this cases a prudential value P(C|LDik)=1 was adopted.
The total computation time resulted 3 hours and 42 minutes. On average, each model run required 
40 seconds of computation time and each scenario required about 1 minute.
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Section 5.3.1.2 describes a method to determine how many Local Damage scenarios need to be 
calculated to assess if a structure is acceptable or not. In the present example, calculating the LD1 
scenarios alone would have been enough to ascertain that the structure is not acceptable, because 
their contribution to the Structural Risk sums up to
 P C=1min=∑
0
1
i
P C=1∣LDiP LDi=1.95 ·10
−5
Calculating in automatic the LD0 scenario and the 30 LD1 scenarios would have required about 30 
minutes.
6.3.2 Nine-story structure
A tentative testing of the methodology to calculate the Structural Risk was performed on the nine-
story structure described in section 6.2.3.
The automatic algorithm was set to calculate the mean resistance of the structure in 135 scenarios, 
corresponding to all the LD1 scenarios in which one column is removed. The computation stopped 
at the 63rd scenario.
In the partial test a total of 122 model runs were performed, with a computation time of 27 hours 
and 39 minutes. On average each model run required 13.5 minutes of computation time and each 
scenario required about 26 minutes.
Based on this data, it can be estimated that:
– completing the calculation for the 135 LD1 scenarios in which one column is removed would 
require about 2.5 days;
– for all the 342 LD1 scenarios, the computation time would be about 6 days;
– for the 921 LD1 and LD2 scenarios in which columns are removed, the computation time would 
be about 16.5 days;
– for all the 1164 required LD1 and LD2 scenarios, the computation would require about 21 days.
6.3.3 Structural Risk calculation - Summary
The previous sections presented an example in which the first proposed methodology to calculate 
the Structural Risk (section 5.2.2) is tested on the three-story structure described in section 6.2.2, as 
well as an incomplete test on the nine-story structure described in section 6.2.3. The tests were 
aimed at assessing the feasibility and computational effort of the methodology, rather than studying 
the structure itself.
In section 6.3.1 the methodology is implemented on the three-story structure.
A total of 416 scenarios were considered, of Local Damage level ranging from 0 to 5, to which a 
semi-fictitious probabilistic characterization was given. The Structural Vulnerability terms 
P(C|LDik) were automatically calculated using the simplified FORM procedure and static non linear 
analysis. These parameters were used to estimate the Structural Risk of the structure by means of 
equation (5.4).
By comparing the single terms of the summation (5.4) it was highlighted the areas of the structure 
were the mitigation strategies (described in chapter 2) are most effective in order to reduce the 
Structural Risk.
It was observed that for high values of the Central Safety Factor the estimates of the Structural 
Vulnerability obtained with standard and simplified FORM procedures are in different orders of 
magnitude, but these terms give minimal contribution to the total Structural Risk because they 
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correspond to the smaller terms of the summation.
The time required to perform the complete computation was in the order of hours.
A tentative testing of the methodology on the nine story structure is described in section 6.3.2.
A total of 135 scenarios were considered, corresponding to all the Local Damage level 1 scenarios 
in which one column is removed. The computation stopped at the 63rd scenario.
Based on the performed calculations, it was estimated that the time required to perform the 
complete computation would be in the order of days for the considered LD1 scenarios, and in the 
order of weeks if also the LD2 scenarios were considered.
6.4 Summary
This chapter presents some test applications of the first proposed methodology.
The used structural models are described in section 6.1
Examples in which the Structural Vulnerability is calculated on three different structures are 
presented in section 6.2.
Two examples of Structural Risk calculation are presented in section 6.3.
The following chapter summarizes the entire work and presents its conclusions.
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Chapter 7 - Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, section 7.1 summarizes the entire work and section 7.2 presents its conclusions.
7.1 Summary
The present work is about Progressive Collapse of structures. It can be conceptually divided in two 
parts.
The first part, which comprises chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, provides information to understand the 
problem this work is about and the proposed approach to cope with it.
The second part, composed of chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, presents the proposed approach, some test 
applications of it and some ideas for further developments.
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of Progressive Collapse, lists the characteristics that are desirable 
in a structure in order to mitigate the phenomenon, and lists the causes of Collapses, subdivided in 
categories. Furthermore, it describes and analyzes some of the most important case studies of 
Progressive Collapse, as well as some cases in which an initial Damage did not evolve in a 
Collapse.
It is highlighted that the generally accepted definitions of Progressive Collapse include some 
ambiguities, and that the present work intends to overcome this problem by incorporating 
Progressive Collapse in a probabilistic Risk framework.
Chapter 2 lists and explains the strategies that have been devised for Progressive Collapse 
mitigation and lists some of the most significant regulations about this subject, explaining how they 
evolved.
It is highlighted that the level of attention given to Progressive Collapse has changed through the 
years, as it was boosted after the occurrence of the most significant cases but decreased in the 
following years.
Furthermore, it is pointed out that many research results that are still currently referenced are 
decades old and might not be fully valid. Likewise, some building codes requirements are still in 
force with little or no modifications, and their validity has been questioned.
Chapter 3 lists and analyzes several ideas that have been proposed for parameters to quantify the 
propensity to Progressive Collapse of structures, which should be useful to decide if mitigation 
methods need to be applied, and elaborates on the reasons why no building code has adopted any of 
these methodologies yet.
The chapter also elaborates on the terms “robust” and “Robustness”, which are widely used in the 
literature about Progressive Collapse but might lead to ambiguities because they can have different 
definitions and meanings.
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of Risk. It describes the probabilistic Risk management 
framework developed by the University of Braunschweig, whose concepts are used in this work, 
and points out some aspects of the adopted nomenclature.
Several facts that make it difficult to incorporate Progressive Collapse in a Risk framework are 
described and analyzed.
Chapter 5 presents two methodologies to quantify Progressive Collapse propensity of frame 
structures. The motivations to the development of these methodologies and the targets they aim to 
are described. The basic ideas of the methodologies are first presented, and then the details of how 
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the methodologies can actually be implemented are described.
Chapter 6 presents some test applications of the first proposed methodology.
First the used structural models are described. Then examples in which the Structural Vulnerability 
is calculated on three different structures are presented, and then two examples of Structural Risk 
calculation are presented.
It is pointed out that the main target of the performed analyses is not the testing of the structures, 
but the testing of the algorithms used for the analyses, to study the the feasibility of the proposed 
approaches, to find out their problems, and to debug the implemented algorithms.
Chapter 7 summarizes the entire work and presents its conclusions.
Chapter 8 lists several aspects that need to be further considered to improve the proposed 
methodologies and elaborates on some of them. Other ideas that might be developed are also 
described.
7.2 Conclusions
The target of the present work is expressed in section 5.1 and here reported again:
attempting to understand if, and up to which extent, it is possible to devise a reliable and practical  
method to quantify the propensity to Progressive Collapse of a given structure, as well as to 
quantify an acceptable level of this propensity.
Every element in this statement has a precise reason to be. Let's analyze the statement:
– the core concept is that two things are needed: the quantification of the propensity to 
Progressive Collapse and the quantification of an acceptable level of this propensity.
– The target of the present work is attempting to understand if it is possible to devise a 
methodology to obtain these two things.
– Two constraints are added: the methodology should be reliable and practical. In other words, it 
should provide information that really represents the studied system, and it should be usable in 
practice. These constraints derive from the consideration that some quantification 
methodologies found in literature don't have these qualities, which makes them virtually 
pointless or unusable.
– The target of the work can be expressed with the question “is it possible to devise such 
methodology?”. The answer to this question cannot simply be a “yes” or a “no”, because every 
methodology can provide different levels of information quality, different levels of reliability, 
and different levels of practicability. This is why the words “and up to which extent” are 
included in the statement. Studying “up to which extent” the target can be reached implies 
understanding the limitations and the problems of the chosen approach, which consequently will 
influence the way the methodology is constructed.
Now the obvious question arises: was the proposed target achieved?
Not yet. The first steps towards the achievement of the target were performed. The developed 
methodologies are to be considered as prototypes that need further improvement to actually be 
usable.
Another question that might arise is about the effective validity of the proposed approach. Is it 
really valid? 
The proposed approach consists in incorporating Progressive Collapse in a probabilistic Risk 
framework; this type of approach proved to be effective in reducing Losses with other types of 
129
Hazards. No particular evidence was found to prove that the target of the present work is impossible 
to reach through this approach.
There are two aspects that might lower the validity of the approach.
The first is the availability of data to formulate a probabilistic characterization of the Local Damage 
scenarios. If this characterization is not obtainable, then a conventional (or partially conventional) 
one could be used, at the cost of a reduction of how well the results represent reality. 
The second aspect is that deciding an acceptable level of the Structural Risk depends on the 
acceptable Total Risk, i.e. on the expected Losses. The relation between the two types of Risk 
generally depends on the specific context and is not studied in the present work. The quantification 
of an acceptable level of Risk is important because without it the methodology cannot be a decision 
tool: the question “is this structure sufficiently safe?” cannot be answered if there is not an absolute 
reference to compare the calculated parameters to.
One more question: if it will be proved that the methodology is effective, will it be necessary to 
apply it to every structure?
The answer is: no. First of all, it is reasonable that estimating the propensity to Progressive Collapse 
would be useful only for those structures whose Collapse can produce consistent Losses, such as 
strategic and/or very big buildings.
Secondly, if the ultimate target of a Progressive Collapse study is reducing the Risks at an 
acceptable level, then the best imaginable scenario is to prove that the indirect method is effective 
to achieve that target. In other words, the best scenario is that, by prescribing some structural 
measures, there is certainty that the structure is sufficiently safe, without the need to perform any 
calculation. This might be possible at least for structures of a given regularity, size and importance, 
similarly to what is commonly done in seismic designing.
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Chapter 8 - Further aspects to consider
This chapter presents several aspects that need to be further considered in order to improve the 
proposed methodologies, as well as other ideas that might be developed.
8.1 Improvements and testing needs
As stated, the proposed methodologies are to be considered as a first step towards the achievement 
of the proposed target. This section contains a list of aspects that need to be further studied; the 
following sub-sections elaborate more in detail some of these aspects
Dynamic effects. If occurrence of a Local Damage is sudden, then the dynamic effects in the 
structural behavior should be non negligible. Section 8.1.1 discusses on how they can be taken into 
account.
Discretization. In the implemented models, all beams are modeled with 10 beam type elements and 
all columns are modeled with 5 beam type elements, in order to capture the effects of geometrical 
nonlinearities. This discretization was adopted because it is common practice at the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, where the original models were developed. Depending on 
the type of finite elements used, a denser discretization might result in more accuracy of the results, 
while a coarser discretization should make the models smaller and faster. Further testing is needed 
to find out an optimal discretization level (see also section 8.1.2).
The “immaculate removal” approach. In the performed tests, Damage was always modeled by 
removing structural elements from the structure and retaining integrity of the adjacent nodes, 
following the so called “immaculate removal” approach (section 2.2.2.3, figure 2.7). This approach 
was adopted for its simplicity, but might not represent real events correctly. Section 8.1.3 further 
discusses this issue.
Progression of the Damage. In this work two methodologies to reach the proposed target are 
presented (sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, respectively). The difference between the two is the type of 
information that is obtained: in the first one the incipit of Collapse is considered, in the second one 
the final extension of the Collapse.
Only the first methodology was actually implemented and tested. The second was not, for two main 
reasons. The first one is that a model that simulates the progression of the Collapse was not 
available. The second is that the complexity and the number of unknowns are much bigger than in 
the first methodology; it was preferred to study the first one to get experience and knowledge from 
it. Section 8.1.4 deals with the modeling of Damage progression.
Interaction with non structural elements, such as wall panels and floor slabs, can have a 
considerable influence in the behavior of a structure (see for example figure 2.2). Research is 
needed to assess how different the results can be by neglecting this interaction, and to find out 
simplified methods to include it in the structural models. One idea to follow could be to include 
struts in the structural models to simulate the effect of the panels, as it is already done in seismic 
engineering (figure 8.1).
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Instability. Structural Damage can spread as a consequence of a loss of stability, as in the case of 
Building 7 of the World Trade Center (section 1.4.4.2; figure 1.23). The algorithms implemented for 
the presented tests consider the detachment of a structural element as Collapse condition, but do not 
take into account column buckling.
The characterization of the random variables must be further studied. In the presented examples, 
the characteristic values of the loads and of the material are taken from the original design, while 
their probabilistic characterization (type of distribution and relationship between the relative 
parameters), as well as the characterization of the model uncertainty term ξ, are taken from 
literature. There is no guarantee that these are the best choices to represent the analyzed structure.
Number of random variables to consider. In the performed tests, four or five random variables were 
considered. In order to obtain reliable enough results, the number of variables that really need to be 
considered could be much higher.
In particular, a single random variable has been assumed for the live load L and one for the dead 
load D, which have been considered uniformly distributed on all the floors of the analyzed 
structure; it seems reasonable that at least a different variable of each type is needed for each floor. 
Val's methods [50] can be implemented to take into account different uniformly distributed loads on 
each floor, but they cannot take into account different load patterns, like for example “chessboard” 
type loads.
Also, in the performed tests only one random variable that characterizes the materials is used (the 
yield stress of steel fy). Further research is needed to find out if other properties need to be 
considered and how the variation of the material properties in different part of the structure can 
affect the results.
Other reliability methods. The implemented methodology uses the First Order Reliability Method, 
which is more approximated but faster than other methods. Other less approximated methods could 
be incorporated in the methodology.
More tests are needed in order to further validate the procedures, as well as to assess the influence 
on the results of details such as the adopted load step sizes, the stop criteria parameters, the types of 
finite elements, and so on.
More experimental results are needed in oder to simulate correctly the behavior of the structural 
elements.
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Figure 8.1 : Representation of how the effect of a wall panel in a frame (left) can be modeled with a 
strut element (right).
Fire can have an important role in Progressive Collapses. For example, all the three World Trade 
center Collapses (section 1.4.4) would not have happened in absence of fire. Taking into account 
fire would require the introduction of the variable time in the problem, i.e. analyzing how the 
characteristics of the structures vary in time.
Other construction technologies. The presented methodologies are restricted to frame structures and 
were tested on steel frame models. They need to be improved in order to be applicable, for example, 
to masonry structures.
8.1.1 Dynamic effects
In the presented examples, the Structural Vulnerability terms P(C|LDik) are calculated using static 
nonlinear analysis. In reality the occurrence of a Local Damage is likely to be sudden; as a 
consequence, the dynamic effects should be non negligible and the actual value of the P(C|LDik) 
terms should be higher than the ones calculated. This section briefly elaborates on how they can be 
considered.
One way to take dynamic effects into account is to apply amplification coefficients in static 
analyses. This approach is commonly used in Alternate 
Load Path verifications. Typically, the static analysis is 
performed with the loads in the damaged area multiplied 
by a coefficient. This coefficient is often taken equal to 2, 
because in a vertical single-degree of freedom (SDOF) 
linear elastic oscillator in free vibration the maximum 
reaction is twice as the static reaction (figure 8.2).
Examples of this are the formulas (2.7) and (2.9), which 
are from the regulations DoD 2005 [12] and GSA 2003 
[15], respectively.
The value 2 might be excessively approximated. Studies 
have recently being carried out to find out more realistic 
values (McKay et al. [30]), which have been incorporated 
in the 2009 version of the DoD regulations [13] (formula 
(2.8)).
The issue can also be addressed by simply performing a dynamic nonlinear (“time history”) 
analysis, instead of static. The analysis consists in modeling the loaded undamaged structure, then 
suddenly remove the “failed” elements, and then check if the Collapse condition is reached in the 
following moments. 
Compared to static analysis, implementing the presented Structural Vulnerability calculation 
procedures with dynamic analysis implies one big practical difference: the value of the resistance R 
(and consequently of the performance function g) for a given set of random values cannot be 
calculated with a single model run. Instead, only the sign of g can be calculated (negative if 
Collapse condition is reached, positive if it is not).
As a consequence, in the standard FORM procedure the Newton method cannot be used to reach the 
critical condition G(r,φ)=0 by moving along the r polar coordinate (see section 5.3.1.1.3 and figure 
5.5), and a slower method like bisection must be used instead.
For the same reason, applying dynamic analysis to the simplified FORM procedure would require 
more runs of the model in order to estimate the mean value of the resistance μR, while static 
analysis only requires one for each Local Damage scenario.
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Figure 8.2 : Schematic representation of a 
vertical linear elastic SDOF oscillator.  
The maximum vertical displacement is  
twice as the static displacement. As a 
consequence, the maximum reaction is  
twice as the static reaction.
8.1.2 Accuracy
Predicting the behavior of a structure requires modeling it, and models can be implemented using 
different methods and different levels of detail. 
The more a model is detailed, the more accurate the results are likely to be. The drawback of very 
detailed models is the big effort required to implement and run them, which can make them 
virtually impossible to use (some models used in the context of Progressive Collapse literally 
required weeks or months of computation time for just a single run; see for example those described 
in sections 8.1.4.3 and 1.4.4.2).
Conversely, simpler models require less effort, but they might neglect important details and thus 
provide inaccurate results.
To achieve the proposed targets by means of the presented procedures we need models that are 
accurate enough, but do not require excessive computational effort. What “accurate enough” means 
is subjective; the following are some considerations about this.
Accuracy is commonly defined as the degree of closeness of a measured or calculated quantity to its 
actual (true) value. Let's say that it is possible to witness a physical phenomenon and measure the 
actual value of an interesting parameter IPA. The “degree of closeness” of the calculated parameter 
IPC can then be expressed with the relative error
EAC=|(IPC-IPA)/IPA| (8.1)
Saying that a model is “accurate enough” means that the relative error is always within an 
acceptability range, for all possible scenarios that need to be considered. The subjectiveness 
consists in deciding how wide this acceptability range should be.
Also, two different models of the same physical phenomenon can be compared by calculating the 
relative difference:
E12=|(IPC2-IPC1)/IPC1| (8.2)
If model 1 is more detailed than model 2, then we can assume that the former will produce more 
accurate (closer to reality) results then the latter. Then the relative error of model 2 is1
EA2=|(IPC2-IPA)/IPA|=|(1±E12)·(1±EA1)-1| (8.3)
In the light of these considerations it is possible to sketch a procedure to asses if the accuracy of a 
model is acceptable.
The first thing to do is to choose one parameter (or more parameters) of the physical phenomenon 
that is (are) interesting for the proposed goal.
In the present work, the modeling is required to estimate the Structural Vulnerability terms
P(C|LDik) (first proposed procedure; section 5.2.2) and P(FD=f|LDik) (second procedure; section 
5.2.3). A choice of the interesting parameter to consider for the first procedure can be the resistance 
R (i.e. the load that, applied to the structure, causes spread of the Damage); for the second 
procedure, it can be the final extension of the Damage FD.
Then an acceptability range AR (i.e. the maximum acceptable value of the relative error EAC) must 
be chosen. For example, it can be AR=0.10=10%.
If it is possible to witness the physical phenomenon and obtain a measure IPA of the interesting 
1 The signs are: (1+EA1) if IPC1>IPA; (1-EA1) if IPC1<IPA; (1+E12) if IPC2>IPC1; (1-E12) if IPC2<IPC1.
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parameter, then from (8.1) follows that a model can be deemed accurate enough if
EAC≤AR (8.4)
for all possible scenarios.
In general it is not possible to witness the physical phenomenon, or it is possible just for a few 
scenarios. In these cases the accuracy check can be performed by comparing the model with a very 
detailed one. If model 1 is so detailed that the relative error EA1 can be considered negligible 
compared to the relative error E12, then eq. (8.3) becomes
EA2≈E12 (8.5)
and the model can be deemed accurate if
E12≤AR (8.6)
for all possible scenarios.
In order to develop models that are accurate enough, but do not require excessive computational 
effort, one way (probably the only way) to follow is to start from experimental data and very 
detailed models and simplify as much as possible, keeping track of the errors introduced in every 
simplification step.
In the present context, the adjective “detailed” refers to the capability of the used elements to 
represent the analyzed phenomena, to the level of discretization of the modeled system and to the 
number of considered parameters and properties. For example, a single structural beam can be 
modeled with many 3D elements, or with several 1D elements, or with just one 1D element; with 
some softwares these different levels of discretization can lead to noticeably different results (as in 
the example of figure 8.3).
As for the choice of the acceptability range AR, it does not necessary need to be “very small”. The 
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Figure 8.3 : The same beam, with fixed ends and subjected to the same uniform load, modeled with the  
software SAP2000 using one (first row), two (second row) and twelve (third row) 1D elements. The material  
model is linear elastic and the analysis is set to include geometrical nonlinearities. (Left) The difference in 
the calculated maximum deflection between the first and the third case is 34% and between the second and 
third case is 6% (in the first case the graphical interface is not able to draw the deformed shape). (Right) The 
difference in the maximum (positive) bending moment is respectively 54% and 1%; the difference in the 
minimum (negative) bending moment is respectively 28% and 3%. It is worth to highlight that the DoD 2005 
regulation [12], in its section C-5 presents an example of Alternate Path analysis using this software, stating 
that “if large displacements are used, it is very important that every member that forms a plastic hinge is 
subdivided into at least 20 smaller members. This is the only way SAP can determine the catenary effects”.
important is to be aware of the level of approximation of the calculated results (or, in other words, 
of the maximum “distance” that can be between the calculated value of the interesting parameter 
and its actual value).
It must also be noted that it does not matter if other, “non interesting” parameters of the physical 
phenomenon are not represented accurately by the model (as long as we are aware of this, of 
course).
A similar “pragmatic” type of approach is widely used, for example, in seismic engineering, where 
linear analyses can be used to assess if a structure is safe enough. When using this type of analyses, 
the designer must always be aware that the used models do not replicate the actual phenomenon; the 
maximum displacements calculated directly from the models, for example, are usually 
underestimated.
Since in the presented methodologies the ultimate target is the calculation of the Structural Risk 
P(C=1) and P(FD=f)·f, the choice of the acceptability range AR should depend on the acceptable 
approximation of these quantities.
For example, in the first methodology the model is used to calculate the critical load IPC of a given 
scenario, which in turn is used to calculate the Structural Vulnerability P(C=1|LDik)C.
From (8.1) follows that the actual value of the critical load is IPA=IPC/(EAC+1).
As a consequence:
– the actual value of the Structural Vulnerability P(C=1|LDik)A is in a neighborhood of the 
calculated value P(C=1|LDik)C,
– and the actual value P(C=1)A is in a neighborhood of the calculated value P(C=1)C.
The maximum acceptable radius of this last neighborhood should be the criterion to choose the 
acceptability range AR of the interesting parameter.
In the literature about Progressive Collapse (scientific papers and building regulations) there are 
models with every level of detail. The Writer is currently not aware of any study about the influence 
of detail level on results.
8.1.3 About the quantification of the Damage Level
In the presented methodologies the Damage levels are always expressed as “the number of “failed” 
structural elements, i.e. as the number of elements that are not able to fulfill any of their functions 
anymore”. Furthermore, in the first procedure for Structural Vulnerability calculation it is assumed 
that Collapse condition occurs if at least one connection in the structure is lost, resulting in physical 
separation (section 5.3.1.1). These assumptions deserve some observations.
In the presented examples the Local Damage scenarios are modeled by removing some structural 
elements while retaining the integrity of the adjacent nodes. This approach, commonly referred as 
“immaculate removal”, is adopted mainly for its simplicity (section B-4.1 of DoD 2005 [12], here 
reported in section 2.2.2.3; see also figure 2.7).
This assumption might not represent real events correctly. It corresponds to case (a) of figure 8.4. 
Cases such as (b), (c) and (d) can also happen; they would generally result in lower critical loads 
and, ultimately, in higher values of the calculated Structural Risk.
Further research is needed to assess the influence of the immaculate removal assumption in the Risk 
analysis. An extensive survey of the type of Damage caused by different Hazards might highlight if 
some types of nodal Damage are more frequent. It is likely that structural details have a strong 
influence on this; for example, if the structure is reinforced concrete with little confinement and 
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insufficient continuity of the longitudinal bars, then case (d) is much more likely to happen then the 
other ones.
Another issue is how you quantify the final extension of the Damage. In the second proposed 
procedure, it is assumed assumed that “the final extension of the Damage is expressed as the 
number of failed structural elements” (section 5.2.3).
It must be highlighted that, according to the adopted definition of “failed” element, the simple 
detachment of a connection does not necessarily imply that the adjacent elements are failed. For 
example, in case (a) of figure 8.5 the element would not be considered failed if the remaining 
connection is able to bear the loads.
Furthermore, the number of failed elements is not the best parameter for the estimation of Losses; 
expressing the extension of the Damage as the failed area would be better. In fact, if we compare a 
structure with many small structural elements and one with few big elements, the same number of 
failed elements will correspond to a different failed area and, ultimately, to different Losses and a 
different Total Risk.
Moreover, two elements can have different importance, even if they have similar dimensions; e.g. 
the examples of figure 8.6 depict the failure of beam elements of similar length, but the example on 
the right does not imply Collapse of floor area.
8.1.4 About the modeling of Damage progression
Applying the procedure described in section 5.2.3 requires modeling the progression of the 
Collapse. Some building regulations (e.g. DoD 2005 [12] and GSA 2003 [15]) include procedures 
for Alternate Load Path verification, in which progression of the Damage is considered. The 
effective reliability of these procedures is unknown, since they are deterministic and the modeling 
of Damage progression is very simplified. (It must also be noticed that the 2009 version of the DoD 
regulation [13] does not admit Damage progression anymore).
Nowadays the Finite Elements Method (FEM) is probably the most widely used numerical 
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Figure 8.4 : Four different ways to model the removal of an element from a structure.
Figure 8.5 : Three possible consequence of  
the detachment of a beam connection.
Figure 8.6 : Two examples of failed beams that lead to  
different consequences.
technique for structure modeling. It has been studied for decades, and most current FEM softwares 
can handle advanced features such as material and geometrical nonlinearities and structural 
instability. Some FEM codes allow to remove elements from the model, even automatically during a 
computation; this feature is sometimes used to simulate the “failure” of structural elements in 
Progressive Collapse analyses (e.g. in [31]).
The three following sub-sections briefly describe some other approaches and methods that might be 
usefully applied to the considered problems.
8.1.4.1 Applied Elements Method (AEM)
The Applied Elements Method (AEM) has been invented by H. Tagel-Din in 1995 and it is 
described in many of his works (e.g. in [47]).
With the AEM, a structure is modeled as an assembly of small 3D elements, connected by springs 
located at contact points distributed around the element edges. Stresses and deformations are 
properties of the springs, rather than of the elements.
The Authors claim that the Applied Elements Method has more capabilities than the Finite Elements 
Method, which are especially useful in the field of Progressive Collapse (figure 8.7, right). In 
particular, it is said to be capable of modeling separation (even partial) and collision of the 
elements.
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Figure 8.8 : The Alfred P. Murrah federal building of Oklahoma City, USA. (Left) Screenshot of a AEM 
model. (Right) The building after its Progressive Collapse. (Sources: www.appliedelementmethod.com; 
Oklahoma Publishing Company).
Figure 8.7 : (Left) Schematic representation of Applied Elements connectivity. (Right) Comparison of  
Applied Elements Method and Finite Elements Method capabilities, according to the advertising of an 
AEM software company. (Source: www.appliedelementmethod.com).
Several studies have already been carried out with the AEM. For example in [47] it is used to model 
the A. Murrah building Collapse (section 1.4.3). A rough idea of the required computation times of 
the method is given by the following data: using 10,000 3D elements and a time step of 0.0001 
seconds, the analysis took around 4 days on a 3.2 GHz Pentium IV to reproduce about 6 seconds of 
Collapse.
8.1.4.2 Fuzzy logic and neural networks
Möller et al. [32] present a method to estimate the probability that a Collapse happens according to 
a given modality. The method uses the general uncertainty model fuzzy randomness and the 
structural response is approximated with a neural network following the response surface 
methodology.
An example is presented in [32]. A fictitious, three-story reinforced concrete building is modeled 
with the Finite Elements software LS-DYNA, using 2330 3D elements. Damage is modeled by 
removing from the computation the elements that reach a specific plastic strain; the Authors admit 
that ”...this element ‘erosion’ algorithm does not conserve mass, introduces element size dependent 
results and for compressed parts, does not allow to describe correct geometry. Nevertheless, for a 
large part of the collapse events mainly in the first important phases the negative effects of this  
erosion model are rather small”. Contact between elements is considered.
Each run of the FE model required approximately 20 min of CPU-time on one processor of an 
Itanium2 cluster; since a dataset of 500 computational results was used to train the neural network, 
the theoretical2 total computation time was approximately 7 days.
The result of the computation is a “fuzzy probability”, i.e. an interval inside the range between 0 
and 1. In the presented example the probability that the Collapse happens according to the chosen 
modality “...varies between 0.781 and 0.992”.
8.1.4.3 Hydrocodes
Luccioni et al. [26] use a hydrocode to reproduce the actual Collapse of a building that suffered a 
terroristic bombing (figure 8.10). A hydrocode is “...a computational tool for modeling the behavior 
of continuous media. In its purest sense, a hydrocode is a computer code for modeling fluid flow at  
all speeds. It can, however, be adapted to treat material strength and a range of rheological models  
2 Itanium2 are multi-core CPUs.
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Figure 8.9 : Study by Möller et al. (Left) Finite Element representation of the collapsing structure.  
(Right) Approximation of the structural response with neural networks. (Source: [32]).
for material behaviour” [10].
In [26] columns, beams and slabs are modeled with 3D solid elements; walls are modeled with shell 
elements. The air in the structure is modeled, too. The model simulated the detonation and its direct 
Damage, as well as the subsequent Collapse. Running the model required approximately 310 hours 
(almost 13 days) on a machine with a Pentium IV Processor and 500 Mhz RIMM Memory. The 
paper does not mention the total number of elements used, the total time interval modeled and the 
time step of the computation.
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Figure 8.10 : The 1994 bombing of  
the AMIA building in Buenos Aires,  
Argentina. (Top) Screenshots of the 
hydrocode model of the Collapse by 
Luccioni et al. (Right) Comparison 
between the actual and the modeled 
final Damage. (Source: [27]).
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